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8 December 1980

USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 80

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SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS: STRUGGLE AGAINST MAOISM

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 80 signed to press
22 Jul 80 pp 3-10

[Article by Dotsent and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Col I. Klimov, and Dotsent and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Capt 1st Rank L. Roshchin: "The CPSU on the Necessity of a Principled and Uncompromising Struggle Against Maoism." Passages in italics originally printed in bold face.]

[Text] The foreign policy course which is being carried out by the present Beijing leadership represents a great danger for all peace-loving peoples. In order to attain their hegemonistic goals, the present Chinese leaders have resorted to an outright alignment with the most extreme world reaction, from the militarists and enemies of detente in the nations of the West to the racists in South Africa and the fascist Chilean dictatorship of Pinochet. The Maoists in every possible way are endeavoring to prevent detente and not to allow disarmament, and by all means are spreading hostility between states, in excelling particularly in anti-Sovietism and in provoking a third world war in the hope of benefiting from it.

At the 25th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "At present it is not enough to say that Maoist ideology and policy are incompatible with Marxist-Leninist teachings. They are directly hostile to it.... In the future we will conduct a struggle against Maoism, a principled struggle, an uncompromising struggle."¹ The success of this struggle depends largely upon to what degree the evolutionary trends in Maoism are considered as well as those changes which are presently occurring in China.

After the death of Mao Zedong, in Beijing his closest collaborators and the supporters of the Cultural Revolution were arrested or removed from their positions, and rehabilitation was extended to many members of the Politburo which had been elected at the Eighth CCP Congress in 1956, including the former chairman of the PRC and deputy chairman of the CCP Central Committee, Liu Shaoqi. On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, he had been accused of carrying out a "counterrevolutionary revisionistic line."² The Chinese press has recognized that during the period of the Cultural Revolution many mistakes had been made.

A certain reassessment is being made of the role of Mao's personality in the history of China. Chinese propaganda is now asserting that Mao was not the wisest of the wise, all-seeing or omniscient, and that Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four" had made him into a "god." In actuality, they say, he was as mortal as others, with

the mistakes and shortcomings inherent to man.³ The most odious and compromised provisions and views of the "Great Helmsman" have been discarded or reinterpreted, including his concept of the class struggle, the theory of continuing the revolution under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the policy of commanding strength, and so forth. The basic efforts of Mao's successors have been aimed not at furthering the class struggle and organizing ideological campaigns, but rather at solving economic problems and carrying out modernization. While previously in Beijing they said that "the class struggle solves everything," now they are stating that "the four modernizations solve everything."⁴ While previously Beijing asserted that "the ideas of Mao Zedong are a spiritual atomic bomb" and that "economic incentives in the national economy are revisionistic rubbish," at present they are now urging "to act in strict accord with economic laws" and "to combine ideological and political work with measures of economic action."⁵

In observing these and other changes, certain bourgeois authors have drawn the conclusion that the process of demaoization is occurring in China. Thus, the prominent West German political scientist K. Mehnert in his book "The Successors of Mao Are Doing Everything Differently" has written that "the virtually complete abandonment of Mao's heritage" is supposedly the basic factor in the domestic policy of the new Chinese leadership.⁶

Such views of the bourgeois ideologists are unfounded. In carefully criticizing the deification of Mao and in reinterpreting certain of his theories and ideas, none of the present Beijing leaders has abandoned Maoism as a doctrine and as a standard. In the slogans dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the PRC and published in September 1967, it was again stressed that Mao Zedong ideas are the leading ideology of the country.

A certain adjustment of the ideas of Mao Zedong has been carried out, in the first place, for the purpose of adapting them to solving the practical tasks of today, and, secondly, in order to give them a more attractive appearance.

"In restoring the appearance of the ideas of Mao Zedong," the Beijing leaders are endeavoring to represent them as an integrated scientific system, the result of the collective wisdom of the CCP, and as the creative development of Marxism-Leninism.

V. I. Lenin has taught that "philosophies must be judged not from the signboards which they hang on themselves...but rather from how they in fact solve basic theoretical questions, with whom they side, and what they teach...."⁸

What is Maoism, and what are the basic directions of its evolution at the present stage? *In socioclass terms it is a petty bourgeois nationalistic ideology and policy which is hostile to the working class and to Marxism-Leninism.* Maoism is a unique variety of anticommunism. It has sided with the most reactionary militant circles of imperialism.

Even in 1964, at a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade M. A. Suslov said: "How could it turn out otherwise that, in following their incorrect, anti-Leninist path, the Chinese leaders have arrived at an actual siding with the reactionary, militaristic elements of imperialism."⁹ These words have been affirmed. At present the Chinese leadership has actually become an ally of imperialism and reaction in the struggle against world socialism, the international communists, workers and

national liberation movements. At present, as was pointed out in a letter of the Central Committee of the American Communist Party to the CCP Central Committee, Maoism at its basis is "a policy of betraying the interests of the working class and the ideals of socialism as dictated by the desire to pick up the crumbs falling off the table of imperialism...an adaptation to the interests of imperialism generally and to the interests of the leading country of imperialism, the United States, in particular. It is opportunism the existence of which is only possible because there are other socialist countries which are carrying out a firm policy of fighting against imperialism."¹⁰ In acting against the countries of the socialist commonwealth, the Maoists are aggravating the situation in the world and more and more are siding with the militaristic circles of the United States. The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade K. V. Rusakov, in speaking at a ceremony devoted to the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, said: "To a large measure the exacerbation of the international situation is due to the hegemonistic and militaristic course of the Chinese leadership. Its rabid hostility to the USSR and the socialist commonwealth is perceived as a major trump card in the military-political game of Washington."¹¹ Diplomatic relations were established between the PRC and the United States on 1 January 1979. After reciprocal visits by the leaders of both states, and among these one should particularly point out the visit of the U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown to the PRC in January 1980, America and China have set out on a path of drawing closer together. In Beijing a number of documents have been signed reinforcing their military and political ties. A further step along this path and for coordinating aggressive plans was the trip of a Chinese military delegation headed by the member of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee and Deputy Premier, the Chief of the Secretariat of the Military Council of the CCP Central Committee, Geng Biao, to the United States at the end of May 1980. In endeavoring to carry out their hegemonistic plans, Mao's successors are sacrificing the interests of the Chinese people and they fully support the militaristic, aggressive actions of the imperialists in various regions of the world, particularly in Southeast Asia.

The Maoists have concluded a treaty with Japan which is aimed against the USSR, Vietnam and the other socialist countries. Beijing's ties are becoming ever stronger with the aggressive and reactionary NATO forces. China is called the 16th member of NATO. During his trip to the Western European countries in the summer of 1979, Hua Guofeng urged the reactionary, militaristic circles to approve at the December NATO Session a decision to increase nuclear potential in Western Europe. Such "partnership of imperialism and Beijing hegemonism," states the decree of the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "represents a new dangerous phenomenon in world policy, dangerous for all mankind, including for the American and Chinese peoples."¹²

The Chinese leaders are establishing ever closer economic and political ties with the reactionary regimes and domestic reaction of the developing countries. Along with the U.S. imperialism and Pakistan, they are waging an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan. The U.S. ruling circles as well as China, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated at the July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, have stopped short of nothing, including armed aggression, in order to prevent the Afghans from building a new life.^{12a} They have suggested to the association of Southeast Asian States (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) to create a military bloc directed against Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. In Africa and Latin America, the Maoists support all the antidemocratic, reactionary forces.

Thus, Maoism stands on the other side of the barricades. The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 110th Birthday of V. I. Lenin" states that the Chinese leadership, in carrying out a great-power, hegemonistic policy which is hostile to the cause of peace and socialism, acts as a direct supporter of imperialism.¹³ For this reason, the struggle against Maoism, along with the struggle against imperialism, is one of the most important tasks of all progressive, revolutionary forces.

The certain dressing up of individual ideas of Mao as carried out by his successors *has not altered the theoretical essence of Maoism*. It was and remains an ideological conglomerate which arose on a petty bourgeois social basis, as a result of borrowing reactionary ideas from the previous China. Hegemonistic ideas and chauvinistic concepts underlie the theory of "three worlds."

The present aims set by the Beijing leadership reflect reactionary, great-power notions of the Chinese bourgeois nationalists who have always dreamed of the militarization of the country and the creation of a powerful army for suppressing the people within the state, for waging predatory wars, and for annexing the so-called lost territories.

Maoism is completely incompatible with Marxism-Leninism in terms of its essence and theoretical sources. The ideological cleaning up has not altered its anti-socialist essence. Moreover, in it there has been a strengthening of militant nationalism, unrestrained hegemonism, malicious anti-Sovietism and militarism which have been and remain the chief elements in the sociopolitical content of the ideology and policy of Maoism.

Great-power chauvinism and hegemonism are an old and chronic illness of the Maoists. Even in 1969, L. I. Brezhnev, in speaking at an international conference of communist and workers parties in Moscow, said: "The struggle for hegemony in the communist movement, against the Marxist-Leninist parties, is inseparably linked with the great-power aspirations of the present Beijing leadership, and with its claims to the territory of other countries. The Chinese workers and peasants have been fed the notion of the messianic role of China. There is mass brainwashing underway in a spirit of chauvinism and malicious anti-Sovietism. Children are taught geography using textbooks and maps which put the lands of other countries as part of the Chinese state."¹⁵

The territories which the Beijing leaders now claim exceed the area of China itself. In the autumn of 1979, Beijing published a manual entitled "Kitay. Obshchiye Svedeniya" [China. General Information]. The list included in it of territories which supposedly "historically" belong to China includes the Soviet Amur area, the Maritime Province, Sakhalin, part of Kazakhstan, Mongolia, a part of Vietnam, as well as major expanses of India, Burma, Laos and other states.

Beijing is endeavoring to theoretically establish its territorial claims and to put a "historical basis" under them. China supposedly at various times occupied the territory between Kamchatka and the Philippines, Lake Balkhash and India, between the Ryukyu Archipelago and Afghanistan. Particularly characteristic in this regard is the article "Certain Questions in Assessing Genghis Khan" published in the autumn of last year by the newspaper GUANGMING RIBAO. In justifying the thesis of the "age-old" belonging of the Mongols to the Chinese nation, the newspaper wrote: "The Mongol nation is a national minority of China. The ancestors of the Mongols

worked, lived and grew up on Chinese lands. Since Genghis Khan was a Mongol khan, he then was also a Chinese khan who in antiquity came to power as the representative of one of the national minorities. It cannot be considered that ancient Mongolia was a foreign state."¹⁶

The Maoists consider the turning of China into a powerful military superpower to be the most important condition for achieving the great-power, hegemonistic aims. "We should become the first nation of the world," proclaimed Mao in 1956. "We should conquer the earth,"¹⁷ he urged in 1959. The 21st century is the century of China, his successors now assert. They, like the "Great Helmsman," are feverishly searching for the most effective ways for rapidly solving this problem. In truth, the successors of the "Great Helmsman" do not speak of their plans with the same frankness as Mao did. "China," wrote RENMIN RIBAO on 1 November 1979, "does not lay claim to hegemony and will not claim it even when it becomes a powerful state." However, their actions speak otherwise. Even now the Maoists are working for the role of leader in the struggle against the USSR and the other socialist countries.

Thus, great-power chauvinism and hegemonism were and remain a characteristic feature in the ideology and policy of Maoism. This creates an ever-growing danger for freedom-loving peoples, particularly the states neighboring on China. Many, including bourgeois researchers, have reached this conclusion. For this reason, the struggle against the great-power, hegemonistic policy of Beijing is the duty of everyone who cherishes the ideals of peace, national independence and social progress. "Any connivance with this policy," emphasized the Statement of the Soviet Government, "is connivance with coercion and dictatorship, and connivance with the attempts of the Chinese leadership to involve the world in war."¹⁹

The ideology and policy of the successors of Mao Zedong have an *openly antisocialist, anti-Soviet character*. "They," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces on 26 October 1973, "constantly repeat the hackneyed fabrications of anticommunist propaganda about a 'Soviet threat,' they reiterate the idea of the 'threat from the North,' and in rejecting all reasonable proposals for settlement or for the concluding of a nonaggression treaty, continue to hold their people in an artificially created feverish atmosphere of military preparations. And all of this is accompanied by the most absurd slanderous accusations against the USSR and other countries, and by unabashed attempts to intervene into our, and, incidentally not only our, internal affairs."²⁰ At present the anti-Sovietism of the Maoists has become even more malicious. Along with the United States, they have initiated a hysterical campaign which is unprecedented in scope and fierceness over the question of Soviet aid to revolutionary Afghanistan and the stationing of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan at the request of its government.

The intensification of anti-Sovietism can also be seen from the modernization of the theory of "Three Worlds" by the successors of the "Great Helmsman." Under Mao this theory called for a struggle against the hegemonism of the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR. At present the USSR is in first place. It has been declared the most dangerous seat of world war. The successors of Mao are urging the creation (certainly, under Chinese leadership) of the "broadest international united front in the struggle" against the USSR. This front would also include the United States. "It is essential to thwart the global military plan being hatched by the Soviet Union," stated Deng Xiaoping, "and I hope that this

cause will be joined by the entire world, by the third world, the second and even the first, that is, by the United States."²¹

The hackneyed myth of imperialist propaganda about the "Soviet military threat" or the "threat from the North" is being spread about by the Beijing leaders in order to justify the feverish militarization of all aspects of social life. *Militarism was and remains a characteristic trait in the ideology and policy of Maoism.*

In the area of ideology militarism is manifested in the absolutizing of the role of violence, the role of the army in the system of the state bodies, the resurrection and propagandizing of militaristic historical traditions, and the theoretical *justification of any wars*. "Our leading star," prophesized the "Great Helmsman," "is war and dictatorship." He considered war to be a higher form of resolving the contradictions between classes and nations, a higher form of revolution, and proved its benefit for peoples.

At present in Beijing the propagandizing of war has been somewhat played down. At times there one can even hear words of the necessity of preserving peace. However, as before, the Chinese leaders speak of the inevitability of a third world war, and they urge to prepare for it and not to fear it. "A new world war can merely be put off but it cannot be avoided," asserted the PRC Minister of Defense Xu Xiangqian.²³ At the beginning of 1980, the American press carried the statement of Deng Xiaoping in which he voiced the following notion: China is a weak country, and for this reason we have nothing particular to lose, and we are less concerned than the United States, Western Europe and Japan by what could be destroyed in the event of a war.²⁴

In characterizing militarism as a result of capitalism, V. I. Lenin taught us to distinguish its two forms: internal and external.²⁵ At present, in Maoism militarism also is manifested in an unique bilateral manner.

In the domestic policy of the Maoists, militarism is manifested in the systematic suppression of the working class and the broad working masses who are struggling against the regime of the military bureaucratic dictatorship and its reactionary, aggressive course. For this purpose extensive use is being made of military units, militia subunits, the public security bodies, and various punitive bodies and institutions. The Chinese army was virtually turned by the Maoists into an instrument of repression of the working class and the Chinese people. The present Chinese leadership, the journal KOMMUNIST has pointed out, continues to increase the role of the army as the support of the existing regime. The servicemen are actively involved at the center and on the spot in ensuring "order and solidarity," and are combating "crime."²⁶

For strengthening their regime of a military bureaucratic dictatorship and for suppressing all who act against its policy, the successors of Mao have affirmed the legal validity of the Decree of the PRC State Council of 1957 on Labor Reeducation. "The 'updated and supplemented' 1957 Decree and the listing of a number of civil rights," wrote PRAVDA, "opens up new opportunities for arbitrary rule and illegality to which the masses of people in China have been subjected to over many years. These repressive measures cannot be viewed as anything except the intention to create a sort of concentration camp in the nation."²⁷

In the acute life of China, military-bureaucratic methods of administration and management prevail, and there is the militarization of all aspects of social life in the nation. The Chinese army has an enormous influence on all processes occurring in the country. In fact it has been turned into the universal mechanism for a despotic administrative system. The serviceman is the most important figure in the Maoist regime. At present the military also predominates in the upper echelon of authority. They are actively involved in carrying out various measures, for example, those such as the "instilling of order," the defense and propaganda of the ideas of Mao Zedong, and the organizing of numerous campaigns in the area of ideological and political influencing of the population.

At present the Maoists are "furtively preparing for war, they are increasing the military-economic potential, and are improving the armed forces in the aim of attaining their aggressive, great-power, hegemonistic plans. In November 1978, Beijing called upon the Chinese people to prepare for war, and not to eat and not to sleep if this work is carried out passively. The Maoist slogan of the "four modernizations" is ultimately the modernization of the army and the increasing of nuclear missile potential. "In 20 years," stated the deputy chief of the General Staff, Wu Xiquan, in September 1979, "we plan to catch up with the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, in terms of the development of military equipment and strength."²⁸ The military expenditures of China are constantly increasing. Last year they rose by 20 percent. In terms of the level of per capita national income, China is ranked 125th, but in terms of the amount of expenditures on military purposes, it is in 3d place in the world."²⁹

In recent years, the total number of the Chinese regular units, formations and their staffs has been over 4 million persons.^{29a} The number of tank formations has increased significantly. Political indoctrination and military training of the troops are being intensified in every possible way, and measures are being taken to increase their organization and discipline and readiness to fight.

In foreign policy the militarism of the Maoists is manifested in overt aggressive economic actions, numerous border provocations against neighboring countries, in actions aimed at thwarting the policy of detente and increasing tension, in fostering new increases in the arms race, and in attempts to bring the United States and USSR into collision and to provoke a world-wide conflict. As is known, in 1956, the Maoists attacked Burmese territory, and in 1959, Indian territory. In 1969, they organized armed conflict on the Soviet-Chinese border, and in 1974 seized the Paracel Islands. In February 1979, Beijing committed overt armed aggression against socialist Vietnam. "The Chinese attack on Vietnam," stated the declaration of the Soviet government, "again shows how irresponsibly Beijing considers the fates of the world, and with what criminal ease the Chinese leadership resorts to arms.... These aggressive actions... disclose to the entire world the true essence of the hegemonistic policy of Beijing in Southeast Asia."³⁰

At present the Maoists along with the imperialists are aiding the Po' rot bands, and are carrying out feverish activities in seriously jeopardizing the sovereignty and independence of Kampuchea. Along with American imperialism and the reactionary circles of Pakistan, they are delivering weapons to the bands and are training saboteurs for sending back into Afghanistan. Beijing openly threatens to teach a second lesson to Vietnam. It has unilaterally and roughly broken the second round of talks to normalize Vietnamese-Chinese relations. A large number of

formations is concentrated on the borders with Vietnam, the armed border conflicts are increasing, and the concentration of Chinese troops is being kept along the frontiers of Laos and Burma. The secret plans of the Chinese military published by the Hong Kong press in September 1979 provide for the occupation of Northern Laos and the setting up of a puppet government there.

The Beijing military is also threatening 'to carry the struggle against Soviet social imperialism to its end.'³¹ At a session of the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives in June-July 1979, Wu Xiuquan urged the West to abandon the "appeasement" of the USSR and to act "sword to sword" vis-a-vis this country. The Chinese authorities have rejected all initiatives of the Soviet government to normalize relations between the USSR and the PRC.

The extremist foreign policy of China at present is aimed against the USSR and other socialist countries. For imperialism it has provided new opportunities for large-scale provocations against the socialist countries and the national liberation movement.

Thus, Maoism is the enemy of the policy of a lessening of tension and disarmament. For this reason the highest vigilance, and a principled and uncompromising struggle against Maoism are the duty of all who cherish the cause of socialism, peace, detente and disarmament.

FOOTNOTES

¹ "Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 11.

² PRAVDA, 9 March 1980.

³ JIEFANG RIBAO, 22, 25, 27 August 1979.

⁴ See KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1980, p 104.

⁵ Ibid., p 105.

⁶ E. Melnert, "Maos Erben Machens Anders," Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1979, pp 25, 32.

⁷ V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 18, p 228.

⁸ M. A. Suslov, "Izbrannoye. [sic.] Rechi i Stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, p 382.

⁹ KOMMUNIST, No 1, 1979, p 108.

¹⁰ PRAVDA, 22 May 1980.

¹¹ Ibid., 24 June 1980.

¹² Ibid., 24 June 1980.

¹³Ibid., 16 December 1979.

¹⁴L. I. Brezhnev, "Aktual'nyye Voprosy Ideologicheskoy Raboty KPSS" [Urgent Questions of CPSU Ideological Work], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 280.

¹⁵GUANGMING RIBAO, 11 September 1979.

¹⁶Quoted in the book "Opasnyy Kurs" [Dangerous Course], No 8, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 56.

¹⁷PRAVDA, 19 February 1979.

¹⁸L. I. Brezhnev, "Na Strazhe Mira i Sotsializma" [On Guard for Peace and Socialism], Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, pp 312-313.

¹⁹KOMMUNIST, No 5, 1978, p 94.

²⁰Ibid., No 4, 1979, p 80.

²¹PRAVDA, 13 March 1980.

²²V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 17, pp 187-188.

²³KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1980, p 102.

²⁴PRAVDA, 4 March 1980.

²⁵KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1980, p 102.

²⁶Ibid., p 97.

²⁷ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 12, 1978, p 19.

²⁸PRAVDA, 17 February 1979.

²⁹RENMIN RIBAO, 1 May 1977.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: THE ROUT OF JAPANESE MILITARISM

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22 July 80 pp 11-16

[Article commemorating "The 35th Anniversary of the Rout of Imperialist Japan" by
Lt Col A. Sidorov: "The Rout of Japanese Militarism"]

[Text] On 2 September 1945, on board the American battleship "Missouri" in Tokyo Bay the act of unconditional surrender was signed by the Japanese. Thus ended World War II which had been started by Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan and was to be the fiercest and bloodiest in the history of mankind. It was the inevitable historical finale for the aggressive aspirations of fascism and Japanese militarism.

For almost 10 years, Japanese militarism continuously waged war in dooming its own people and the peoples of neighboring countries to cruel hardships, heavy sacrifices, deprivations and inhuman suffering. The Japanese-Chinese and the Russo-Japanese wars, the expansion in Korea and the turning of it into a colony, the occupation of Manchuria, the intervention in the Soviet Far East, the aggressive policy in the Southeast Asian countries, the military adventures against the USSR and Mongolia--this is a far from complete list of the military crimes of Japanese militarism against the peoples of Asia and all mankind.

Over the many years which preceded World War II, Japanese militarists intensely prepared for aggression against the Soviet Union, and they created a powerful military machine ready for war against the USSR. In April 1943, the Japanese ambassador to Germany Osima stated this to Ribbentrop: "One thing is indisputable, and that is for 20 years now all the plans of the General Staff have been worked out for the drive into Russia..."¹ Blinded by a class hate for the world's first socialist state, the reactionary circles of the leading Western powers indulged the aggressive policy of Japan in Asia, providing it with the necessary strategic raw materials and equipment for developing the military industry. In its far-reaching plans world imperialism assigned militaristic Japan, along with Nazi Germany, the role of the assault force in the struggle against the Soviet Union.

Nazi Germany and then militaristic Japan collapsed chiefly under the blows of the Soviet Armed Forces directed and inspired by the Leninist Communist Party. The finale of the war started by the imperialists was the natural outcome of historical forces. The victory won by the Soviet people again convincingly showed the world the invincible vital force of our system and its indisputable advantages over

capitalism. "The Soviet people," emphasized the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade I. I. Brezhnev, "honorably withstood the harsh testing of the war. The enemy was crushed and defeated. Our remarkable people, a hero people, a cavalier people raised high over the planet and victoriously carried through the flames of the war years the glory-wreathed Leninist banner, the banner of Great October, the banner of socialism."²

The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against militaristic Japan was a just historical act and the firm fulfillment of its Allied and international duty. The general political and military-strategic situation which had developed by the summer of 1945 in the Far East was determined by the complete collapse and surrender of Nazi Germany, as well as by the fact that its main ally, imperialist Japan, did not intend to abandon the continuation of the war. Without a victory over Japanese militarism, the Great Patriotic War and World War II could not be concluded.

On 26 July 1945, the United States, Great Britain and China demanded unconditional surrender from Japan. But when the Imperial Cabinet rejected this demarche, the Soviet Union, faithful to its Allied obligations, joined the declaration of the three powers and on 8 August 1945 declared war against Japan. On 10 August, Mongolia declared war against Japan.

In entering the war, the Soviet Union set the following political goals for itself: the quickest possible elimination of the last center of World War II, the elimination of the constant threat to itself and to Mongolia by the Japanese imperialists, the providing of active aid in quickly restoring world peace; along with the Allies to expel the Japanese invaders from the lands occupied by them, to reduce the number of casualties and destruction inevitable with a drawing out of the war, and to regain the previously lost Southern Sakhalin and Kuril Islands. The statement of the Soviet government on 8 August 1945 emphasized that "such a policy is the only means capable of bringing peace closer, freeing the peoples from further sacrifices and suffering, and providing an opportunity for the Japanese people to escape from those dangers and destruction which Germany had experienced after it rejected unconditional surrender."³

The strategic plan of Hq SFC was to surround the Kwantung Army, to simultaneously split it into parts and destroy each of them separately." This was to involve the forces of the following fronts: the Transbaykal (commander Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovsky, member of the military council Lt Gen A. N. Tsvchenkov, and chief of staff, Gen Arm M. V. Zakharov), the First Far Eastern (commander, Mar SU K. A. Meretskov, member of the military council Col Gen T. F. Shteykov, and chief of staff, Lt Gen A. N. Krutkov), the Second Far Eastern (commander, Gen Arm M. A. Purkayev, member of the military council, Lt Gen D. S. Lomov, and chief of staff Lt Gen F. I. Shvachenko), with assistance from the Pacific Fleet (commander, Adm I. S. Yumashev, member of the military council Lt Gen Shore Serv S. Ye. Zakharov, and chief of staff, Vice Adm A. S. Prolov) and the Amur Naval Flotilla (commander, Rear Adm N. V. Antonov, member of the military council, Rear Adm M. G. Yakovenko, chief of staff, Capt 1st Rank A. M. Gushin). Formations of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army were also to be involved in the operation.

The main component in the combat operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East was the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation conducted on 9 August.

2 September 1945. In terms of its spatial scope (a front of over 5,000 km and a depth of 200-300 km), rate of advance in a difficult theater of war with a desert-steppe, mountain, forested-swampy and tundra terrain and major rivers, this operation had no equal in the course of the entire World War II.

The practical implementation of the plan of HQ SHC and the methods of conducting the operation allowed the Soviet troops to rapidly encircle and cut up the main enemy forces in Manchuria. Such factors as the massed air strikes and the use of airborne troops played a major role in the rapid development of the strategic operation. The broad use of armored-tank and mechanized troops and the close cooperation of the ground troops with the naval forces contributed to the high pace of the offensive. The Pacific Fleet supported the maritime flank of the First Far Eastern Front. In conducting landing operations, it operated on the enemy lines of communications. The Amur Flotilla had a significant impact on the successful development of the operations of the Second Far Eastern Front.

The complete defeat and surrender of the Japanese troops were the outcome of the operations by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East. During 15-day continuous battles, the enemy lost around 700,000 soldiers and officers, including 83,737 men killed and 594,000 captured. The Japanese had not suffered such losses at any time during the war. It was quite obvious, thus, that the combat operations of the American Armed Forces in the Pacific Basin in terms of significance and results were inseparable with the decisive strikes by the Soviet Army and Navy.

The victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the campaign in the Far East was of world historical significance. The defeat of the million-strong Kwantung Army and the surrender of imperialist Japan again demonstrated the might of the socialist state and its armed forces.

The Motherland had high praise for the feat of its sons and daughters. The medal "For Victory Over Japan" struck by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was awarded to all the participants in the battles against the Japanese militarists. Fourteen generals, admirals, officers, sergeants, soldiers and sailors were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and more than 308,000 Soviet servicemen were presented combat orders and medals. Scores of outstanding formations and units received the honorary names of Khingan, Amur, Ussuri, Kharbin, Mukden, Sakhalin and Amur. Many formations, units and ships were awarded orders of the USSR.⁶

The success of our troops in the Far East again convincingly showed that the Soviet Army had mastered the most advanced military art. It not only widely used the rich experience of the war against Nazi Germany, but also had acquired the skills of conducting operations and battles under the conditions of a desert and mountain-tundra theater of war.

The defeat of the Kwantung Army, the strongest and most reactionary part of the Japanese Armed Forces, was carried out with such force and speed that it was a complete surprise for the enemy and stunned the leading upper clique of Japan. This was a decisive condition for surrender. The commander of the U.S. Air Force in China, Gen W. Chennault, in August 1945 stated: "The rapid strike made by the Red Army against Japan completed the encirclement and brought Japan to its knees."⁷

As in Europe, so in Asia, the Soviet Armed Forces honorably carried out the great liberating mission, in bringing freedom and independence to the Chinese and Korean

citizens. The Chinese and Korean peoples clearly were convinced that our army was the embodiment of noble ideas and immortal principles of internationalism, friendship and the fraternity of peoples. They thanked the Soviet soldiers for their liberation from Japanese captivity which had lasted for many years, and from the terrors and impoverishment of imperialist aggression. In speaking on 17 December 1945 at the Third Enlarged Session of the Executive Committee of the North Korean Organizational Committee of the Korean Communist Party, Kim Il-Song emphasized: "The heroic Red Army of the Soviet Union, having expelled the Japanese imperialists from the territory of our motherland, has brought liberty and independence to the Korean people. A path to a bright future has opened up for the liberated Korean people."⁹

The "Great Helmsman" Mao Zedong who at one time recognized historical truth, at that time wrote: "The Red Army brought aid to the Chinese people in expelling the aggressors. There has never been such an example in the history of China. The influence of this event is inestimable."¹⁰ Unfortunately, subsequently the "Great Helmsman" himself and the present leadership in Beijing have forgotten much in their anti-Soviet policy. And precisely they have forgotten all the enormous political, material and moral aid which the USSR provided China. There was also Manchuria which had been liberated with rich minerals and a developed industry and which became a part of China, as well as hundreds of aircraft and tanks, thousands of weapons and machine guns, and naval weapons all turned over to the command of the People's Liberation Army [PLA] of China, and so forth. Because of this, the PLA was victorious over the Chiang Kai-shek army in the civil war which broke out. A people's republic was formed in the country.

The defeat of militaristic Japan which had enslaved many peoples of South and South-eastern Asia led to a fundamental change in the situation in these regions of the world. Favorable conditions were created for the development of socialist revolutions in a number of Asian countries (China, North Korea and Vietnam). A national liberation movement developed widely among the peoples of Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines and others.

The collapse of Japanese militarism also freed the Japanese people themselves from the military-fascist dictatorship, and made it possible for them to begin a struggle for a peaceful democratic path of development for their country. But still this struggle which brought a number of substantial victories to the people did not attain its goal. Regardless of the fact that a new constitution was approved in 1947 and this formally was based on the principle of the sovereign power of the people and proclaimed the rejection of war, the facts of subsequent times show that the ruling upper clique of Japan flagrantly violated the constitution and the democratic victories of the workers.

In following the example of its overseas allies in joining the arms race, and having signed a treaty with Maoist China directed against the USSR, Japan has again set out on the path of restoring militarism and fanning military hysteria. The "Self-Defense Forces" have been turned into an army which is well supplied with modern weapons and military equipment. Japan has become firmly established among the first 10 military strongest states of the world. An annual 10-15-percent increase in allocation for military purposes has been planned for the next 2-3 years, although even now the military budget of the nation has reached the sizable amount of 2-3 trillion yen.

For achieving these goals, a previously unprecedented militaristic offensive has been developed in all areas. The military-industrial complex is raising its head ever higher. The next "intermediate" five-year defense plan for 1980-1984 has begun to be carried out. It provides for the turning over to the "Self-Defense Forces" of an additional 500 aircraft, 300 tanks, 180 self-propelled artillery mounts, 110 armored personnel carriers, around 40 fighting ships, a large number of missile units and other weaponry.¹¹

The participation of the "Self-Defense Forces" in the naval exercises conducted in the spring of this year by the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, called "Rimpac-80" marked the official emergence of the Japanese military on the international scene.

The talks held on 27 and 28 May between the previous Prime Minister of Japan M. Ohira and the Premier of the PRC State Council Hua Guofeng again emphasized that the anti-Soviet alliance of the United States, China and Japan is assuming an ever more overt form. This, in turn, has served as one of the incentives in increasing the military might of Japan. "The present Japanese-Chinese summit talks," wrote the Japanese newspaper YOMIURI in May of this year, "were held directly after the Japanese-American summit talks which were at the beginning of this month. At present the Deputy Premier of the PRC State Council Geng Biao is in the United States for the purposes of developing military cooperation between China and the United States. Considering these circumstances it cannot be denied that in many countries the impression is being created that a 'network for encircling the Soviet Union' is being created."

In endeavoring to lull the Japanese people and to again direct it along the slippery path of military preparations, the government and the monopolies, the military and the reactionary nationalistic organizations have developed a broad campaign of "brainwashing" in a militaristic and chauvinistic spirit. Here the threadbare notorious myth of the "Soviet threat" is importunately being advanced, and the foreign policy of the USSR is maliciously distorted. The workers of Japan and participants in mass meetings and demonstrations have justly demanded that the government revise the program of the arms race and are fighting actively for peace and social progress.

Incidentally the myth of the "Soviet military threat" has become the core of various falsifications by the bourgeois ideologists and their Maoist partners. In using it, they have endeavored to justify the Japanese aggression against the peoples of China and Korea as an attempt to "ensure security from the direction of the Soviet Union." Here nothing is said at all about the "Kan-Toku-En" Plan or the various militaristic provocations by the Japanese military against the USSR. Such a position of the bourgeois falsifiers has long been unmasked in the eyes of progressive mankind, but, regardless of this, the ideologists of imperialism continue to defend it for the sake of the militaristic policy of the United States and Japan.

The distortion of the decisive role of the Soviet Union in achieving victory over militaristic Japan is another object of falsification by the bourgeois ideologists. Since the times of the former U.S. president H. Truman who stated "the Russians did not make any military contribution to the victory" and up to the present, imperialist propaganda in every possible way has endeavored to play down the role of the Soviet Armed Forces in the defeat of Japan.

The political motives for such attacks are obvious. In being a component in the falsification of the history of World War II, they are aimed, on the one hand, at undermining the international authority won by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the struggle against the Japanese aggressors, and on the other, to establish the present political, military and economic programs of the American and other imperialists in the regions of Asia and the Pacific. But neither time nor the rabid attacks by the falsifiers of the history of World War II are capable of eradicating the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan from the memory of the people. "The great feat of the Soviet people in World War II, a feat of millions of well-known and nameless heroes who broke the back of fascism and brought freedom to the peoples of many countries" said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "will never be eradicated from the grateful memory of mankind."¹²

Some 35 years have passed since the end of World War II. But the problem of war and peace as before is urgent and important. The dialectics of our age is such that the historic clash between the two social systems, the forces of progress and reaction, is occurring under the sign of growing superiority of the socialist commonwealth and revolutionary forces of the modern world over imperialism and over the forces of reaction. "An end to wars, peace between peoples, and an end to violence and plundering are precisely our ideal . . ."¹³ wrote V. I. Lenin. For this reason the Soviet Union and the socialist countries oppose the militaristic policy of imperialism with a policy of the active defense of peace and a strengthening of international security. This is again emphasized in the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact States approved in Warsaw on 15 May 1980: "Inspired by the great ideals of socialism and communism and to their peoples and the peoples of the entire world, the states represented at the conference reaffirm their conviction to redouble their efforts and to struggle even more actively for a military detente, the halting of the arms race and disarmament, including a reduction in the military expenditures of states, their armed forces and weapons."¹⁴

FOOTNOTES

¹"Istoriya KPSS" [History of the CPSU], Vol 5, Book 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 622.

²L. I. Brezhnev, "Na Strazhe Mira i Sotsializma" [On Guard for Peace and Socialism], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 36.

³"Vneshnyaya Politika Sovetskogo Soyuz a Period Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny" [Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union During the Period of the Great Patriotic War], Vol III, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1947, p 363.

⁴The enemy grouping numbering over 1 million men included 6,640 guns and mortars, 1,215 tanks, 1,907 aircraft and 26 ships. Over a length of 1,000 km the enemy had 17 fortified areas. In addition, the local puppet troops of the Manchukuo Army were under the Kwantung Army.

⁵"Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuz a 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945], Vol 5, Voenizdat, 1963, p 581.

⁶"Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna Sovetskogo Soyuz 1941-.945. Kratkaya Istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. Brief History], 2d Edition, revised and supplemented, Voenizdat, 1970, p 544.

⁷KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 August 1945.

⁹Kim Il-Song, "Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya" [Selected Work], Vol 1, P'yongyang, 1970, p 11.

¹⁰A. M. Vasilievskiy, "Delo Vsey Zhizni" [A Cause for One's Entire Life], Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, p 525.

¹¹KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 May 1980.

¹²L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 3, Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, p 6.

¹³V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 26, p 304.

¹⁴PRAVDA, 16 May 1980.

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MILITARY HISTORY: BATTLE OF KULIKOVO

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 80 signed to press
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[Article from the section "From the Heroic Past of the Russian People" by Honored Scientist of the RSFSR, Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences Col (Ret) L. Beskrovnyy: "The Kulikovo Battle (1380)"]

[Text] Famous down through the centuries, the Battle of Kulikovo, the 600th anniversary of which we are celebrating this year, has gone down in world history as an undying feat of the great Russian people in their long and stubborn struggle to throw off the Mongol-Tatar yoke. It was a turning point in the development of the national liberation movement in Russia, as well as in the creation of a unified Russian state headed by Moscow.

Soviet people have shown an enormous interest in the heroic past of our motherland, including for the legendary battle on the Kulikovo Field and this has become a symbol of the nationwide struggle against the foreign invaders and one of the inexhaustible sources of vital Soviet patriotism, spiritual strength and endurance of the people during the times of severe hardship.

In the first half of the 13th century, the hordes of Mongol-Tatar conquerors under the leadership of Khan Batu descended on the Russian land like a terrible avalanche. Over 5 years (from 1236 through 1241), they captured and mercilessly devastated enormous territories from the Volga to the Carpathian Mountains. In following years the fighting nomads succeeded in devastating Poland, Hungary and certain Balkan lands. But the decisive resistance put up by the Russian people against the invaders and the heroic defense of the cities and all the Russian lands held up their further advance to the West. As a result, the ambitious plans of the heirs of Genghis Khan to conquer the entire European continent were thwarted. The Russian people, at a price of enormous sacrifices, saved the peoples of Central and Western Europe, from cruel enslavement by foreigners. The comparatively rapid conquering of Russia by the Mongol Tatars was aided by its feudal disunity which led to a situation where in the place of the one-time strong Kievan state by the 1230's almost 40 individual principalities had formed. Because of the constant disputes and civil dissention, they were incapable of uniting for a joint struggle against the external enemy. Defeated one by one, the feudal principalities were forced to recognize the authority of the Golden Horde.¹ As a result the Russian people were enslaved by the conquerors and for long years the heavy and humiliating Mongol-Tartar yoke ruled over them. This yoke, wrote K. Marx, "not only suppressed, but

also destroyed and dried up the very soul of the people who had become its victim."²

The freedom-loving Russian people could not accept the foreign suppression and the loss of their independence. Even during the first years of the rule of the Khan, there were rather frequent outbursts of popular indignation caused by the arbitrariness and merciless cruelty of the Golden Horde officials and tax collectors. Thus, in 1262, the urban poor rose up in Rostov, Suzdal', Vladimir and Yaroslavl', and "slaughtered the Tatars everywhere, not tolerating oppression from them." At the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century, revolts occurred in Kostroma, Rostov, Yaroslavl', Tver' and elsewhere.

Regardless of the fact that these isolated attempts to throw off the yoke were not crowned with success, they were the first blow against foreign domination and forced the khans to turn over the tax collecting function to the Russian princes themselves, and by the start of the 14th century to abandon the system of "bas-kachestva" [tax farming].³

In the 14th century, the Russian lands were divided into a number of Grand Duchies under the Horde, and included Moscow, Tver', Ryazan', and Nizhniy Novgorod. In Novgorod and Pskov there were feudal republics. The Grand Duke of Vladimir was considered to be the head of Russia, and at the Horde he had received a patent for the right to govern Russia. For this reason, the Russian princes were constantly struggling to seize the Vladimir throne. The Golden Horde khans in every possible way supported these disputes and rivalry, as they feared the unification of all the duchies into a single strong Russia. It must be pointed out that even then, under the conditions of the feudal method of production, the achieved level of economic development created definite prerequisites for the unification of the nation into a single centralized state. The realization of this greatest historical mission was the destiny of the Moscow Duchy which assumed the leading place in the development of agriculture, crafts and trade.

Moscow achieved its greatest political might under Prince Dmitriy Ivanovich (1359-1389) and he organized an alliance of the northwestern duchies, and carried out important measures to centralize state administration and military affairs. He was the first of the Russian princes to lead the armed struggle of the people against the Mongol-Tatar enslavers.

In Saray⁴ they were following the growing strength of Moscow with concern. Having realized that the setting of one Russian prince against the other had not brought the desired result, the ruler of the Golden Horde, Mamay, decided to strike initially at the individual duchies, and then repeat Batu's invasion of all Russia.

In carrying out this plan, the Horde troops in 1377 set off for Nizhniy Novgorod, devastated it and put it to flame. In the following year major forces led by Murza Begich were moved up toward Moscow. Learning of this, Dmitriy decided to prevent the enemy invasion. He boldly set off with his troops to meet the Mongol-Tatars and defeated them on the Vozha River (a right tributary of the Oka on the territory of the Duchy of Ryazan').

"Eleven August 1378," commented K. Marx, "Dmitriy Donskoy defeated the Mongols on the Vozha River (in Ryazanskaya Oblast). This was the first real engagement with the Mongols won by the Russians."⁵

The achieved victory was of great importance. It showed that the Russians could fight successfully against the Mongol-Tatars. It was a bold, open challenge thrown down to the Golden Horde. Both sides realized that it would be followed by an even fiercer struggle, and they undertook preparations for the crucial clash.

The defeat of Begich by the Russians forced the ruler of the Horde into an alliance with Lithuania, an alliance aimed against Moscow. Prince Oleg of Ryazan' joined this alliance under pressure from Mamay, and Oleg put his own particular interests higher than the general Russian ones. Then, as a result of an involved political struggle, the Duchy of Nizhniy Novgorod abandoned Moscow, and the Novgoroders assumed a position of wait-and-see.

Regardless of the fact that the Horde by this time was already weakened by internal dissent and indications of collapse had appeared in it, its ruler Mamay on the eve of the crucial engagement with the Prince of Moscow possessed enormous troops numbering up to 150,000 men. Moreover, this could be increased by allies. During talks between the ambassadors from the Horde, Lithuania and Ryazan', it was agreed that their forces would meet "by the Oka, on the shore on the seventh day,"⁶ that is, on 1 September.

Moscow learned at the end of June of the appearance of the forward detachments of the Horde on the frontiers of the Duchy of Ryazan'. The runner who arrived stated that the Mongol-Tatar cavalry was positioned on the Voronezh River, awaiting the approach of the mercenary detachments from the Caucasus and Crimea and the allied Lithuanian host. The information received pointed to a serious danger hanging over all the Russian land.

In Moscow, Prince Dmitriy convened a council of his boyars, and then sent out "to all the Russian princes, the military leaders and all the people" heralds with an appeal to assemble the militia for repelling the invaders. Kolomna (on the Oka) was chosen as the place for the concentration of the troops, and supplies of food and fodder had been delivered here previously. In setting the assembly there, Dmitriy Ivanovich was aiming to occupy the banks of the Oka as quickly as possible, outdistancing the enemy.

By the middle of August 1380, under the fighting banner of the "Grand Duke of Vladimir and Moscow," many independent princes had arrived with their detachments as well as boyars with militia formations "each from his own city" as well as "many foot soldiers and...many people and merchants from all lands and cities."^{6a} Here also were Ukrainian warriors who had arrived in their time with Prince Dmitriy Bobrok Volynets ("son of the Volynian land") who subsequently became one of the heroes of the Battle of Kulikovo, as well as Belorussian troops headed by Andrey Polotskiy and Dmitriy Bryanskiy (the Ol'gerdovich brothers).

The size of the Russian forces has been set by the chroniclers differently. Some have pointed out that Prince Dmitriy succeeded in assembling "all forces of close to 200,000,"⁷ Others give a figure of 150,000 men⁸ and even 453,000 men.⁹ However, all these data are obviously inflated. Most probably, Moscow was able to field up to 100,000 men. Basically they were peasants and craftsmen.

Having carried out a 10-day march maneuver from their concentration area at Kolomna, the Russian troops on 6 September reached the Don. Prince Dmitriy Ivanovich, after

discussing the plan for further actions at the military council, took the decision to strike initially against the Mamay Horde, and then turn their troops against his allies. He ordered "bridges to be thrown up across the Don and fordes at night," and in the morning of 8 September, to cross the river and take up positions on the field of Kulikovo (now Kurkinskiy Rayon in Tul'skaya Oblast), as this gave the Russians a number of advantages. The Grand Duke here stated: "We go to battle today for the Don and offer our lives...for our brothers, for Christianity..."¹⁰

The decision to cross the Don and to be victorious or perish for Russian land shows that Prince Dmitriy viewed active operations as the sole means for achieving victory. Moreover, having moved the troops across the Don, he prevented the possibility of a surprise attack by the Lithuanian and Ryazan' troops from the rear.

The actions of Prince Dmitriy did not remain unnoticed by Mamay who "having heard the approach" of the Moscow troops to the Don was extremely amazed by Dmitriy's boldness and the readiness of the Russians to accept an engagement. Under the existing situation, the Horde ruler decided not to wait for the Lithuanian troops, but rather to achieve victory by his own forces. At the same time, the Lithuanian Prince Yagaylo vacillated and did not show any particular desire to take a direct part in the engagement, as the Ukrainian and Belorussian formations which were part of the Lithuanian troops were reticent to fight against the united Russian troops. It may be assumed that for this reason Yagaylo waited for the outcome of the clash between the troops of Prince Dmitriy and Mamay.


Kulikovo Field, where the great battle occurred on 8 September 1380, was a flat surface cut by small streams. To the south it gradually rose and grew into a prevailing height (Red Hill).

The Russian troops formed up in three lines (see the diagram). The main line was held by the regiments of the Right Arm, the Grand Regiment and the Left Arm. In front of it positioned one behind the other were the Guard and Forward regiments. A special reserve was positioned behind the left flank of the Grand Regiment. Finally, an Ambush Regiment was concentrated in Zelenaya Dubrava [Green Oak Stand].

The Guard Regiment included only cavalry. It was given the mission of thwarting the actions of the forward enemy detachments in the sector of its main thrust. It was under the command of Semen Melik, and his assistants were princes Obolenskiy and Tarusskiy, as well as Andrey Seriz and Mikhail Okindrovich. The Forward Regiment manned chiefly with infantry detachments was to receive the blow of the basic Horde forces in order to wear them down prior to contact with the Grand Regiment and thereby facilitate the operations of the forces on the main line. At the head of the Forward Regiment which had been joined by the Kolomna militia stood princes Drutskiy.

The Grand Regiment comprised the basis of the battle formation. The regiments of the Right and Left arms covered its flanks.

The command of the regiment of the Right Arm had been given to Prince Andrey Ol'gerdovich and to Andrey Starodubskiy as well as to the military leader Fedor Grunk. The regiment of the Left Arm was led by princes Belozerskiy, Vasilii Yaroslavskiy and Fedor Molozhskiy. The special reserve was under the command of Prince Dmitriy Ol'gerdovich, and the general reserve or Ambush Regiment under



Battle of Kulikovo of 8 September 1380

Prince Vladimir Andreyevich Serpukhovskoy and Dmitriy Bobrok Volynets, while princes Roman Bryanskiy, Vasilii Kashinskiy and Novosil'skiy were assigned to help them.

Prince Dmitriy left the command of all the troops and the command of the Grand Regiment to himself. As assistants he took the military leader Timofey Vel'yaminov, the boyar and military leader Mikhail Brenk.

In assuming that Mamay would attempt to carry out a flanking maneuver by making massed strikes against the left flank of the Russian battle formation, Prince Dmitriy devoted main attention to this sector. He positioned the special and general reserves precisely here.

The battle formation of the Mamay troops included a forward detachment (vanguard) made up of light cavalry, and the main forces concentrated in the center which included the infantry with a detachment of Genoan infantry, and strong wings which were cavalry formed up in two lines. Mamay also assigned a strong reserve of cavalry for making the crucial strike.

Having positioned his troops, Dmitriy rode along the main line and urged the men to carry out their duty for the sake of liberating the homeland from foreign enslavement. The liberating aims of the pending engagement inspired the troops and instilled in them a determination to defend their fatherland.

Then Prince Dmitriy, according to the knightly tradition, moved off to the Guard Regiment in order to commence the battle. He entrusted the command of the Grand Regiment to the boyar Mikhail Andreyevich Brenk.

By 1100 hours the thick fog which had covered the Field of Kulikovo had begun to dissipate. The enemies were ready for combat. "And it was terrible to see," pointed out the chronicler, "the two great forces bent on bloodshed and a rapid death."¹¹

The clash of the main forces was preceded by a duel of two knights, Peresvet and Temir-Murza (Chelubey) who fell on the battlefield as a result of a simultaneous blow with spears.

The combat operations consisted of three stages. In the first of them there was the battle of the Russian Guard and Forward regiments with the enemy vanguard. The chronicle points out that the clash of the forces dashing toward one another was of a fierce nature. And virtually all "the great Russian foot army, like wood was broken, and like straw, mowed down."¹² However the enemy's plan of a quick success was not realized. The battle continued with redoubled fierceness. A frontal clash of the main forces was its next stage.

Grand Duke Dmitriy who had fought in the ranks of the Guard Regiment returned to the Grand Regiment.

After the loss of the Forward Regiment, the enemy rushed against the Grand Regiment and for 3 hours endeavored to break through the center of the Russian host. The Russian soldiers fought with the greatest tenacity and courage, however the superior forces of the Horde began to get the best of them. The standard of the Grand Duke was knocked down, and falling with it were both Mikhail Brenk as well as many other military leaders, boyars and rank-and-file soldiers. Prince Dmitriy, having sustained severe blows, fell unconscious. But soon thereafter the Vladimir and Suzdal' troops under the leadership of Timofey Vel'yaminov and Gleb Gryanskiy restored the situation. The Grand Regiment stood unconquered and withstood the enemy thrust.

Simultaneously the cavalry of Mamay attacked the regiments of the Right and Left arms. The attack on the right flank was driven off. The light cavalry of the Horde retreated and refused to fight any longer on the rugged terrain. The situation was more difficult for the left flank of the Russian troops. Almost all the leaders of the regiment of the Left Arm had been killed. The regiment began to pull back. But the route of retreat to the crossings had been cut off.

The attack by the Tatar cavalry which had tried to reach the rear of the Grand Regiment up to now had held in check the special reserve of Dmitriy Ol'gerdovich, but soon thereafter it was crushed by the fresh forces sent by Mamay to exploit the success. It seemed to the Horde military leaders that the second stage of the battle had gone to the Mongol-Tatars, and it was merely a question of undertaking one further effort to consider the victory complete. But there were not enough fresh troops for this. They had all been committed to battle.

Precisely at this time, the military leader Dmitriy Bobrok who was observing the course of the battle from Zelenaya Dubrava, committed to the attack the Ambush

Regiment which consisted of a crack, well-armed cavalry. It had cost him much hard work to restrain Prince Andreyevich from premature action. The latter was impatient and said to Bobrok: "Brother Dmitriy, what will be our condition and what success will there be if we do not help?" However, Bobrok correctly pointed out to him: "Yes, Prince, if we begin out of time, we will cause ourselves harm." But when Bobrok saw (in the fourth hour after midday) that the enemy, distracted by the maneuver of the retreat of the Russian Grand Regiment, had exposed its right flank and rear, he exclaimed: "Our hour is come, the time approaches. Forward, brothers and friends!"¹³

The Russian troops attacked the enemy fiercely. The prompt commitment of the large reserve which altered the balance of forces in the sector of the main thrust of the Horde was the turning point of the Battle of Kulikovo. Not expecting the appearance of fresh Russian forces, the Horde cavalry was thrown into confusion.

Initially the enemy endeavored to resist, but was unable to stand against the attack of the heavy Russian cavalry, and began to withdraw. At this time the Grand Regiment and the regiment of the Left Arm went over to an offensive. By a counter-thrust of the troops on the main line of the Russian battle formation, the attack by the Golden Horde infantry was halted. "And the change was so fast that one could not make out one's own troops and Tatars were mixed in the Russian regiments, and Russians in the Tatar regiments."¹⁴ And then the crucial change occurred. Under the Russian blows, the Mongol-Tatar cavalry took to flight. Thus ended the third stage of the battle which also included the pursuit of the scattered Horde troops to the Krasnaya Mesh' River. In the course of it many fleeing troops were destroyed. The remnants of the Horde troops along with Mamay fled to their camps in the lower reaches of the Volga.

The losses on both sides were enormous. Some 40,000 men of the entire Russian army remained alive. The Mongol-Tatars had lost significantly more.

The Russian troops remained 8 days on the Kulikovo Field until the killed soldiers had been buried. The fraternal graves were located by the village of Rozhdestveno-Monastirskhina and along the banks of the Nepryadva and Smulka rivers.

And the Lithuanian troops which on the day of the battle were a day's march away from Kulikovo Field "fled back at a great speed as if chased by someone."¹⁵ And Prince Ulag, having received news of Mamay's defeat, "left his lands and himself fled to Lithuania (Lith.), with his princess, children and boyars, and beseeched him (Prince Dmitriy -- L.B.) greatly not to send his troops against them."¹⁶

On 1 October 1380, Moscow triumphantly greeted its heroes headed by Prince Dmitriy Ivanovich who was given the name Donskoy (Don) in honor of the great victory won.

The battle on Kulikovo Field was truly a concern of the entire people, as here the question of their freedom and independence was settled. It provided a powerful impetus to a broader and stronger unification of all the duchies into a single whole and strengthened the importance of Moscow as the bastion of the Russian lands. The Golden Horde, after the heavy blow dealt it, was unable to recover its former might and gradually went into a decline. And although the dependence of Russia upon the Horde lasted another whole century, the bases of its power had been fundamentally undercut.

The victory of the Russian people won with the leading role of Moscow was of enormous significance not only for Russia.¹⁴ It marked the beginning of the liberation of the other peoples of Eastern Europe from the foreign yoke. These included the Western and Southern Slavs, Moldavians, Romanians, Baltic and Caucasian peoples. The international significance of the Battle of Kulikovo was well understood by its contemporaries. "...The fame spread quickly to the Iron Gates, to Rome and to Caffa, to the sea and to Ternaw, and from there to Tsarygrad in praise. Great Russia had conquered Mamay on the Field of Kulikovo..." wrote the author of "Zadonshchiny".¹⁵

The Moscow Prince Dmitry Ivanovich played a major role in achieving the victory of the Russian troops over Mamay's hordes. Understanding well the crucial role of the people in the liberation war, he was able to involve the broad masses of simple people in it, and lead this "popular force" during the crucial engagement against the Mongol-Tatars.

Dmitry Ivanovich and his military leaders considered an active offensive as the main type of combat operations, and not a passive defense of the cities, as had been the case during the period of feudal separation. For this reason, the strategic plan worked out by Dmitry included the rapid march maneuver of the Russian troops from Moscow to the Don, for the purpose of defeating the main forces of the Horde before they could join up with allied troops and invade northeastern Russia. This plan was successfully carried out.

The Russian military leaders proved to be brilliant tacticians. Even the very character of the position contributed to the positive outcome of the engagement. The skillful use of the particular features of Kulikovo Field limited the maneuvering abilities of the Golden Horde troops which consisted chiefly of cavalry.

One of the crucial factors in the victory in the Battle of Kulikovo was the steadfastness and self-sacrifice of the Russian troops, as well as the independent and enterprising actions of the military leaders in the course of the engagement.

In the centuries of Kulikovo were born many significant general Russian traditions which were permeated by a spirit of unity, solidarity, love of the motherland and heroic self-sacrifice. In our days all the Soviet people and their military guards - the Red Army and Air Force - are a worthy heir and continuer of them.

In the difficult time of the Great Patriotic War, on the ancient Tula land in the region of Kulikovo Field, in the autumn of 1941, a fierce battle again was struck up, this time against the Nazi invaders pushing toward Moscow. The units of the Red Army together with the Tula workers regiment, with the aid of all the local population who built defensive works, threw back the Nazi hordes from the walls of their home city, and then from the commemorative sites of the Battle of Kulikovo.

A valiant resistance that was created, won and defended by previous generations - said L. I. Brezhnev in his speech on the occasion of presenting the Order of the Patriotic War and the Gold Star medal to the hero city of Tula. "Over the centuries Tula has been the shield and arsenal of the Russian state. In these ancient walls the character of the Russian man was shaped as an indefatigable worker and skillful artisan, a valiant defender of the motherland, and an unflinching fighter for a happy future."¹⁶

On Kulikovo Field itself, there is a number of significant monuments erected here in honor of the victorious engagement. There is the Church of the Birth of the Virgin on the site of one of the graves of the fallen Russian soldiers (where the Nepryadva River flows into the Don), and the Temple of Sergey Radonezhskiy built according to the plans of Academician Shchusev, and the monument to Dmitriy Donskoy on Red Hill. After restoration they will comprise the basis of a large commemorative complex which will immortalize the great historic event.

FOOTNOTES

¹The Golden Horde (Ulus Juchi) was an artificial state formation of the feudal type which came into being by the capturing of foreign lands. It was founded in the beginning of the 1240's by Khan Batu after his victorious campaigns, and included areas of the Volga Bulgars, the Polovitsian steppes, the Crimea, and Western Siberia. The indigenous Russian lands were not part of the Golden Horde, however they were in vassal dependence on it, they paid tribute and carried out the demands of the khans for a number of political questions.

²K. Marx, "Biografiya" [Biography], 2d Edition, Moscow, Politizdat, 1973, p. 333.

³"Baskaks" were officials of the Mongol Khans in charge of collecting taxes and counting the population in the conquered land. They had military detachments for their disposal, and with their aid they suppressed the actions of the conquered peoples against Mongol-Tatar enslavement. The collection of taxes by the baskaks entailed great cruelty and violence, and caused frequent popular revolts.

⁴Sarai was the capital of the Golden Horde. It was built by Khan Batu in 1254. As a result of the internecine wars, it lost its importance and was finally destroyed in 1480.

⁵"Arkhiv K. Marksa i F. Engelsa" [Archives of K. Marx and F. Engels], Vol. 8, p. 151.

⁶"Polnoye Sobraniye Russkikh Letopisey" [Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles] (henceforth "PSRL"), Vol. XXIII, St. Petersburg, 1910, p. 125.

^{6a}"PSRL," Vol. XI, St. Petersburg, 1897, p. 56.

⁷"PSRL," Vol. XXIII, St. Petersburg, 1910, p. 125.

⁸"Voinskiye Povesti Drevney Rusi" [Military Tales of Ancient Russian], Moscow-Leningrad, AN SSSR, 1949, p. 143.

⁹"Povesti o Kulikovskoy Bitve" [Tales of the Battle of Kulikovo], Moscow-Leningrad, AN SSSR, 1959, p. 291.

¹⁰"PSRL," Vol. XI, p. 56.

¹¹"PSRL," Vol. XI, p. 59.

¹²"PSRL," Vol. XI, p. 60.

¹³"Povesti o Kulikovskoy Bitve," p 149.

¹⁴V. N. Tatishchev, "Istoriya Rossiyskaya" [Russian History], Vol V, Moscow-Leningrad, Nauka, 1965, p 146.

¹⁵"PSRL," Vol XXV, Moscow - Leningrad, AN SSSR, 1949, p 205. Mamay fled back to the Horde and began to feverishly prepare for a new campaign. He succeeded in collecting fresh forces, but at this time Khan Tokhtamysh took up arms against Mamay and defeated his troops on the Kalka River. With a small group of supporters, Mamay fled to Kaffa, where he was killed by natives. "And thus Mamay evilly ended his desperate life."

¹⁶"PSRL," Vol IV, St. Petersburg, 1848, p 82.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸B. U. Grekov and A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, "Zolotaya Orda i Yeye Padeniye" [The Golden Horde and Its Collapse], Moscow-Leningrad, 1950, Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, pp 242-243.

¹⁹"Voinskiye Povesti Drevney Rusi," p 37.

²⁰L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskiy Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 6, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, pp 284-285.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: ROLE OF SUPREME HIGH COMMAND REPRESENTATIVES

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[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Mar SU and Twice Hero of the Soviet Union I. Bagramyan, and Col, Dotsent and Candidate of Historical Sciences I. Vyrodov: "The Role of Representatives of Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Stavka VGK) During the War Years. Organization and Methods of Their Work"]

[Text] In the age of mass armies, wars have assumed a global nature. The scope of combat operations and their intensity have increased immeasurably. They have begun to be carried out simultaneously in many strategic sectors or several theaters of war. Strategic leadership of armed combat has become significantly more complex. It became difficult for the Supreme High Command (SHC) to carry out direct command and control of the troops in the Operational Army. To put it briefly, a definite gap was created between the center and the operational fronts.

In order to bring the SHC closer to the front, an intermediate command level had to be introduced. The tendency for the establishing of such an element had been brought out even by F. Engels.¹ The Russian command used it for the first time initially in the war against Japan (1904-1905), and later in World War I. Soviet military theoreticians such as M. V. Frunze and others provided the arguments for the need for an intermediate level in major wars.² The intermediate element was widely employed in various forms during the period of the Civil War and particularly in the Great Patriotic War. At the outset of the last war, this functioned in the form of the main commands of the strategic sectors, and then as representatives of Hq SHC (Stavka VGK) and the chief command in the theater of war. The article briefly examines the basic questions characterizing the activities of only the representatives of Hq SHC.

At the very outset of the Great Patriotic War, the Nazi Command developed a broad offensive with large troop groupings in all the strategic sectors. In line with the growing scope of armed combat, the rapid changes in the situation as well as the disrupting of communications between Hq SHC and the fronts and of cooperation between the operational groupings, the necessity arose of bringing strategic leadership closer to the troops of the Operational Army. On 10 July 1941, three main commands of strategic sectors (MC SS) were formed, and these as a whole played a positive role in organizing the combat operations of the Red Army during the most difficult period of the war. However, subsequently, due to the significant changes

in the conditions of armed combat along the entire Soviet-German Front, Hq SHC gradually (in the first half of 1941 through the first half of 1942) abolished them and assumed control of the fronts. At the same time, the objective need for an intermediate element continued to remain. The place of the main commands began to be taken by the representation of Hq SHC at the corresponding front (or group of fronts) during the period of preparing for and conducting major and significantly important strategic operations.²⁰

The representation of Hq SHC was qualitatively a new stage in the development of the intermediate element within the overall system of strategic and operational leadership. It was the most stable, flexible and effective form of control and command, and functioned virtually until the end of the war. The representatives of Hq were appointed from among the prominent military leaders holding responsible positions within the general system of the Soviet SHC. They took a direct part in the work of Headquarters, they were constantly informed of the basic military-political events, and they had a good knowledge of the strategic situation on the Soviet-German Front, and the intentions of the Soviet command. In a majority of instances, this role was carried out by members of Hq SHC or by deputies of the People's Commissar of Defense¹ who possessed broad powers and capabilities for settling fundamental questions on the spot related to carrying out the plans of Headquarters considering the existing situation along the entire strategic front. In essence the representatives of Hq SHC with their small working staffs (a group of generals and officers from the General Staff (GS) and the staffs of the basic branches of troops) were temporary bodies of operational and strategic leadership set up for the period of the preparations for and conduct of major operations in the corresponding strategic sectors. In terms of the nature of activities, they operated as intermediate levels between Headquarters and the fronts.

The prototype of the representation of Hq SHC was the sending of responsible representatives of the NKO, People's Commissariat of Defense and the GS, G. K. Zhukov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, N. F. Vatutin and others to the Operational Army at the outset of the war for clarifying the situation on the front, reporting to Hq SHC their conclusions about it and considerations on the prospects for conducting combat operations. Their stay at the front was usually brief, and documents were still not worked out which would define rights and obligations. All the activities of these representatives basically were of an informational nature.

In 1942, they began to be sent to the Operational Army for longer periods. The directives of Hq SHC began to give them definite specific obligations with the imposing of responsibility (along with the commanders of the fronts where they were) for the result of troop combat operations.

After the reorganization of the main commands of the strategic sectors, the sending of representatives of Hq SHC to the troops operating in the main sectors and carrying out the major strategic missions of the campaign became regular. At the end of 1942 and the start of 1943, at Stalingrad its representatives were Gen G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevskiy and N. N. Voronov; during the period of the breakthrough of the Leningrad blockade, the operations of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts were coordinated by Mar SU K. Ye. Voroshilov and Gen G. K. Zhukov, respectively; in the course of the Ostrogozhsk-Rosssk², Voronezh-Kastornenskiy and Khar'kov operations, the representative of Hq SHC at the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts was Gen A. M. Vasilevskiy, and Gen N. N. Voronov was also here; in the Kursk Battle, Mar SU G. K.

Zhukov coordinated the operations of the Central, Bryansk and Western fronts, and Mar SU A. M. Vasilevskiy the Voronezh and Steppe fronts; in the course of the liberation of the left-bank Ukraine, the crossing of the Dnepr and the beginning of the liberation of the Crimea, the representatives of Hq SHC were: A. M. Vasilevskiy on the Southwestern and Southern fronts (from 20 October 1943, the 3d and 4th Ukrainian fronts), G. K. Zhukov on the Voronezh and Steppe (from 20 October 1943, the 1st and 2d Ukrainian fronts) and K. Ye. Voroshilov (separate Maritime Army). In 1943, at different times the role of representatives of Hq SHC was carried out by Mars SU G. K. Zhukov (Northwestern and Northern Caucasus fronts), S. K. Timoshenko (Leningrad, Volkhov and Northern Caucasus fronts and the Black Sea Fleet), Gen N. N. Voronov (Northwestern, Bryansk, Kalinin, Western, 1st and 2d Baltic fronts) and others.

In 1944, when the offensive by the Soviet troops was being carried out successively along the entire strategic front (from the Berents to the Black seas), the institution of the representatives of Hq SHC was further developed than in 1943. As a rule the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Mar SU G. K. Zhukov, and the Chief of the General Staff, Mar SU A. M. Vasilevskiy, were sent out to the most crucial sectors. Thus, in the course of the Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation, the actions of the 1st Baltic and 3d Belorussian fronts were coordinated by A. M. Vasilevskiy, and those of the 2d and 1st Belorussian by G. K. Zhukov. The latter was also responsible for the 1st Ukrainian Front in the L'vov-Sandomir Operation carried out by it. A. M. Vasilevskiy coordinated the efforts of the 1st, 2d and 3d Baltic fronts in the course of the Baltic Strategic Offensive Operation. In its concluding stage, he was responsible for the 3d Belorussian Front. Mars SU K. Ye. Voroshilov and S. K. Timoshenko, Chief Mar Art N. N. Voronov, and others were also sent out to the operational troops. For some time the commander of the Leningrad Front, Mar SU L. A. Govorov (2d and 3d Baltic fronts) was a representative of Hq SHC as a second responsibility.

By the beginning of 1945, the representation of Hq SHC in the Operational Army declined sharply, and by the end of the war had been reduced to a minimum. This was brought about by the following factors. As a result of the successful operations conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces in the summer and autumn of 1944, Nazi Germany had suffered a major defeat. For the Soviet Union, a favorable military-political situation had developed, and it was extremely disadvantageous for the enemy. The total front had been reduced by 2-fold (from 4,400 to 2,200 km), and our ten frontal formations were operating on it. The basic efforts of the Soviet Army were concentrated in the central (Western) sector. The main assault grouping included three fronts (the 1st and 2d Belorussian and the 1st Ukrainian), and Hq SHC had directly assumed leadership of it. In the Baltic, the operations of the troops were coordinated by Mar SU A. M. Vasilevskiy. The fronts were headed by experienced military leaders and famous generals. By the end of the war on the entire Soviet-German Front there were only two active strategic sectors, the central (Berlin) and the southwestern. On the latter Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko was the representative of Hq SHC.⁶ He was the last of its representatives in the concluding stage of the war.

The representation of Headquarters differed from that of the MC SS in its simplicity of its organization, and did not require great material outlays for the support of the administrative personnel. The representatives possessed great opportunities for maintaining closer contacts with the SHC, and thereby thus brought

Hq SHC closer to the front, and this contributed to the prompt and effective settling of questions related to the preparations for and support of the operations. Moreover, they made it possible to maintain uninterrupted and closer strategic and operational-strategic coordination between the advancing groupings, services of the Armed Forces and branches of troops. Large and cumbersome working (TOE and administrative) staffs were not required to carry out the functional activities of the representatives. All their assistants (advisers and consultants) carried out their duties, in basically combining them with positions in the central organization.

In turn, the representation of Hq SHC during the war years was not uniform (heterogeneous) in its composition, legal capabilities and functional duties. In actual terms only the members of Headquarters were fully empowered representatives; the remaining individuals carried out this role as its authorized agents, but more actually were representatives of the basic branches of troops (services of the Armed Forces) or the General Staff. The difference between them was that the former operated on behalf of Hq SHC, and the latter on the basis of its powers. The basic functions of the representatives were: participation in elaborating the overall plan, the planning for and preparations of the forthcoming strategic operation, exercising control over the course of carrying out the orders and directives of Headquarters; providing help to the commanders of the fronts in preparing for and conducting operations, in the most rational and effective use of the equipment and personnel in the course of carrying them out; the organization and maintaining of strategic and operational-strategic cooperation between the ground groupings, the services of the Armed Forces and branches of troops in accord with the overall plan of the SHC; coordinating the actions of the troops in the course of the operation; regular reporting to Headquarters on the situation at the front, and so forth.

It must be pointed out that from the summer of 1944, Mar SU G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevskiy not only coordinated the actions of the troops, but also provided "leadership of the operations" carried out by the troops on all the Belorussian, Baltic and 1st Ukrainian fronts.⁵ The remaining representatives of Hq SHC did not possess such functions. At the same time a similar duty was entrusted to Mar SU L. A. Govorov, that of "leadership of the operations conducted by the 2d and 3d Baltic fronts, with his keeping of the duties of commander of the Leningrad Front."⁶

Many representatives of the services of the Armed Forces and the basic branches of troops were sent out into the Operational Army basically for providing aid to the commanders of the fronts in rationally utilizing the services of the Armed Forces and branches of troops in the operations conducted by them (N. N. Voronov, A. V. Vorozheykin, A. Ye. Golovanov, A. A. Novikov, I. T. Peresypkin, Ya. N. Fedorenko, and others). A portion of them were sent to the front upon the instructions of the SHC independently, but a majority along with Mars SU V. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevskiy and S. K. Timoshenko, were also their advisers for their own type of activities. The Chief Mar Art N. N. Voronov was often entrusted with the duty of coordinating troop actions, and at Stalingrad, their general leadership.⁷ The representative (authorized agent) of Headquarters, Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy, was sent to the 1st Ukrainian Front for providing aid to its commander (Gen N. F. Vatutin) in stabilizing its operational-strategic situation in the zone of the front. Other authorized agents of Headquarters carried out missions related to material-technical, artillery and engineer support of the troops during the period of preparing for and conducting operations (A. V. Khrulev, N. D. Yakovlev, V. I. Venogradov, K. S. Nazarov, and others).

The conditions for the functioning of the institution of representatives of Hq SHC were somewhat unusual. As a rule, they did not have their own permanent working personnel. During the period they performed their representative functions, only small operational groups were set up and these included responsible workers from the central staff of the NKO, generals and officers of the GS who played the role of assistants (advisers and consultants). The operational groups also included officers who were representatives of the GS in the formations the operations of which were being coordinated by a representative of Hq SHC. The servicing personnel for the operational workers was also small in number. Its routine billeting was carried out by the services of the field headquarters where they were. For maintaining contact with the SHC and the field headquarters of the formations, the representatives of Hq SHC used high-powered truck-carried radios (from the mobile communications center of the GS), the state communications lines, and the special communications centers (which were set up ahead of time as field semistationary centers), in addition to the communications system of the fronts.⁸

The specific tasks confronting the representatives of Hq SHC as well as the conditions of their activities had a direct influence on the methods of their work. Prior to leaving for the front, all of them, as a rule, participated in working out the overall plan for conducting the strategic operation, they approved the material and technical supply plans for the troops, and clarified the basic questions of cooperation between the fronts. After this, 1-3 weeks before the start of the operation, they flew to the appropriate front where for the first time they studied the situation, heard the reports of the commander and the other responsible workers, and began to discuss and adjust the plan for the operation. Many questions were settled on the site of the forthcoming operations during the period the representative worked with the direct executors of the plan of Hq SHC, that is, the army and formation commanders.

Thus, the representative of Hq SHC, Mar SU G. K. Zhukov, 18 days before the start of the Belorussian Operation arrived at the temporary command point of the 1st Belorussian Front, and after a brief familiarization with the situation, on the same day (5 June 1944) left for the right wing of the front, where he carried out the appropriate measures related to preparations for the operation. During the last 2 days, along with Gen N. D. Yakovlev, he also worked in another sector, in the area of Rogachev and Zhlobin, and on 8 June left for the 2d Belorussian Front. From here, after hearing the plan of the commander of the front and the arguments of the commander of the air army, the commanders and the chiefs of the branches of troops concerning the pending operation, G. K. Zhukov, along with Gens G. F. Zakharov, S. M. Shtemenko and N. D. Yakovlev, traveled out to the 49th Army, where they clarified the situation and worked out the missions of the army to prepare for the operation. Having completed the work in the area of the army, the representative of Headquarters left his deputy (Gen S. M. Shtemenko) at the 2d Belorussian Front, and himself returned to the 1st Belorussian Front.⁹

The representative of Hq SHC at the 1st Baltic and 3d Belorussian fronts, Mar SU A. M. Vasilevskiy, organized his work somewhat differently during the period of the preparations for the Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation. Accompanied by the deputy artillery commander of the Soviet Army, Gen. M. N. Chistyakov, and the deputy commander of the Air Force, Gen F. Ya. Falalev, he arrived at the command post of the 1st Baltic Front early in the morning of 8 June 1944.¹⁰ Here the marshal worked almost the entire day. Having assembled the leadership, he heard the reports on the

course of preparations for the troop offensive. After approving the plan for the frontal operation, A. M. Vasilevskiy visited the 6th Guards Army of Gen M. N. Chistyakov, and later the 43d Army of Gen A. P. Beloborodov, where he showed particular attention to the just-appointed young commander. During the night of 9 June, the marshal reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that in the 1st Baltic Front, preparations for the operation were successfully underway, and immediately left for the 3d Belorussian Front.

In the course of preparing for an operation, the representatives of Hq SHC participated in the sessions of the military councils, they were present at the exercises of the command personnel, where they became more closely acquainted with the leading workers of the front, they clarified the missions of the troops in the forthcoming operation, they selected the most effective forms and methods for conducting combat operations considering the specific conditions of the situation, and defined the ways for the rational use of the men and equipment. Personally or through their assistants, they exercised control over the course of carrying out the orders and directives of Hq SHC, and provided practical help to the front commanders in organizing all-round control and communications, camouflage and deception of the enemy. Each day they reported on the course of preparations for the operation to Headquarters, personally to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Regular contact was also maintained with the General Staff.

During the operations, the representatives of Hq SHC spent a larger portion of their time at the command and observation posts or in the staffs of the formations, and closely followed the development of events on the front. In the event of a complicating of the situation in any sector, they immediately traveled there, they personally studied it, they listened to the arguments of the commander, approved them, or when necessary, made the appropriate corrections, and recommended that various measures be carried out. In this regard, adjustments or supplements and at times even changes were made in the operational plan for certain questions, and a report was immediately sent to Hq SHC and the General Staff was informed.

It must be pointed out that in the process of "coordinating actions" and "leading operations," the basic efforts of the fronts (and particularly their mobile troops and aviation) were constantly directed by the representatives at achieving the chief aims of the operation. For increasing the power of a thrust on the selected axis, with the absence of the necessary men and equipment in the fronts assigned to them, they often turned to Hq SHC with a request to call in the long-range aviation or a portion of the strategic reserves, and personally themselves (along with the commanders of the fronts) were concerned with the questions of their use.

The representatives of Headquarters who had the authority of the SHC to direct the operations in particular instances issued verbal instructions to the appropriate front commander, and this was immediately reported directly to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Thus, in the course of the 1944 Baltic Strategic Offensive Operation, basic attention was given to the 1st Baltic Front, the basic mission of which consisted in cutting off the Army Group North from the remaining troops of the Nazi Wehrmacht. Having discovered that the enemy command had concentrated the main forces of Army Group North and the 3d Tank Army assigned to it from Army Group Center in the Riga defensive zone opposite the right wing of this front and had significantly weakened its grouping in the Shyauliyay-Klaypeda sector, the representative of Hq SHC, Mar A. M. Vasilevskiy, submitted a proposal to Hq SHC on shifting our main

thrust from the Riga axis to the Memel (Klaypeda) one. After the approval of this proposal, on 24 September 1944 we immediately commenced to regroup the troops. As is known, the designated plan was successfully implemented in the course of the Memel Operation which was, in essence, the finale in the liberation of the Soviet Baltic from Nazi occupation.

A particular feature in the work of the representatives of Hq SHC was the fact that they, as a rule, did not give written orders, directives or other operational documents to the fronts (armies) in the exception of individual instances. However, all their recommendations were of an executive nature of a superior level, and were compulsory for execution by inferior ones. Often from the results of the reports and proposals of its representatives, Hq SHC issued the appropriate orders or directives directly to the front (armies), and thereby sanctioned (approved and supported) their activities. The representatives, along with the commanders and military councils of the fronts, bore full responsibility to the SHC for the results of the combat activities of the troops in the operation being carried out. Thus, in June 1942, the representative of Hq SHC on the Crimean Front, Arm Commissar 1st Rank L. Z. Mekhlis and the front commander, Lt Gen D. T. Kozlov, for the defeat of the Soviet troops on the Kerch' Peninsula were removed from their positions and reduced in rank.¹¹

The GKO [State Defense Committee] and Hq SHC, in continuing to combine the Leninist principles of leadership, that is, collectivism and one-man leadership, in the following years of the war continuously increased the demands placed on the command personnel of all levels (including on the representatives of Hq SHC), and gave them full responsibility for efficient troop command and control in the operations. "In any event and in all circumstances without exception," pointed out V. I. Lenin, "collectivism should be accompanied by the most precise establishing of personal responsibility of each individual for a precisely defined question. Irresponsibility concealed behind references to collectivism is the most dangerous evil... which in military affairs quite often lead inevitably to a catastrophe, to chaos, panic, divided power and defeat."¹² This Leninist thesis applied fully to the activities of the representatives of Hq SHC who embodied it on definite strategic sectors or areas of the front. The difficulty of the work was that they, without taking over from the commanders of the fronts and without impeding their initiative, were obliged to quickly find and promptly suggest to them the optimum ways for carrying out the complicated and suddenly arising tasks, and to satisfy the necessity (if it was caused by objective conditions) of strengthening the corresponding groupings with their reserves for achieving the main goal of the operation.

The work style of the representatives of Headquarters was formed depending upon the nature of the missions to be carried out, the official position held, the level of military preparation and personal qualities. As a whole it had a creative nature. At the same time, each of them had his own distinct working style which was inherent and unique only to him. For example, the working style of Mar G. K. Zhukov was characterized by decisiveness, by quick responses to the situation, by firm convictions, by unswerving tenacity in carrying out the missions (in achieving the goal of the operation), by will, by constant high exactingness for subordinates, and by indefatigability in searching for the ways to achieve victory. The characteristic traits in the work style of Mar A. M. Vasilevskiy were tenacity, decisiveness, a creative approach to carrying out the missions, restraint and argumentativeness. His work style stood out in its great punctiliousness in carrying out the plans of Hq SHC and by high staff practices.

The representatives of Hq SHC as a whole played an important role in organizing the military operations on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, in increasing the tenacity, efficiency and effectiveness of the leadership over the Armed Forces, and in the rational use of the men and equipment in the operations carried out. With their aid, the SHC was able, with minimal administrative expenditures, to successfully carry out the basic tasks of preparing for and conducting strategic operations, to coordinate the actions of large troop groupings, and maintain close and uninterrupted cooperation between them, the services of the Armed Forces and the branches of troops. The chief merit of this group was the fact that its creation virtually required no special managerial reserves or a great deal of time, as well as great material and technical expenditures on support. At the same time, with the aid of the institution of its representatives, the SHC could achieve highly efficient leadership over the military operations of the troops on the fronts, raise the effectiveness of the administrative processes, exercise effective control over the course of carrying out its strategic and operational plans, and provide prompt aid and support to the troops of the Operational Army. Representation brought Hq SHC closer to the front and helped in successfully carrying out the tasks of strategic leadership over the Armed Forces with minimal managerial expenditures. With the aid of its representatives, the SHC could quickly create operational centers for solving complicated, suddenly arising problems in the corresponding strategic sectors.

The experience acquired in the course of the Great Patriotic War in leading large troop groupings has enriched Soviet military art. It has largely not lost its importance under today's conditions, and can serve as a valuable source for the further development of military theory and the practice of military affairs, considering those fundamental changes which have occurred in them in the postwar times.

As before, the development of managerial systems occurs in a dialectical unity and under the impact of the overall development of the Armed Forces, as well as socio-economic and scientific-technical progress. The most characteristic and general thing in it is the continuous greater complicating of the control systems and the relationships between them. There have been significant changes in the structure of the control and command bodies, the methods and means of directing the Armed Forces, the material and technical base of control and command, and all forms of internal contact between the elements of the control and command system. The increasing scale of a possible armed struggle and its destructive nature, the immeasurably increased intensity, speed and scope of military operations have sharply increased the volume of control operations (work to be carried out), and have significantly complicated all their processes. All of this has caused an objective need to reduce the time for performing control operations, and an immediate response to a rapidly changing situation, that is, a rise in the efficiency of leadership over the Armed Forces and troop control. Thus, the military-technical aspect of the control activities of the SHC has undergone significant changes.

At the same time, the sociopolitical essence of modern wars, as before, remains unchanged. For this reason all the fundamental political principles of strategic leadership remain basically as before. The most important trends in their development in the postwar years have been: a strengthening of the unity of political, state and military leadership; the increased leading role of policy in relation to strategy, and political leadership in relation to strategic, and so forth. Actual reality has required an ever-greater strengthening of the leading role of the CPSU

in directing the Armed Forces. For promptly carrying out the immeasurably increased range of control tasks, probably, even greater efficiency is required in the work of the SHC, and a closer link between it and the troops.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹In the middle of the 19th century, F. Engels pointed out that in the age of mass armies, the strategist and tactician (the commander on the battlefield) cannot be reduced to one person, and here a division of their labor has commenced. "Strategic operations--the coordination of the operations of various troop formations--should be directed from one central point with the aid of telegraph lines; leadership over the tactical operations will be provided by individual generals" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 7, pp 511-512).
- ²M. V. Frunze, in referring to the experience of the Civil War, at the end of 1921 pointed out that according to the strategic and geographic position of the Ukraine, the troop grouping of the permanent Red Army here should correspond to three probable theaters of wartime (in peacetime, three military districts) headed by troop commanders who would be directly subordinate to the representative of the RVSR Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic in the Ukraine. In turn this necessitated the establishing of a "unity of command and control over all the armed forces in the Ukraine in the person of the representative of the RVSR with the rights of a deputy commander-in-chief..." (M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. Soch." [Collected Works], Vol 1, Moscow-Leningrad, Gosizdat, 1929, p 203).
- ^{2a}Thus, while in the summer and autumn of 1941, the Nazi Army was conducting active offensive operations in all the strategic sectors of the Soviet-German Front, by December it was already forced to go over to the defensive almost everywhere. The failure of the Barbarossa Plan (the adventuristic plan of defeating the Soviet Union), and the significant losses of Nazi troops in the winter of 1941-1942 confronted Germany with the inevitability of conducting an extended war with an army which had suffered a series of major defeats. In 1942, the Nazi Command was able to draw up and implement a strategic offensive only on one wing of the Soviet-German Front in the aim of seizing the Crimea, the Caucasus and reaching the Volga. Here in the middle of 1942, a difficult situation developed for us. Hq SHC began to send its representatives precisely here.
- ³An exception was the following: Gen Arm K. K. Rokossovskiy and Mar SU L. A. Govorov who, in holding the positions of front commanders (respectively of the Belorussian and Leningrad) were appointed as representative of Hq SHC in the 1st Ukrainian Front (K. K. Rokossovskiy in 1943) and the 2d and 3d Baltic Fronts (L. A. Govorov in 1944) as a second official position.
- ⁴TSAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 132-A, inv. 6242, file 39, sheets 13, 50, 53, 69, 79, 81, and so forth.
- ⁵Ibid., folio 132-A, inv. 2642, file 36, sheets 426, 427; file 37, sheets 1, 86.
- ⁶Ibid., file 37, sheet 67.

⁷Ibid., folio 86-A, inv. 1711, file 7A, sheet 242; "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopaedia], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1976, p 363.

⁸See I. T. Peresypkin, "Svyaz' v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny" [Communications in the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Nauka, 1973, pp 74, 85, and so forth.

⁹G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i Razmyshleniya" [Memoirs and Reflections], Moscow, Izd. APN, 1970, pp 533-534.

¹⁰Gen Arm I. Kh. Bagramyan was the commander of the 1st Baltic Front.--Editors.

¹¹TsAMO, folio 132-A, inv. 2642, file 41, sheets 177-184.

¹²V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 39, p 46.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: AVIATION AND GROUND FORCES COOPERATION

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Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Doctor and Candidate of Military Sciences Lt Gen Avn (Ret) N. Ostroumov: "Mutual Identification and Target Designation of Troops and Aviation".

Text: The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that for carrying out close cooperation between the aviation and troops, along with solving other questions, it was very important to have a well organized system of mutual recognition and target designation. Where a clear designation of the forward edge and target designation for aviation were organized, our fliers confidently and accurately attacked the designated objectives on the battlefield close to their own troops and directly in their interests.

In the first period of the war, for designating the forward edge, they employed visual signaling panels, smoke charges, colored signal rockets, tracer bullets and shells, the light of motor vehicle headlights, and so forth. But often the subunits did not have enough rocket and smoke charges, and the special signal signaling panels were simply lacking, particularly in the newly formed units. This led to a situation where under the difficult conditions of a dynamic combat situation, when fierce battles were occurring on the ground and in the air, it was very difficult for the pilots to determine where our troops were and where the enemy was. For this reason to avoid attacking our own troops, they attacked targets which were significantly distant from the front line, and the combined-arms (tank) formations could not promptly utilize their results.

Of course the soldiers understood the role of designating the front line for their pilots, and ordinarily took all the necessary measures. In his book, "Malaya zemiya" [The Little Earth], L. I. Brezhnev gives an example of when the soldiers put out white undershirts on the breastworks of the trenches to designate their front line before the attacks by our aviation.

It must be said that in the first period of the war, the personnel of the ground troops had little knowledge of the silhouettes of their aircraft, and it did happen that they fired on them. The directive of the Air Force Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army of 6 October 1941 drew attention to this shortcoming. The use of radio communications for controlling the aircraft from ground guidance stations during the first months of the war was extremely limited as a consequence of the poor equipping

of radio gear and its post-war replacement on the multipurpose scale. Forward command posts were also lacking for controlling the air staff.

In the second period of the war, the aviation units received a sufficient quantity of radio equipment which made it possible to change over to radio control over the air operations both from the aircraft of the commanders of the aviation unit as well as from the ground control posts. The aviation commanders, in being at the command post of the commander of the entire battle formation, knew where their troops and the enemy were, and guided them by radio both to airborne and ground targets. This suggested on the one hand, improved the precision and promptness of bringing the aircraft to the designated targets, however the problem of mutual recognition and target designation was not yet solved. For settling the question of mutual recognition of the troops in the air, the General Staff issued the special instruction on the use of the aircraft and communications signals before the war. These instructions were issued in the autumn of 1944. Thus, the questions of identification of the troops in the air and the designation of targets by radio were completely solved.

In the third period of the war, the aviation units received a further improvement in the equipment of the radio gear and the instructions on the use of the aircraft and communications signals. The instructions on the use of the aircraft and communications signals were issued in the autumn of 1944. In preparing any operation, the aviation units were guided by these instructions.

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practice of putting identification marks on the tanks. But these were quickly obliterated and became almost invisible from the air.

The experience of cooperation between aviation and the troops in the operations showed that, in addition to guiding the flyers by radio, one of the best means for designating the forward edge was signal rockets. There were two signals: "Here are friendly troops" and "Here is our forward edge." For giving the first signal, the rockets were fired at an angle of 90°, and for the second at an angle of 50-60° toward the enemy. The color of the rockets in either instance was the same (white or green)."

For the identification of friendly troops, of great importance was the orientation of all pilots before each sortie on the line of combat contact with the enemy and the study of the "I am a friendly aircraft" and "friendly troops" signals, and so forth. The navigators of the air units and subunits carefully supervised the carrying out of this requirement, in checking the knowledge of the flight personnel on the route of the pending flight, the characteristic markers on the terrain and the established signals. At the moment of the sortie the front line was designated on the maps of each crew. During the third period of the war, on all the front-level operations, there was the extensive practice of sending air representatives to the command post of the combined-arms (tank) formations, and guidance officers to the units. In the zone of eye visibility, they, in maintaining radio contact with the aircraft and knowing the location of the units and formations, monitored the prompt sending of identification signals by the troops, and at the same time using the guidance radio set informed the aircraft groups of the position of the ground troops. In a number of instances, they made certain that the enemy did not deceive our flyers. Thus, on 24 June 1944, during the Belorussian Operation, in the combat zone of the 3d Belorussian Front, a Nazi radio station began to transmit data in Russian on the location of German tanks supposedly in the region of Bogushevsk. Rockets were also used for the spurious guidance. In actuality this was a grouping of our own tank units. Only due to prompt intervention by the aviation representative were the pilots of the 64th Ground-Attack Air Regiment correctly informed by radio of the location of friendly troops and the foe. The trick failed.⁵

Colored smoke signals used in the East Prussian Operation of 1945 also played a certain role in informing the crews of the forward edge. For example, on the 3d Belorussian Front, for designating friendly troops, orange and blue smoke was used. The ground support and signals service of the 1st Air Army (commander, Col Gen Avn I. I. Khryukin) organized a system of control-identification points (KOP). The latter were located along the forward edge 5 km apart. Each of them had its own color of smoke signals. The flyers knew the position of the KOP relative to the front line, and this made it possible for them to accurately reach the combat zone of their troops. The KOP provided great help to the flyers, as the colored signals could be clearly seen over a distance of several kilometers.⁶

During the Berlin Operation, for designating the battle formations of the 3d Guards Army and the 3d Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, provision was made to use only rockets, while in the 13th and 4th Guards tank armies of the same front, in addition to them, smoke pots and smoke grenades were also used.

When it was necessary to concentrate the efforts of two air armies for attacking in the area of a single front, as was the case, for example, in the Belorussian,

Thus, identification of friendly troops and aviation became one of the most important questions in organizing and carrying out cooperation, for, without having determined where were friendly troops (aircraft) and where were those of the enemy, it was impossible to open fire (drop bombs) without exposing one's own troops (aircraft) to the risk of being hit.

Another area for ensuring the coordination of the troops and aviation was the improving of the target designation (guidance) system. With fluid combat operations, the importance of reliable target designation on the battlefield became much more important, and both the troops and the aviation were interested in this. This was carried out by guiding the aircraft to the target by radio, by various movements of the aircraft, by tracer bullets and shells, as well as by pyrotechnical devices. Thus, for designating objectives for air strikes, the artillery set a check point over them, firing, as a rule, with smoke shells, and also fired toward the targets with tracers. And the pilots, using a coded map, radioed data to the ground troops on the targets, and indicated them by diving and firing.

Aircraft were guided to the target from the battle formations of the troops by guidance officers who were assigned by the staffs of the air units and formations. Initially the aircraft were brought to the area of combat operations and then detailed guidance was provided. In turn, the aircraft crews informed the command of the tank formations of the enemy's location, the position of its guns, the moving up of tanks, artillery, and so forth.

The troops and aviation prepared ahead of time for target designation and guidance, and in the course of combat operations they improved the methods of carrying them out. The experience of the cooperation of aviation and artillery showed that the artillery troops could successfully help the ground assault aircraft. On the fronts instructions were worked out for the cooperation of aviation and artillery. Thus, on the 3d Baltic Front, in July 1944, instructions were issued which described the target designation procedures for the ground assault planes by artillery ahead of the troops of the 1st Ground-Attack and 54th armies. The instructions pointed out that aviation should be called in through the representatives of the 14th Air Army who were at the observation posts of the artillery commanders of the combined-arms armies (Fig. 1). The ground-attack aircraft subunits sortied according to the air operations plan or according to the request of the ground troops. Communications between the command post of the commander of the air army and the airfield and artillery batteries assigned for target designation was provided by using the established coordination wave length. For ensuring the accuracy of target designation, a uniform coded chart was used, and from it the artillery battery provided data on the location of the target in meters from a coded point.

When receiving an order to open fire for target designation, the battery commander replied affirmation and gave his call number. The commander of the group of ground-attack planes in approaching the target, established radio contact with the battery which was to designate the target. Having received the signal, the battery sent off three salvos (12 shells) at intervals of 3 seconds. If the pilots did not spot the shell explosions, their commander requested a second spotting of the target. Target designation was carried out considering the range of artillery firing from the firing position to the target. In the example given in the figure, it equaled 9 km.




Fig. 1

- Key:
- 1) Command post of commander of artillery battery assigned for air target designation;
 - 2) Observation post of artillery battalion commander;
 - 3) Command post of air army;
 - 4) Observation post of commander of army artillery. Aviation representative of air army (air formation).

We should note the experience of solving the questions related to cooperation between the aviation of the 1st Air Army and the artillery of the 11th Guards Army and the 11 Guards Tank Corps in the preparations for the Belorussian Operation. In conducting games, including in a sand box, they worked out the methods of mutual target designation, as well as the maintaining of contact between the aviation and artillery in the course of the operation. In addition, the artillery troops recommended the safest altitude to the pilots at which the flights should be carried out considering the flight trajectory of the various calibers of artillery shells.

For making it easier for the pilots to locate the targets on the battlefield, provision was made to set check points by firing from tank cannons and artillery pieces.⁷ For example, in the 111 Guards Attack Air Corps and in the 11 Guards Tank Corps (commanders, respectively, Lt Gen Avn M. I. Goriachenko and Lt Gen Tank Trps V. S. Burdeynyy) provision was made for the following methods of target designation: by tank--shrapnel firing toward the target, by setting a check point over the target from the guns of tanks in which the aviation guidance officers were, with the required warning of the aircraft of this by radio, the radioing of target coordinates, and firing signal rockets toward the target, by the artillery--by setting a check point over the designated target at the request of the commander of the

III Ground-Attack Air Corps who was at the command post of the commander of the II Guards Tank Corps); by aviation--the diving of the aircraft at the targets; red signal rockets; radioing data; at night--the setting of light markers over the objects of the attack and in the direction of the movement of the tanks. All target designation signals were issued to executors beforehand and were carefully studied.

In the course of combat operations, it was often necessary to retarget the aircraft groups which were approaching the combat area. This was successfully carried out by a well-developed target designation system. For example, in the III Ground-Attack Air Corps, retargeting was carried out by the aviation guidance officers who were stationed in the tank formations and units. On 25 June 1944, the 25th Tank Brigade of the II Guards Tank Corps reached the village of Lisuny where it unexpectedly came under enemy fire. The guidance officer, having data on a sortie of ground attack planes to the brigade's area of combat operations for hitting a different target, with the approach of the group of aircraft to the battlefield, radioed: "Hit the enemy artillery located on the eastern edge of the forest directly in front of us. Look, I am setting a check point for target designation." After this, a check point was set above the target by firing from the gun of the tank where the guidance officer was. Seeing the bursts of the shell, the ground-attack planes found the target and attacked it. Using the results of their strike, the tank brigade moved ahead.⁸

The necessity of the signal "I am setting a check point" was dictated by the fact that the enemy was also using shells which produced a black color in exploding. For this reason the radio warning with the indication in what direction the check point was being set helped the ground-attack planes reach the target precisely. If a check point was not spotted, it was given again. As a rule, three or four rounds were required for setting the check point. It was better when it was set by bursts of colored shell smoke. Under the conditions of a rapidly changing situation, such retargeting was frequently carried out. On 26 June 1944 alone, 149 aircraft were retargeted because of the rapid advance of our tanks from the guidance radio of the III Ground-Attack Air Corps.⁹

The organization of nighttime target designation was the most complicated. The experience of the war provides us with examples of carrying out this mission. In the given instance ordinarily the bomber formations and units provided air support for the ground troops on the battlefield. They made air strikes, as a rule, deep in the enemy troop positions, attacking its second echelons located near rivers, lakes, population points and other markers clearly visible from the air or objects well-designated by artillery fire. Thus, in the concluding stage of the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation, in the zone of the 2d Ukrainian Front, intense engagements were underway to complete the defeat of the remnants of the surrounded enemy grouping in the area of Shenderovka. Our artillery had set several houses afire in this population point, and this made it possible for the flyers of the night bombers of the 5th Air Army (commander, Lt Gen Avn S. K. Goryunov), under very difficult conditions (a snow storm and at night) to reach the target precisely and make bomb strikes against it.

We should also note the experience of the 1st Air Army in nighttime guidance of aircraft to ground targets. For this the EOS Antiaircraft Illuminating Service utilized two types of existing searchlights: the small PP-45 and the large 3-15-4 in various combinations. With them two variations of target designation were employed.

If it was necessary to attack two targets at once, then the beam of a small searchlight was directed at each of them. The large searchlight focused its beam on one of the targets, overlapping it with the beam of the small one (Fig. 2). This made it possible for the night bombers to arrive precisely over the target. In the event that one important target was to be bombed by a large group of bombers, an intersecting of three searchlight beams was created over it (Fig. 3). The flyers reached this marker and made a precision bomb strike. Here the searchlights were turned on with the approach of the aircraft to the combat positions and were turned out after bombing had been completed. Each pilot precisely knew the location of the searchlights and the nature of their work (a fixed beam, a swinging beam, and so forth).




Fig. 2




Fig. 3

In the Berlin Operation, on the 1st Ukrainian Front, on 20 April 1945, the night bombers were making continuous strikes against the heavily fortified positions in the region of Kotbus. Here the target designation for them was provided by a staff officer from the 208th Night Bomber Air Division. Directly before the start of bomber operations, he established contact with the ground troops, and agreed with them

on the methods for designating their forward edge. In the area of Kotlow (6 km to the east of Kotbus), a PP-45 searchlight was set up. With the approach of the night bombers, the guidance officer gave the signal to the ground troops and the latter marked the forward edge. Then, at his command, the searchlight was turned on and its beam was directed to the target. These signals were given every 2 minutes, and this made it possible for the crews to carry out pinpoint bombing in direct proximity to their troops.

An analysis of the generalized experience of the Great Patriotic War in the area of the mutual identification and target designation of ground troops and aviation makes it possible to draw a number of conclusions on the ways for successfully solving this problem, and these have maintained their significance under present-day conditions. Thus, clear mutual identification and target designation were achieved only under the condition of observing the following requirements: instructing the personnel of the ground troops in the ability to identify friendly aircraft and designate the line of contact with the enemy; careful working through of the questions of cooperation for time, place and targets during the period of preparing for the operations at joint exercises and in training the troop and aviation officers on the terrain or with three-dimensional mock-ups with a plotted operational-tactical situation in the aim of practical study of the entire system of identification and target designation; the necessity of the integrated use of radio and radar, light signal devices, as well as increased-power signal rockets with an extended burning time; the maintaining and development of special training methods for the officers of the Air Force and Ground Troops for maintaining uninterrupted troop and aviation cooperation, and the mastery by them of the methods of guidance to the target from the ground using tank and artillery fire, as well as equipment; the training of TOE crews in the subunits of ground troops and equipped with radio, light and other means for aviation identification and target designation; a previously elaborated back-up target designation system, for the enemy always endeavored to create interference or imitate target designations (this is particularly important under the conditions of the fluid operations of the troops).

Since the war, qualitative changes have occurred in the ground troops and aviation as a result of technical progress. They are now armed with modern military equipment which possesses great mobility, supersonic jet aircraft, missiles and automated control equipment. Combat helicopters have also appeared. All of this places new, increased demands on solving the problem of troop and aviation identification and target designation.

FOOTNOTES

1. I. Brezhnev, "Malaya Zemlya" [Little Earth], Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 14.

2TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 35, inv. 260657, file 18, sheets 92-95.

3"Informatsionnyy Sbornik Upravleniya Voyennykh Vozdushnykh Sil Krasnoy Armii" [Informational Collection of the Air Force Directorate of the Red Army], No 24, Voenizdat, 1945, pp 12-13.

⁴"Shturmovaya Aviatsiya v Otechestvennoy Voiny" [Ground Attack Aviation in the Patriotic War], Collection of Articles, No 1, Voenizdat, 1946, p 91.

⁵Ibid., p 112.

⁶"Informatsionnyy Sbornik...", No 24, p 8.

⁷"Shturmovaya Aviatsiya...", p 74.

⁸Ibid., p 120.

⁹Ibid.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: ENGINEER SUPPORT OF GROUND ATTACKS

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22 Jul 80 pp 42-50

[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Chief of the Military Engineering Academy imeni V. V. Kuybyshev, Col Gen Engr Trps Ye. Kolibernov: "Engineer Support for the Penetration of Enemy Defenses Based on the Experience of the War." Passages in italics printed in bold face]

[Text] The theory of the engineer support for the breakthrough of enemy defenses in our army was worked out on the eve of the war. A major contribution to its elaboration was made by Hero of the Soviet Union and outstanding scientist, Professor, Doctor of Military Sciences D. M. Karbyshev, the centennial of whom will be celebrated by our nation this year. The basic provisions of this theory were reflected in the 1936 Field Manual as well as in the special regulations and textbooks of those times.

In the course of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Army gained enormous experience in breaking through enemy defenses under various conditions. In the first period, in particular during the counteroffensive at Moscow, our army skillfully broke through the hurriedly occupied focal defenses of the enemy. In the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, under severe winter conditions, a breakthrough of the defenses was carried out, and these defenses had been prepared by the Nazi troop for around a month, and even longer in certain areas. These defenses were shallow (7-8 km), but continuous, and were made up of two positions which were 3-5 km apart. Each position was equipped with two lines of trenches and emplacements for weapons. The most important sectors were covered by antitank and antipersonnel minefields. From 1943 until the end of the war, our army successfully broke through prepared enemy defenses which reached a depth of 150 km and more. Here the practical defensive area, as a rule, was 15-20 km deep and included two zones.

In the third period of the war, in 1944-1945 (in the Vyborg, East Prussian, Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations), it was necessary to break through enemy defenses which incorporated fortified areas, fortresses (cities), population points and individual urban structures.

The success in breaking through any defenses to a significant degree depended upon the quality of engineer support for the troop combat operations. It is no accident that the organization of this support was the concern of not only the chiefs of the

engineer troops and troop engineers, but also the commanders personally (the combined-arms commanders). They determined the nature and times for the engineer organization of the areas to be occupied by the troops, and gave instructions on the assigning of men and equipment from the branches of troops to aid the engineer units, as well as on making passageways and on other questions related to engineer support.

For example, the quantity and time for making passageways were usually determined by the army commanders in conducting reconnaissance with the corps (divisional) commanders.

In preparing for the operations, engineer support plans were worked out and these were approved by the commanders of the fronts (armies). They designated the methods for carrying out the basic missions in breaking through the enemy defenses and also the resources allocated for this.

The missions for the engineer support of the breakthrough of defenses were determined on the basis of the developing situation, and had their particular features in each operation. However, in all cases, it was essential first of all to covertly concentrate and position the assault groupings of the fronts and armies, and this was achieved by the engineer organization of their jump-off zones. Simultaneously, engineer reconnaissance of the enemy defenses was carried out intensely. Prior to the start of the breakthrough in virtually all the offensive operations, it was essential to organize passages through our own minefields and the enemy obstacles in front of its forward edge. In the course of the breakthrough of the defenses, and particularly their tactical area, it was imperative to support in engineer terms the advance of the battle formations of the advancing troops across the trench and mine zone, as well as the commitment to battle and combat operations of the mobile groups of the armies and fronts used for farthing the breakthrough of the enemy defenses.

In breaking through heavily fortified positions, fortified areas or in the capturing of cities of the greatest significance were the assault operations of the troops in which the engineer subunits were widely involved. The methods for carrying out these missions were selected depending upon the existing situation and were improved as experience was gained and engineer equipment introduced.

The organization of the jump-off zones for the assault groupings in the offensive operations at Moscow and Stalingrad in practical terms consisted in adapting the natural shelters and various structures (buildings) for the position of the troops, in building show trenches, as well as using the structures prepared during the previous defensive operations, in preparing communications lines and carrying out camouflage measures.

The engineer organization of the jump-off regions was most developed in the Battle of Kursk and in the subsequent offensive operations. For the purposes of the protection and concealed moving up of the troops to the breakthrough areas, emplacements, lit trenches, shelters, and areas of trenches and communications trenches were built for the personnel and military equipment. Moreover, in the jump-off zones, basic, secondary and dummy artillery firing positions, waiting and jump-off positions for the DIS (direct infantry support) tanks, command and observation posts were set up, the routes for the advance of the troops were also prepared and

camouflage measures carried out. All the missions were carried out, as a rule, under the guise of improving defenses.

In the area of the fortification organization of the terrain, in 1943, a transition was made from a system of individual foxholes to a system of trenches which became the basis not only of the defensive zones but also the troop jump-off areas.

In the preparing of the defenses and the counteroffensive at the Kursk Salient a particularly large amount of missions was carried out in the fortification equipping of the defensive positions and these were subsequently used as the jump-off positions. In particular, in the 13th Army of the Central Front (chief of engineer troops, Col Z. I. Kolesnikov), up to 8 km of trenches and communications trenches were dug per kilometer of front in the main defensive zone, and these were subsequently used for the concealed disposition of the troops in preparations for the counteroffensive. In digging the trenches and communications trenches in the Battle of Kursk and in all subsequent operations, provision was made for ensuring simultaneous attacks on the enemy forward edge by the rifle subunits of the first echelon and by the DIS tanks. The attacking subunits could close in through the communications trenches to the first enemy trench to an assault distance, that is, to 150-200 meters.

For the DIS tanks, concentration areas and jump-off positions were prepared 1-2 km from the forward edge, and from here the combat vehicles began to move up during the period of artillery softening up.

The concentration areas as well as the waiting and jump-off areas for the tank corps and armies were equipped so as to provide for their prompt commitment to battle for widening the breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone before the operational enemy reserves could be brought up.

A characteristic trait in a number of offensive operations during the second and third periods of the war was the fact that the jump-off areas for the offensive were taken up and equipped on bridgeheads captured on major water obstacles in the course of previous operations. In preparing the jump-off areas on a bridgehead, the throwing up and maintaining of bridges assumed the greatest significance.

Thus, as a result of the Belorussian and L'vov-Sandomir operations, the troops, respectively of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Front, in July 1944 reached the Vistula, they crossed it from a march formation and captured three bridgeheads in the regions of Magnuszew and Pulawy (the 1st Belorussian) and Sandomir (the 1st Ukrainian). From 12 and 14 January 1945, they commenced the Vistula-Oder Operation. For ensuring the concentration of the troops on the bridgeheads and contact with the other shore, 8 bridges were built and put up to the Magnuszew bridgehead, 8 to the Pulawy, and 13 to the Sandomir.

By the start of the Vistula-Oder Operation, the Magnuszew bridgehead had been widened to 70 km, and the number of bridges on it had been brought up to 21.¹

For the purposes of camouflaging the troops in the jump-off areas and concealing the directions of the main thrusts being prepared, dummy concentration areas were set up in preparing for a number of offensive operations. Here spurious foxholes, trenches and shelters were dug and designated, and models of tanks and equipment

were set out. Tank and artillery subunits were assigned to make the dummy areas seem alive.

The camouflage engineer measures confused the Nazi troops. The enemy repeatedly bombed the dummy areas, and sometimes even regrouped its troops, fearing an unexpected breakthrough of the Soviet troops in the sectors where these had been created.

Engineer reconnaissance of enemy defenses was aimed at disclosing the nature of its engineer organization, and above all establishing the presence and disposition of obstacles, the types of mines employed and their position in the mine fields. For achieving this aim, engineer observation posts (INP), reconnaissance and search groups were created, and combat engineers were assigned to the subunits and units carrying out reconnaissance in force. During the operations of the second and third periods of the war, the density of the INP was two-three posts and more per kilometer of breakthrough sector. Thus, the density of the INP on the 1st Belorussian Front during the Vistula-Oder Operation was three-four posts per kilometer of breakthrough sector.²

In preparing for the breakthrough, the engineer search and reconnaissance groups worked actively. For example, on the Stalingrad Front (chief of the engineer troops of the front, Maj Gen Engg Trps I. A. Petrov), the engineer reconnaissance groups made 24 sorties into the enemy rear and this secured data on the nature of its defenses.

For conducting engineer reconnaissance, the TOE combat engineer subunits were used. In 1944, in each combat engineer battalion of the rifle divisions, one combat engineer platoon was assigned as a non-TOE platoon of combat engineer scouts. They underwent special reconnaissance training.

Integrated use of various methods of engineer reconnaissance (including observation and search) helped our troops in ascertaining the system of enemy defenses, and above all the place and nature of the wire and mixed minefield obstacles set out by it. For example, for reconnoitering the obstacles in the Vistula-Oder Operation of the 1st Belorussian Front, for the purpose of detecting enemy minefields, just one soldier (Pfc Krupaz) made 42 sorties to the forward edge of enemy defenses.³ Here the combat engineer scout not only reconnoitered the minefields and established their limits, but also removed fuzes and mines.

All of this significantly contributed to the successful breakthrough of enemy defenses.

Passages in our own minefields and enemy obstacles in front of the enemy forward edge were usually made prior to the start of the breakthrough of the defenses in all offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War.

In the winter of 1941-1942, when the enemy actively mined only roads and particularly important approaches to the forward edge, the engineer troops rarely had to make passages prior to the start of the offensive.

In the second period of the war, regardless of the fact that the Nazis began to set out minefields more widely ahead of the forward edge, unmined areas still remained.

They could be used for the advance of the troops, and for this reason only a small number of passages was made. For example, in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, in the zone of advance of the 15th Guards Rifle Corps of the 57th Army, just four passages were made, and in the 50th Guards Rifle Division of the 5th Tank Army, six passages.

In the summer of 1943, when the enemy went over to creating solid minefields in front of the forward edge, passages had to be made on the entire breakthrough sector. Here tens of thousands of mines were removed. For example, in the counteroffensive at Kursk in July 1943, in the zone of the Bryansk Front alone, the engineer troops alone made 1,700 passages in their own and enemy minefields.² In building the passages in the breakthrough sector of the 11th Guards Army of the Western Front, more than 30,000 antitank and 12,000 antipersonnel mines were removed. The passages were built figuring two per rifle company and three-four per tank brigade.³

In the Belorussian Operation, in the summer of 1944, on the 3d Belorussian Front, in preparing the breakthrough in the zones of the four armies, 60 passages were made for tanks and 453 for the infantry; this provided for a simultaneous attack on the entire breakthrough front.⁴

By the start of the Vistula-Oder Operation of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts (January 1945), it had been possible to remove all our own minefields in the jump-off areas and make passages in the enemy minefields in front of the forward edge of its defenses. Here just on the bridgeheads in front of the breakthrough of the defenses on the 1st Belorussian Front, the combat engineers removed 80,000 antipersonnel and about 42,000 antitank mines. As a total in this operation, in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, the engineer troops made 672 passages in the enemy minefields. Here 19,483 antitank and 14,201 antipersonnel mines were removed.

The passages in our own minefields were built as a rule by hand. In the enemy minefields, this mission in 1941-1942 was carried out in the same manner, and beginning in 1943, using concentrated explosive charges and mangalore torpedoes, and from June 1945, for clearing in the course of an attack, they began to use the newly formed engineer-tank regiments equipped with tanks having the MTD clearers.

The number of passages in the breakthrough sectors was usually determined by the army commanders, and in certain instances also by the front commanders. The places for making them were carefully chosen and coordinated with the commanders of the rifle and tank units (subunits), and the approaches to them and the passages themselves were carefully marked by uniform indications.

In making passages, for marking them and for maintenance, as a rule, all the tank army and front engineer formations and units were assigned figuring one combat engineer squad per passage. In addition, provision was also made to have a reserve squad for every three-six passages. Usually for building the passages and organizing a traffic control service on them, each first echelon division in the main sector was reinforced with one combat engineer battalion. An emphasis was placed on the tactical flexibility of the engineer troops in the breakthrough sector.

Passages through our own minefields were made one-two nights prior to the start of the offensive, and in the enemy minefields during the night prior to the attack. Here mine-sweeping battalions were built for attacking the former.

The quality of the clearing and making of the passages was supervised by the officers of the engineer formations and units as well as by representatives from the staffs of the engineer troops in the fronts and armies.

The main means for the clearing of minefields and passages across the trench and minefield zone in the manner of breaking through the enemy defenses during the war was carried out by infantry escort groups, by DPs, tanks and artillery, and these were set up fighting in a combat engineer squad to a platoon for each first echelon battalion, in a combat engineer company per regiment (brigade) of DPs tanks and in a combat engineer platoon per divisional regiment. This was not always done.

When the offensive began, the main purpose of preparing for a wide-scale offensive, initiated and carried out by the army, was to break in the methods of crossing obstacles.

The main difficulty for the formations of the DPs tanks in the course of an attack before the introduction of the introduction of clearing tasks. However, there were no difficulties in the clearing of minefields. It was possible to do much more work in a number of directions. The main difficulty in supporting the operations in the clearing of minefields was to ensure that one for attacking the forward position and the other for the second position.

The main means for clearing across the trench and minefield zone, clearing groups, were organized on a wide scale. For the counteroffensive, the clearing groups were organized fighting one or two per division (according to the number of divisions). In the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, and in particular, in the counteroffensive, the clearing groups operated as part of the attacking infantry divisions. Each division had five combat engineers in each per rifle company. The clearing groups, along with the combat engineers accompanied by the DPs tanks.

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The experience of organizing such detachments was widespread in all subsequent operations of the Great Patriotic War. The road and bridge detachments were set up in divisions, corps and armies. They included combat engineer and pontoon bridge subunits which, in using the previously prepared structures, repaired and laid roads and column tracks, assembled and threw up bridges in crossing water obstacles in the course of a breakthrough. These were the prototypes of the present-day traffic support detachments.

Engineer support for the commitment to battle and combat operations of mobile groups (tank corps and armies) used for widening the breakthrough of the tactical enemy defensive zone, included the following: Equipping the concentration areas and waiting areas, preparing the routes of advance (2-3 per tank corps and 4-6 per tank army) from the waiting (jump-off) area to the start line, the clearing of the start line, the covering of the flanks of the mobile groups using obstacles, as well as the making of passages through enemy obstacles when the formations of the mobile groups went over to the attack.

The preparations of the routes of advance for the tank corps and armies usually were carried out by the road and bridge-building detachments as well as by the rifle units and subunits. The clearing of the lines for committing the tank formations and field forces to the engagement as well as the covering of their flanks by obstacles were carried out, as a rule, by the engineer units and subunits of the first echelon troops. For covering the flanks special groups and detachments numbering up to a combat engineer battalion were organized from the engineer troops of the fronts and armies.

In using mobile groups for widening the breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone, the making of passages in the enemy obstacles was also entrusted to the engineer units and subunits of the first echelon combined-arms formations and field forces. The companies of the engineer reinforcement battalions assigned to the tank and mechanized corps for supporting combat operations were in fact used as traffic support detachments. Their main missions were reconnoitering possible bypasses and repairing bridges.

It must be said that the organization which developed in the war for engineer support of committing the mobile groups of the fronts, including for widening the breakthrough of enemy defenses, did not fully conform to their place and importance in the operations. The tank armies were a means for developing the offensive of the front troops, and the support of their commitment often was entrusted to the combined-arms armies in whose area they were operating. This did not always give the proper result.

Utilization of engineer troops in assault operations in the breaking through of heavily reinforced lines and the taking of cities was particularly characteristic for the third period of the Great Patriotic War. However, they also acquired definite experience in its second period, in particular in the battle for Stalingrad.

For breaking through enemy fortifications, assault detachments were created up to a rifle battalion strong and groups up to a rifle company in size. Each assault detachment included up to two combat engineer platoons and these were each issued 10-15 concentrated charges, hollow charges, hand grenades and smoke pots. An assault group included from a squad to a platoon of combat engineers.

The assault detachments and groups destroyed firing and other structures in centers of resistance and enemy strongpoints, and thereby supported the successful advance of the basic formations of our troops deep into the enemy defenses.

The positive experience of the actions of the assault detachments and groups disclosed the necessity of not only reinforcing the first echelon formations with combat engineer subunits, but also forming special formations and units of engineer troops.

Considering this, on 31st October and 1st May 1945 the formation of 15 assault combat engineer brigades with the mission of engineer support for the breakthrough of strong enemy defensive zones and lines.¹⁰ The use of these brigades which included subunits with backpack flamethrowers as well as the flamethrower tank regiments which had been organized by this time substantially increased the effectiveness of the operations achieved by the assault detachments and groups in breaking through enemy fortified positions.

The assault combat engineer brigades acquired particularly great experience in successful assault operations in breaching the cities of Poznan, Budapest, Danzig, Bregenz, and others, in breaking through enemy defenses in the Seelow Hills, as well as in the capture of the East Prussian Operation. In these operations, along with groups of 100-200 units of engineer troops, extensive use was also made of the assault combat engineer regiments of the MVD Reserve of the Supreme High Command. Thus, in the last 100 days of the Operation, three assault combat engineer brigades and one assault combat engineer regiment participated in the assault operations of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, and of engineer troops of the front, Lt Gen Engr Trps N. P. Malin.

In the last operation, the breakthrough of the heavily fortified positions along the Western Wall of the Oder and Neisse and particularly the positions on the Western Wall in the approaches to Berlin, and in the capturing of this city was achieved by the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. Their actions were greatly aided by the able organizational work of the chiefs of the engineering troops of the fronts, Gen's I. Frushiyakov and I. V. Galitskiy. For organization of assault formations and groups, for example, in the 1st Belorussian Front, 44 engineer combat engineer companies and 3 flamethrower tank regiments were assigned. All of these were almost one-third of all the engineer forces in the armies.

In the final stages of the assault on Berlin, the engineer subunits built passageways under the cover of tank fire and under the cover of tank fire as the assault groups broke through the defenses.

The success of the assault groups was supported by using explosive charges to make passageways for the assault, infantry and tanks across an entire city block. The engineer troops used the charges and charges and charges. The engineer troops used the charges and charges. They went off and destroyed the firing positions and buildings in which enemy garrisons were located. In the battles for the city, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front alone made 1,200 passageways in the city and built 1,200 passageways in the city. They built 1,200 passageways in the city and built 1,200 passageways in the city.

The jump-off of engineer troops of the fronts and armies which supported the breakthrough of enemy defenses in the operations of the Great Patriotic War showed a tendency to increase in size. Thus, while in the operations of 1942 the density of engineer troops was around two companies per kilometer of breakthrough sector, in the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, it was up to five-seven companies, and in the operations conducted in the second half of 1944 and in 1945, it had increased from 8-11 to 17-22 companies.¹⁴ This became possible due to the more flexible and decisive maneuvering of the engineer reserve which existed not only for Hq SHC, but also the reserve created in the divisions, corps, armies and fronts.

Thus, engineer support for the breakthrough of enemy defenses in the course of the Great Patriotic War was continuously improved.

In the engineer organization of the jump-off areas for an offensive, in the place of individual foxholes and shelters, continuous trenches and communications passages began to be created.

Of important significance was the prompt making of the required number of passages in minefields. While in the first operations of the Great Patriotic War they were made only manually, subsequently for this they began to use the explosive methods, using concentrated charges and bangalore torpedoes for this. In 1943, the Soviet Army for the first time in the experience of the war, used a PT-5 clearer, and engineer-tank regiments were formed, and passages began to be built in step with the offensive. This provided complete surprise for the attack on the forward defensive edge. Experience showed that engineer support for the committing to battle of the mobile groups of the fronts using the first echelon combined-arms armies was ill-advised. This mission had to be carried out by the chiefs of the engineer troops of the front using their own men and equipment.

In preparing roads and routes, particularly in wooded and swampy areas, the practice of creating road and bridge-building detachments proved effective as well as the slipping of combat equipment, particularly tanks, with cross-country devices, as well as the early preparation of road and bridge elements from local lumber. The creating of groups for escorting the DIS tanks, the infantry and artillery was widespread.

The success of troop assault operations was achieved by using assault detachments and groups which in addition to the rifle, tank and artillery subunits, also included subunits of engineer troops equipped with flamethrower tanks and backpack flamethrowers.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, of important significance was the formation of special assault combat engineer brigades, the engineer-tank and flamethrower-tank regiments, as well as other special units and subunits.

The combined-arms commanders gave great attention to organizing the engineer support for the breaking through of defenses. This was affirmed the correctness of the decision taken by Headquarters in 1941 that the chiefs of the engineer troops of the fronts and armies are simultaneously the deputy commanders.

The Great Patriotic War also showed that the progressing motorization of the army, the greater maneuverability of the troops and the increase in the rate of their

advance raised the scope and reduced the time for carrying out all the engineer support missions and required the broad use of various types of mechanization.

The historical value and significance of engineer support for the breakthrough of enemy defenses in the operations of the Great Patriotic War consists in the fact that it provides combat-tested experience, a study of which helped to find the ways to solve new engineer problems arising in line with the altered nature and conditions for preparing and conducting a modern offensive operation, and above all, the carrying out of its first, most important stage, the breakthrough of the enemy tactical defensive zone.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO, 188a, Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, folio 69, inv. 272735, file 23, sheet 27.

2. Ibid., folio 21, sheet 28.

3. "Inzhenernye Voyska Sovetskoy Armii v Vozhneyshikh Operatsiyakh Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny" [Engineer Troops of the Soviet Army in the Major Operations of the Great Patriotic War], Voenizdat, 1958, p. 213.

4. TsAMO, folio 69, inv. 272735, file 99, sheet 108.

5. "Inzhenernye Voyska v Boyakh za Sovetskuyu Rodiny" [The Engineer Troops in the Battles for the Soviet Motherland], Voenizdat, 1970, p. 166.

6. TsAMO, folio 69, inv. 272735, file 15, sheet 10.

7. Ibid., inv. 272735, file 21, sheets 181-223.

8. "Inzhenernye Voyska v Boyakh za Sovetskuyu Rodiny," p. 141.

9. TsAMO, folio 99, inv. 272734, file 75, sheet 31.

10. Ibid., inv. 12112, file 20, sheet 128.

11. Ibid., folio 241, inv. 36635, file 3/4, sheets 43, 75.

12. Ibid., folio 69, inv. 353809, file 2, sheet 221.

13. Ibid., sheet 223.

14. "Inzhenernye Voyska v Boyakh za Sovetskuyu Rodiny," pp. 380-381, 383.

15. "Inzhenernye Voyska" [Engineer Troops], "Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal" 1980.

16. Ibid.,
17. Ibid.,

WARTIME OPERATIONS: THE MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN

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[Article published under the heading "Memoirs," by Lt Gen (Ret) K. Kalashnikov*:
"On the Far Eastern Borders"]

[Text] In October 1944, the Karelian Front, together with the Northern Fleet, successfully completed the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation, having concluded the defeat of the Nazi invaders in the Arctic. Battle ended here. In November, our front was broken up and field headquarters were assigned to the Headquarters reserve.

Everyone was awaiting a new assignment with impatience, and were guessing where we would be sent. At the end of March 1945, the member of the military council, Col Gen Terentiy Fomich Shtykov, invited me to his office and said:

"Get ready to move to a new place."

"Is it far away?"

"You will learn later. But for now select an operations group, some ten men. You will be traveling with the military council. Our remaining workers will travel in the second echelon."

On 1 April we loaded up into the railway cars. The train started up. Everyone was pressed against the windows to see where the train would turn, to the west or to the southwest. But it, in picking up speed, headed east. There was confusion on the faces of the officers and generals. What could this mean? After some time we received information that our government had broken the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact which had been concluded in April 1941. Because of the treacherous policy of the ruling Japanese circles vis-a-vis the USSR, it had lost all sense. It began to be clear why we were moving east.

On 13 April, the entire field headquarters of the former Karelian Front headed by Mar SU K. A. Meretskov arrived at the staff of the Maritime Troop Group which had been separated from the Far Eastern Front and which we were to head. This group,

*In 1944-1945, K. F. Kalashnikov was the chief of the political administration of the Karelian and then the 1st Far Eastern fronts.

by our arrival, consisted of three combined-arms armies and one air army. Among them was the famous 1st Red Banner Army (commander, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Col Gen A. P. Bel-Borodov), the 23rd Army (commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Col Gen I. M. Chistyakov) and the 35th Army (commander, Lt Gen N. D. Zakhvatayev).

The move of the 5th Army (commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Col Gen N. I. Krylov) had been completed. For additional manning and for the rearming of the troops in the group, trains began arriving one after another from the west with tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, conventional artillery, and the famous "katyushas" (rocket launchers), and aircraft-mighty military equipment which had been tested in victorious engagements. Headquarters reinforced the troops with personnel which had been tempered in the battles against the Nazi invaders. The Main Political Directorate also provided great help, in making available to us around 500 battle-tested political workers. Many comrades from the local troops were sent to the month-long courses started by us for political workers, and officers who had arrived from the west were assigned to the units.

It must be pointed out that the creation of the Main Command of Soviet troops in the Far East headed by Mar Sh A. M. Vasilevsky was of great significance. Col Gen L. A. Shokin was appointed the member of the military council.

Arriving with them was Ilyevich Shokin was a group of experienced political workers. All the questions of political work began to be solved more effectively and purposefully. Early attention was given to improving the vigilance and combat readiness of the troops, to increasing the experience of the Great Patriotic War, to strengthening the morale of the troops and to indoctrinating hate for the Japanese militarists.

From the very first days, we established close ties with the military council and political directorate of the Pacific Fleet. We had common problems to solve. And contact here should be the closest. The sailors asked me to give a briefing at the courses for the chiefs of the political bodies, and to share the experience of party political work in the offensive operations conducted on the Volkhov and Karelian Fronts. I willingly carried out this request.

In order to better understand the situation, the officers from the political department of the Maritime Group for almost a month were continuously in the troops, carrying out active work there. The soldiers, sergeants and officers from the units and formations were longing for battle, but they did not have combat experience. Having studied the state of affairs in the army divisions, we prepared a directive from the military council "On the Content of Party Political Work in the Units and Formations of the Maritime Troop Group for the Near Future," and on 16 May sent it out to the troops. A particular feature of this document was that it was completely permeated with a spirit of the pending offensive, although not a word was said in it about a war against militaristic Japan. At that time our newspapers could not even write about this. In carrying out the directive, in May we held courses for the chiefs of the political departments of the armies, corps, divisions and brigades, and in June, courses for the deputy regimental and battalion commanders for political affairs. In them we spoke of the necessity for preparing the troops to deal a crushing blow against the Japanese militarists and their Kwantung Army in order to eliminate the center of aggression in the Far East, and to shorten the time of ending the war and assist in rapidly restoring universal peace.

The troops of the group realized that the struggle would not be easy. The enemy in the Maritime-Manchurian sector had a grouping 350,000-strong. This was a large force. And the Japanese defenses were strong and well-equipped in engineering terms.

In the agitation and propaganda work, the emphasis was put on unmasking the inimical essence of Japanese imperialism, and showing the atrocities committed by the samurai in the Soviet Maritime Province during the intervention of 1918-1922. We told the soldiers of the events at Lake Khasan and on the Khalkin Gol River, as well as of the treacherous conduct of the Japanese aggressors during the period of the war of the Soviet people against Nazi Germany. In a little more than a year, from the end of 1941 through the beginning of 1943, the Japanese military had committed over 500 provocations in the Maritime Province alone.²

The political directorate of the troop group and the political departments of the armies published in a mass addition an interesting story by A. Stepanov entitled "The Tragedy in Chemulpo," and also republished a large number of selections from his novel "Port Arthur." Poster albums were published on "Japanese Aircraft," "Japanese Tanks," "Japanese Mines," and "Japanese Artillery," as well as the maps "Soviet Maritime Province, Manchuria and Korea," and "Japan and the Countries of the Pacific Ocean."

In large editions we published various instructions which gave the basic requirements of the regulations and manuals considering the experience of the offensive battles conducted on the Volkhov and Karelian fronts, and the particular features of the Far Eastern mountain-tayga theater of war. Instructions were printed for the scout, marksman, machine-gunner, mortar operator, artilleryman, signalman, tankman, and driver, and nor were the road worker, the medical worker nor the warehouse worker forgotten. The poster "A Chatterer--A Gold Mine for the Spy" which we had made on the Volkhov Front was brought along to the Far East. Here it was printed in an addition of 10,000 copies.

From the experience of the conducted offensive operations we realized how important the conducting of continuous party political work was for success. And this was achieved primarily by creating strong, full-blooded party and Komsomol organizations in the subunits, by the prompt instructing of the party and Komsomol organizers, and by the prompt replacing of activists and regular political workers who had been put out of action. The political bodies paid particular attention to these questions. During the preparatory period tens of thousands of the best soldiers were admitted to the party and the Komsomol.

By the start of the offensive,³ there were more than 169,000 communists in the party organizations of the 1st Far Eastern Front. On 1 August 1945, in the 25th Army of the 1st Far Eastern Front, the number of communists and Komsomol members was 78 per cent of the total personnel.

The party bodies devoted a great deal of attention to the correct placement of the communists. For example, in the 1st Battalion of the 50th Rifle Regiment of the 39th Rifle Division of the 1st Red Banner Army, the communists were allocated as follows: 23 of them in the battalion staff and individual subunits, 31 in the 1st Rifle Company, 33 in the 2d, 46 in the 3d, 32 in the Machine Gun Company and 29 in the Mortar Company. Here all the squad commanders and the gunners of the medium and light machine guns were party members or candidate members.

At the beginning of August, together with the chief of the department for party organizational work of the political directorate, Col I. K. Tverdokhlebov and his deputy, Lt Col M. P. Gubanov, we worked out a plan of measures to support the carrying out of the front's combat mission. It was approved by the commander and the member of the military council. It provided for the sending of large groups of workers from the political directorate into all the armies so that they would provide help to the commanders and political bodies in explaining the announcement of the Soviet government of a declaration of war against Japan, the appeal of the military council to the troops of the front, and the informing of the entire personnel of the combat missions and orders. These groups should be involved in preparing and conducting party and Komsomol meetings in the companies and battalions (depending upon the situation), in examining the question of the place of the communist and the Komsomol member in combat, as well as assemblies and meetings of the personnel with an agenda of "Aggressive Japan--The Most Evil Enemy of Our People."

Nor did we forget the work among the Japanese soldiers or the Chinese and Korean population, and the explaining of the liberation mission of the Soviet troops to them. In using the experience of the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany, the political directorate of the front published and distributed over 20 titles of leaflets, posters and pamphlets with a total run of around 6 million copies in Chinese, Japanese and Korean.

During the night of 1 August 1945, our offensive started against the enemy troops positioned in Manchuria.

I will never forget the night of 2 August. I was then at an auxiliary command post of the front located in a forest near Grodekovo. The Japanese were just several kilometers from the border station. Mar Meretskov left for Beloborodov's command post. When he returned (it was already midnight), I noticed that the commander was greatly concerned. Kirill Afanas'yevich [Meretskov] explained what the problem was. Following the experience of the Berlin Operation, it had been planned that the offensive would start during the night, using searchlights. But outside it was pouring rain. The lights would be of no help. And the artillery would fire at random as the targets could not be seen because of the rain and fog. And there would be little benefit from such artillery softening up. And the appointed time of the offensive was approaching. What should be done? Meretskov always excelled in the boldness of his decisions. However this time his order was a surprise for us. The offensive would be started without artillery softening up!

"The weather is on our side," he explained.

One had to be totally confident of the valor and skill of the soldiers and officers to take such a step. In the pitch black, in the rain and fog, thousands of soldiers without a single shot were advancing on the enemy positions. The commanders of the forward detachments, with the aid of the border troops, having carefully studied the terrain, led their subunits toward the enemy fortifications. Ahead were the combat engineers who cleared passages through the minefields and wire obstacles, and behind them the scouts who took by surprise the enemy outposts taking cover from the bad weather and destroyed them. When the Japanese came to their senses, it was already too late as our units were on top of their defenses. The battle in the trenches grew heated.

A great deal of effort was required to cross the enemy Fortified Border Zone. Its length was 40 km along the front, and its depth around 30. Here there were 650 structures, including 295 permanent emplacements, more than a hundred reinforced concrete shelters and armored cupolas. The key center of resistance was Camel Hill. We had repeatedly looked at it through the binoculars. This was a stoney hillock 700 m high, the sides of which were solidly strewn with defensive works. It was taken by storm by a battalion under the command of the communist, Maj G. N. Glazunov, from the 144th Rifle Division. I was phoned from the 5th Army by Col I. K. Iverdokhlebov who had arrived there with a group of political workers, and was told how the hill was taken. In benefiting from the darkness, the men from Glazunov's battalion skirted it and attack the Japanese from the rear. The Japanese opened up with very heavy fire from all types of weapons. However this did not stop the Soviet soldiers. With grenades and bayonets they drove the enemy from the shelters and communications trenches.

The 1st Red Banner Army advanced successfully. Behind the forward detachment, in knocking over trees, came the tanks. The combat engineers cleared a passage and covered the swamps. And where previously there had not even been a path, column tracks arose. From the interrogating of Japanese generals later it was discovered that they had not believed that even a small detachment could get through here, let alone a large modern army with artillery, heavy vehicles and cumbersome loads. This stunned the enemy.

Near the frontier the last garrisons were still resisting in the Japanese concrete permanent emplacements, but the wave of the offensive was already sweeping scores of kilometers deep into the enemy defenses. Both in the preparatory period and in the course of the offensive, party political work was carried out continuously. Two days prior to it, a group of officers headed by the deputy chief of the political directorate, Col M. M. Vavilov, was sent to the first Red Banner Army. They provided great help to the commanders and political workers in readying the troops for the offensive battles which they conducted skillfully.

The troops of the 25th Army also fought skillfully. I recall the 384th Rifle Division of this army and the chief of its political department, Lt Col Pavel Semenovitch Shilykovskiy, an old Far Easterner. This division was the first to cross the very difficult path from Dunning to Dunhua. In order to maintain the high morale of the men, the command and the political department of the formation made skillful use of such an important incentive as the prompt decorating of outstanding men. Orders and medals were presented directly on the battlefield, and in the breaks between the battles, the heroes described to their comrades why they had been given awards. Certainly this was the most effective exchange of combat experience.

The komсомol members of the 25th Army were famous on the entire front and throughout the nation. Here they worked skillfully with the youth. The 384th Division, for example, over a week of battles admitted more than 100 of the finest young fighters to the komсомol. Shilykovskiy told me about one of the young heroes of the division. In breaking through the Dunning fortified zone, the attacking subdivisions were forced to hit the dirt from the fire of an enemy permanent emplacement. The komсомol member Aleksandr Pirsov let off several bursts from his submachine gun. Without any result. Then his ammunition ran out. Reflecting briefly, the soldier threw himself into the firing port and blocked it with his chest. The enemy machine gun ceased firing. The company rose to the attack and carried out the mission.

In the course of combat operations, effective work was carried out by the editors of the front newspaper led by the editor Col B. P. Pavlov. Its entire issue of 10 August was devoted to events of the first day of the offensive. It opened with the editorial "Wider Use of Nighttime for Attacking the Enemy!" The correspondents Maj G. Ladysev and Capt N. Zanin told impressively of the nighttime storming of the hill by the subunit of Hero of the Soviet Union, Capt D. Moskalev. Nighttime battle was described in detail in the stories "A Rapid Strike" and "The Battle of Sinochkan." The newspaper generalized the experience of the nighttime attacks and glorified the heroes in the storming of enemy fortifications. From the first Red Banner Army, Col M. M. Vavilov announced that the offensive was being carried out according to the plan. However, great difficulties were encountered. The artillery, engineer units and bridging equipment had fallen behind. The units and subunits which did not succeed in capturing bridges had to cross the rivers on available equipment. The rear services had fallen behind and the ammunition and food was late in being delivered.

"Let us try to rectify the situation," said Vavilov, "so this doesn't always happen."

But he was most concerned by the fact that in the 39th Division, of the 200 applications to the party, not a single one had been reviewed by the party commission. The vehicle with the party records workers was stuck far in the rear. The divisional newspaper was delivered on the second or third day.

I got in touch with the chief of the army political department Gen K. Ya. Ostroglazov, and asked him to take measures. Later on I got impatient and asked:

"Where are you now?"

He named the spot.

"I'll be there in an hour," I said.

In the column of trucks, with difficulty I found Ostroglazov's vehicle. We turned off the road and began to talk. Konstantin Yakovlevich [Ostroglazov] reported how the shortcomings were being eliminated. With the help of workers from the political directorate, the situation was straightened out. The party commissions were provided with transport. Now their sessions were being held during brief halts. The editorial staffs of the divisional newspapers had been brought closer to the advancing units.

Later on Ostroglazov told about the actions of the 257th Tank Brigade. It was under the command of Col G. S. Anishchik, and chief of the political department was Lt Col K. K. Rol'bin. They were decisive and enterprising officers. The brigade had got into a difficult situation in the battle for Bamiantung, in the region of the gold fields. The Japanese were putting up desperate resistance, in endeavoring to halt at any price the tanks moving separately from the infantry. At that time Anishchik and Rol'bin in tanks dashed forward and began to destroy the enemy firing points. By their example, they inspired on the remaining crews. The enemy strongpoint was crushed.

During period of quiet the chief of the political department assembled his co-workers, he summed up what had been done and pointed to shortcomings. Thus, during all the

battles the party political work in the brigade subunits was carried out continuously and provided for the excellent fulfillment of the combat missions.

For these battles many workers of the political department were awarded orders.

Heavy battles developed for Mudanjiang. Here was located the main grouping of enemy troops. Together with a tank brigade, the subunits of the 300th and 22d Rifle divisions fought successfully. I happened to visit the 22d Division during a short quiet period and was present at a company party meeting in the 246th Rifle Regiment. The question of the role of communists in street battles was being discussed. The meeting was not overly verbose. I recorded its decision:

"1. We, the communists, in the forthcoming street battles will fight boldly and with initiative. By our personal example we will mobilize the nonparty soldiers to carry out heroic feats in combat.

"2. The group party organizers in the platoons are to give specific assignments to the communists.

"3. The editor of the combat leaflet, Comrade Ivanov, in the course of the street battles is to issue express leaflets devoted to the outstanding men and to pass them along."

Thirty minutes later the company was back in battle. The communists kept their word. Their personal example contributed to the successful carrying out of the mission.

I would not err if I said that during the entire time of the offensive, the fiercest battles were those for the city of Mudanjiang which was in the zone of advance of the 1st Red Banner and 5th armies. The Japanese had turned it into a strong center of resistance covering the routes into Central Manchuria. For several days and nights the struggle raged for each district, for each street, for each house.

Late in the evening of 16 August, I went to see the member of the military council T. F. Shtykov. Terentiy Fomich [Shtykov] smiled.

"Well, it has just been announced that our troops have taken Mudanjiang. The 300th Division has distinguished itself," he said.

"Of Gen Cherepanov?" I asked.

"Yes, do you know him?"

"Before the offensive I was in this division and spoke with its commander. He is thoughtful and assertive."

"Right. Gen Cherepanov from the very outset of the battles has fought skillfully and energetically. The division has distinguished itself at Bamiantung and now in the battle for Mudanjiang. More must be said of it in our newspaper. Let us phone the editor."

In actuality, there was something to say about the 300th Division. During the 12 days of the offensive, it had crossed more than 400 km over roadless terrain. Its

Commander had been wounded in battle, and had lost an arm. The motherland hero, Yakovlev was the first for skillful leadership of the formation, for courage and valor. Mr. (M) Kuznetsov, Nikolayevich Chersky was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

(3) Allowing the troops of the front developed rapid. The Chinese joyously received the Soviet soldiers. With a broad smile they stuck up their thumb and re-joined. "Shangge, Shangge!" (Good, Good!)

At the railway station (the Chinese Eastern Railroad) on 24 August, a meeting of Chinese youth was held at which an appeal was approved. It voiced strong thanks to the Korean people and the Red Army for liberating the Chinese people from the suppression of the damned enemy, the Japanese pirates. The participants of the meeting signed a petition of Manchuria Province to express profound gratitude to the Russian people and the Red Army, as well as help the Red Army fully liberate Manchuria from the Chinese invaders.

living with such meetings. I recall a speech at one of them by the rural teacher from the village of Silchue Hsiang. He said: "After occupation by Japan life in Ma Kung's Taiwan was intolerable. There were few food products, and no clothing. Fortunately the Red Army has liberated us. It has dealt such a blow to the Japanese that they will never recover. Previously the Japanese always were shouting about the goodness of the Red Army, and now they are fleeing from it like rats."

By 11 August, the Kuiper troops had defeated the Kwangtung Army. However, individual actions continued until the end of the month.

The troops of the front carried out their mission. Along with the units of the Transbaykal and 2d Far Eastern fronts, with the help of the Pacific Fleet and the 1st Soviet Air Force, the main forces of the Kwantung Army were surrounded and taken prisoner.

The surrender of Japan and the end of the war in the Far East created favorable conditions for the peoples of China, Korea and the other countries of East and Southeast Asia to successfully struggle for their freedom and independence. The Soviet Army provided enormous aid to the Chinese revolutionary forces. Immediately after the defeat of the Kuangtung Army, all its weapons and ammunition were made available to the Chinese People's Liberation Army. This included more than 4,500 guns, 10,000 machine guns, 200 tanks, 10,000 machine machine guns, 100,000 machine machine guns, and much other captured material. Also turned over were 100,000 tons of food, 100,000 tons of clothing, 100,000 tons of medicine, and much other material. Also turned over were 100,000 tons of food, 100,000 tons of clothing, 100,000 tons of medicine, and much other material. Also turned over were 100,000 tons of food, 100,000 tons of clothing, 100,000 tons of medicine, and much other material.

[illegible]

Thus, Japan was defeated. On one of those days, a group of officers from the political directorate climbed the famous Electric Cliff described in the novel by A. Stepanov "Port Arthur." From the top we had a good view of the Bay of Port Arthur, and beyond it the infinite stretches of the sea. Each of them spontaneously recalled the words of the popular song: "And their campaign ended on the Pacific."

FOOTNOTES

¹ TsAMO, 8804, Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, folio 234, inv. 1026, file 7, sheets 1-13.

² Istoriya KPSSU, History of the CPSU, Vol. 5, Book 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p. 622.

³ On 1 August 1945, the Maritime Group was renamed the 1st Far Eastern Front.

⁴ TsAMO, folio 826, inv. 107825, file 1, sheet 14.

⁵ Ibid., folio 244, inv. 1278, file 10, sheet 182.

⁶ "Izbrannyye Voinny Mirskoy Voiny" History of World War II, Vol. II, Voenizdat, 1980, p. 210.

⁷ "Proletariat" Voenno-Istoricheskyy zhurnal, 1980.

⁸ Ibid.
⁹ Ibid., 1980.

COMBAT TRADITIONS: LOYALTY TO THE COMBAT COLORS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 80 signed to press 22 Jul 80 pp 62-67

Article by Senior Science Associate of the Central Museum of the USSR Armed Forces V. Rybkina, and Col G. Solonitsyn: "Under the Combat Colors"*

Text: Some 35 years ago, the salvoes of the artillery salute died away fired off in honor of the world historical victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic war over Nazi Germany.

Under standards, specially made for the national celebration, the Victory Parade, were marching through Red Square the heroic representatives of the Soviet Army and Navy. The finest of the fine received the honorable right to carry the glory-wreathed colors of the units and formations in the parade. The combat banners decorated with order ribbons waved in the first two ranks over each composite regiment of the front. In the column of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the colors of the 340th Guards Rifle Regiment were carried by Hero of the Soviet Union, Guards Sgt V. I. Kudrin. In forward positions, with grenades he had destroyed eight tanks and scores of Nazis.¹ But the guardsman was famous not only for his military mastery. When wounded, the sergeant in the course of combat saw that the standard bearer and assistants had fallen. V. I. Kudrin, under heavy fire, crawled to the sacred object of the regiment, and delivered it to the staff. In the parade the hero was carrying precisely these colors blackened with the smoke of battle.

For 1,418 days, the men of the Soviet Army and Navy fought to the victorious finale of the war inspired by the red banners, the immortal symbols of the Soviet state and the Communist Party, symbols of military honor, valor and glory. The flames of the colors, the glint of the orders on the panels and uniforms, the precise step and the intense yet bright faces of the parade participants--all of this created an unforgettable picture of a triumphant march of victors. And after them, soldiers to the growing rumble of drums, threw down the colors of the enemy units and formations on the war paving stones at the foot of the V. I. Lenin Mausoleum.

After the war, the Soviet Army began to convert to new peacetime establishments without detriment to the military readiness of the troops, the 30 elder ages were

*Last of a series of articles devoted to the tradition of loyalty to the combat colors. For the beginning see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 11, 1978; No 1, 3, 5, 7, 1979; No 1, 1980.

January 1947. In solemn ceremonies, the veterans of the battles, in bidding farewell to their fellow servicemen and army officers, ordered that the combat traditions of their regiment be added to and the heroic labor of the people unflinchingly protected. And each person, kneeling down, with emotion kissed the edge of the crimson banner.

The veterans of the war and war not only survived by demobilization. Many lay, whole regiments and the headquarters of corps and armies were disbanded. The soldiers of these formations were taken over by the central museums of the Soviet Army and Air Force. They laid an honorable place among the most sacred relics of the Soviet past, having left behind them thousands of the units and formations, have not become lost exhibits. The stories of the guides about the military feats of the soldiers and officers, carried on under their protection have inspired a new generation of the defenders of the homeland, and have caused a desire in the youth to continue the business of the past hero -- and engagements in their deeds and actions.

Under the new conditions, complicated by the international situation, the party Central Committee has demanded that the schooling and indoctrination of the Armed Forces personnel be based on the previously tested principle of teaching the troops what is needed for the present struggle, and to give to the extensive introduction of the new Soviet military and scientific achievements of Soviet military science. These measures, taken by the Central Committee in 1946 and 1948 combined-arms manuals, in which the party gave the leadership to the party and the government on the new military regulations, fully regulated their lives, and determined the bases of military discipline.

In 1947, the Central Committee approved in 1947, the new regulations, which gave the importance of the military oath, military discipline and the role of the soldier in the unit. From the first paragraph of the first chapter, Article 1, it says: "Every soldier must observe the military oath" and "protect the honor of his unit like the apple of his eye." The appendices to the regulations contained the complete text (with insignificant amendments to the Unit Regulations) approved by the Congress of the USSR Supreme Soviet in December 1946.

The new regulations emphasized a deeper role in improving the quality of military and political education, and in strengthening international work with the personnel. It also emphasized the activities of the commanders, the political bodies and the party organizations with the increased attention to the propagandizing of the military traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces. A special subject was incorporated in the program for military exercises, and one of the sections of this subject was devoted to the study of legends of the Soviet colors. In the visual agitation of the war years, the main theme was the officer class. They began to more widely show the campaign records of the units and formations, and the fruits of the front-line fighters' work brought to the military colors. With the new recruits, commanders and political officers, at which the participants of battles took the oath before the glorious flag of their regiments and using specific examples of their own service to be added to military duty and in the combat colors in war and peace.

The new regulations, the Central Committee as well as the divisional newspapers, began to actively propagandize the traditions of loyalty to the unit colors and

to take up events related to their trooping and to the military past. For example, the newspaper *Za RodoINU* on 3 August 1949 on its pages carried a detailed story of how the men were introduced to the combat colors of the unit, devoting the first column to this. The editorial stated that the red banner has always embodied the loyalty of the Soviet people to the socialist revolution and to the immortal cause of V. I. Lenin. It went on to explain that loyalty to the combat colors in peacetime is manifested in the exemplary fulfillment of military duty. The outstanding man in military and political training, Sgt V. Iychagin, in his article wrote about the trust shown to him by the command, and the great pride which goes with the high title of standard bearer. In the article "Be loyal to the combat colors," a detailed accounting was given of how the men greeted the combat colors. Here statements by hard soldiers were given, and they recalled combat episodes of reaching the unit colors and how this inspired the men under the difficult frontline conditions.

The editors of many newspapers prepared detailed special-subject columns. The Military Publishing House in 1958 issued in a large run a colored poster by the artist P. T. Mal'tsev on the able and decisive actions of Pvt Bunyat Murshidov. Having heard smoke coming from an adjacent room, he dashed to the door, opened it and saw flames. In recalling the provision of the regulations on the responsibility for the safekeeping of the unit colors, the Komsomol member carefully gathered it up, covered it over his head and rushed to the exit, protecting the colors against the raging fire. Running out of the burning room, he gave the alarm and the alerted guards and duty platoon put out the dangerous fire. Due to the vigilance and the rapid and decisive actions of Bunyat Murshidov, the unit colors were saved as well as military property. The command presented him with a photograph taken in front of the unfurled unit colors.

The introduction of nuclear weapons and missile technology in the 1950's in the Soviet Armed Forces brought about fundamental changes in all areas of military affairs, and placed increased demands upon the moral and psychological preparation of the men. The October Plenum (1957) of the CPSU Central Committee in the Decree "On Improving Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" demanded that the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations were closely rally the personnel around the CPSU, were actively indoctrinate the servicemen in a spirit of wholehearted loyalty to the motherland, and to more actively propagandize the military traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In the units and formations there was a systematic strengthening in ideological and mass political work, and in the indoctrinating of the men in military traditions, including loyalty to the combat colors. Everywhere there were meetings between the servicemen and the participants of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars, with veterans of the units and ships, special-subject meetings and others devoted to the questions of loyalty to the combat colors. In many garrisons they began to create libraries and rooms of combat glory. All these forms of propaganda together with other measures in the ideological and political work helped to develop high moral and political qualities in the men. Like the senior generation in the war years, the young servicemen in peacetime showed loyalty to the military traditions in the great 1940 and long sea voyages, and in combat - in the Eastern Front and Korea.

On 21 April 1961, the newspapers published the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet which stated: "For courage and valor shown during the extinguishing

of a fire on a scientific research vessel and for rescuing the ship's flag during this, he awarded the Order of the Red Star to Sn Anatoliy Yefremovich Bobrov.¹² The Ukase was signed by the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev and the Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet M. P. Georgiyev. The fire broke out in the evening, when the sailors of a submarine of the Pacific Fleet were watching a film. Having learned of the calamity, they rushed to help the ship's crew. Damage Control Sn Anatoliy Bobrov noted that the tongues of flames were approaching the ship's flag. Through the burning superstructures and damaged shells, he made his way to the target and took down the precious flag. Making his way through the flames, the fearless seaman was able to reach the wheelhouse, and from that vantage point, when the fire was extinguished, he was found dead with the lowered flag.

FROM THE DEPTHS OF THE NAVY Anatoliy Bobrov lived at the small Bogotol Station in Stavropol' Krai. From his childhood, he dreamed, like many small boys, of becoming a sailor. He completed 7 years' school and a railroad school, and joined the Komsomol. He was elected his friendly from the submarine found the entry: "A hero is one who does whatever is necessary for the interests of mankind." With this feat, the Siberian showed that these words had become his vital principle. The comrades in the unit where he served unanimously approved the decision: "Bobrov will not be taken off the Komsomol rolls, and his Komsomol card will be turned over for perpetual keeping to the room of military glory."¹³ And they also took time up the story of his feat to the sailors who have newly arrived on board. In opening a Komsomol meeting, the secretary always states that the number of people who lie on the rolls of the Komsomol organization died while saving the ship's flag.

IN 1975 an important event occurred in the Soviet Armed Forces. New combined regulations were introduced as approved by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. They further raised the importance of the military colors which are now called the combat colors of a troop unit. The Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces open with the text of the military oath and the following regulation governing the Unit Military Colors. This emphasizes the great importance of this document and the inseparable link of its requirements with the requirements of the oath. The meaningful and strict phrases of the regulations express the enormous role which the army colors hold in the activities of the troops.

THE REGULATIONS of the Internal Service regulations include a special "Regulation Governing the Procedure for Presenting Combat Orders and Orders to Troop Units" (Appendix No. 1). It clearly and tersely states the documents previously approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Ministry of Defense which regulate the procedure for presenting and passing on the colors of disbanded and reorganized units, the procedure for assigning standard bearers and assistants, the color guard and their insignia, the numbering of the combat colors. The fifth section of Appendix No. 2 contains detailed regulations for the safekeeping and transporting the combat colors. Paragraph 24 states that in transporting the colors, a "separate" railroad car, cabin or aircraft (cabin) is to be allocated. The major, military assistants and guard should travel with the combat colors. The regulations also devote attention to the procedure for turning in, replacing and repairing the combat colors.

The new regulations generalize and reinforce the acquired experience, habits and rules in conducting ceremonial rituals. They regulate in detail the procedure for the trooping and posting of the combat colors in the formations of the unit, its place during the taking of the oath, parades and in assigning honorary guards.

The ceremonies and rituals have a strong emotional impact and are of great significance in indoctrinating the men in a spirit of loyalty to the combat colors, as well as instilling love for the Soviet Army and the home unit. As a rule, these are organized in the taking of the oath by the new recruits, in bidding farewell to demobilized personnel, in presenting governmental decorations to servicemen, during days of national holidays or jubilees of the unit. Here are two examples.

In the Transbaykal Military District in 1975, there was a jubilee of the guards fighter aviation regiment. The decorated auditorium of the officer club was full to capacity. Everyone present stood when to the tune of a march the standard bearer with assistants carried in the combat colors and all glances focused on it. The veterans invited from various cities of the nation were moved in seeing the regimental colors under which they had served during the hard war years. In their speeches the frontline soldiers told of the feats of the fellow servicemen, and they urged the aviators to add to the glory of the guards colors and the combat traditions of the senior generation. That the young defenders have carried on the tradition of their fathers can be seen in the noble and courageous feat of the communist from this regiment, Pilot 1st Class Capt Yu. V. Kozlovskiy. In peacetime Yuriy Valentinovich (Koslovskiy) underwent the harshest testing of spiritual and physical forces. During night flights he had to abandon his jet fighter. This order came at a moment when the aircraft was in the area of a large city. But the pilot catapulted only having made certain that he would not cause harm to the inhabitants. In landing he hit a tree trunk and the rocky slope of a hill. With broken legs, in a frost of more than 20°, for 3 days he made his way to an open place where search helicopters discovered him. The shock, the extensive loss of blood and the cold--any of these factors would have been enough to kill a person in such a situation. "This military pilot was victorious over death with the confidence and courage of Korchagin and Mares'yev," said Lt Col Med Serv K. Krylov later.⁶ Then followed several operations, the amputation of legs, years of treatment in a Leningrad clinic, and long training sessions to learn to walk with artificial legs. Before retirement Yu. V. Koslovskiy for the courage and tenacity shown under particularly difficult conditions was awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland of the USSR Armed Forces" Third Degree. He was promoted to the next rank of major.

In the Central Asian Military District, in front of the drawn-up regiment, in front of the combat colors, the commander Col Gen P. G. Lushev presented the Order of the Red Star to the deputy commander for political affairs of the training company, 1st Lt A. S. Kiselev.⁷ The motherland decorated him for courage and valor shown in carrying out military duties. In field exercises, the young communist rushed to save the life of a subordinate who was late in throwing a live grenade. The officer was severely wounded and lost his hands. Scores of persons were involved in his fate: physicians, nurses, fellow servicemen and friends. There was a moment when Aleksandr's heart stopped. But the physicians were victorious over clinical death. Recuperation started, and immediately the question arose of what he would be after the hospital. He could not imagine himself out of the army, out of formation, and without the work which he loved. Even in school he was firmly determined to become an officer. At the Novosibirsk Higher Military Political Combined-Arms

School he was first unsuccessful in getting in as he did not pass the competition. For a year he worked as a worker at a plant, he steadily acquired knowledge and got his way. And then the wounding... He turned to the command of his motorized rifle regiment with a request to petition for permission to continue service. The USSR Minister of Defense granted the request of A. S. Kiselev. When he walked along the formation of the motorized rifle regiment, the men in the rear stood on tiptoe trying to see the hero better. In front of the combat colors, the officer halted, bent his knee and kissed the edge of the standard. And after the formal presentation his fellow servicemen warmly congratulated him on his decoration and return to his home regiment.

Readiness for a feat and a desire to add to the honor and glory of the military collective by exemplary fulfillment of combat training missions do not come automatically. These qualities are instilled by the entire socialist way of our life, by military service, but primarily by active ideological indoctrination by the comrades and political workers, by the party and Komsomol organizations. With good reason at the 25th Party Congress, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev pointed to the importance of work in the area of the patriotic indoctrination of the Soviet people. "Implanting in the conscience of the workers, and above all the younger generation, the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride for the Soviet nation and for our motherland, and the readiness to stand in the defense of the victories of socialism have been and remain one of the most important tasks of the party," he said in the accountability report.

The readiness to lay down one's life for the combat colors is one of the vivid manifestations of Soviet patriotism, an active and effective feeling urging the carrying out of noble feats for the sake of the motherland. The sources of this loyalty lie in communist conviction, the political maturity of the men, and in an awareness of personal responsibility for defending the victories of socialism. This is why the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979 "On Further Improving Ideological, Political Indoctrination Work" emphasizes the need of "adding to the glorious traditions of the Army and Navy service in which is a remarkable school for labor and military skills, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship."

The combat colors and their motto "For Our Soviet Motherland!" embody the highest and most noble which led the Soviet military to victory over the enemies. At present, in peacetime, it urges each serviceman to worthily carry out his duty as a defender of the socialist fatherland, and to vigilantly protect the creative labor of the builders of Communism.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Voennoye Obozreniye, Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 79356, inv. 13, 1946, sheet 3.

[2] Voennoye Obozreniye, "Vnutrennyye Sluzhby Voennoy Sily Soyuza SSR" [Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces], Voenizdat, 1946, p. 7.

[3] Krasnaya Zvezda, 11 April 1943.

⁴S. Ye. Zakharov, V. N. Bagrov, S. S. Bevz, M. N. Zakharov and M. P. Kotukhov, "Krasnoznamennyy Tikhookeanskiy Flot" [The Red Banner Pacific Fleet], Voenizdat, 1973, p 261.

⁵"Obshchevoinskiy Ustav Vozruzhennykh Sil SSR" [Combined-Arms Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces], Voenizdat, 1977, p 144.

⁶KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 September 1976.

⁷KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA, 16 October 1979.

⁸"Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 75.

⁹"O Dal'neyshem Uluchshenii Ideologicheskoy, Politiko-Vospitatel'noy Raboty" [On a Further Improvement in Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 14.

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SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS: JAPAN'S AGGRESSIVENESS DISCUSSED

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22 Jul 80 pp 68-75

[Article published under the heading "On Foreign States and Armies" by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Col A. Savin: "The Aggressiveness of the Japanese Militarists"]

[Text] Japanese militarism in its development has followed a long path of all sorts of adventures and bloody wars. The methods of its operations have been marked by perfidiousness and cleverness. The Japanese militarists have never declared the start of a war ahead of time. They have attacked by surprise, endeavoring to strike in the enemy's most vulnerable place, concealing its aggressive actions by proclaiming "peaceful" goals and by the necessity of protecting the nation's "lifeline" which has often stretched many hundreds or even thousands of kilometers from the Japanese islands. This was the case during the period of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the intervention of Japan against Soviet Russia, during the occupation of Manchuria and the attack on China. This was also the case in December 1941, when the Japanese Armed Forces made a surprise attack on the basic bases of the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

The essence of the militarism of Japan, like the other imperialist states, consists in the fact that it is the "main weapon of class rule by the bourgeoisie and political subordination of the working class,"¹ as well as a weapon designed and used for armed conflict with other countries. The militarism of the imperialist states is marked by an aggressiveness which is apparent under the appropriate conditions.

The general aims of the Japanese militarists were expressed in the "Basic Principles of State Policy" approved on 11 August 1936 by the Japanese government and provided for the "ensuring of a strong position for the (Japanese) Empire on the Asian Continent, as well as the development of the regions of the South Seas by diplomatic measures and national defense." And by "national defense," as was pointed out in the sentence of the International Military Tribunal, one should understand "the conquering of other countries by the use of armed force."² The Cabinet gave particular attention to increasing military might in Korea and Manchuria so that Japan, as was stated in the "Basic Principles," could make a "decisive strike against the Russians from the very start of the war."³

In 1938, the Japanese military-political leadership began to implement aggressive plans against the USSR. In July the Japanese government accused the Soviet Union of

violating the borders with Manchukuo and undertook an extensive propaganda campaign over the question of the supposed "Soviet threat" from the north. On 29 June, the command of the Kwantung Army began an armed provocation in the area of Lake Khasan. After two 2-week battles, the Japanese were crushed head-on, and were thrown back from Soviet territory.⁴

The defeat of the Japanese aggressors did not teach them a lesson. They commenced an armed provocation against Mongolia in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River. The Soviet government announced that "the frontier of Mongolia, because of the mutual aid treaty concluded between us, will be defended by us as decisively as our own territory."⁵ However Tokyo was not intimidated by this warning. On 12 May Japanese troops commenced combat operations. The battles lasted 4 months and ended with the complete defeat of the Japanese troops.

The Japanese militarists repeatedly showed treachery in foreign policy, in viewing the concluded treaties and agreements as a screen behind which they carried out preparations for aggression. As is known, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka, in signing a Neutrality Pact in Moscow on 13 April 1941, already knew of the attack by Germany on the USSR and assured the Nazi leaders that in the event of a conflict between Russia and Germany, Japan "would be forced to attack Russia on the side of Germany."⁶ And the Japanese military-political leadership acted in accord with this assurance by Matsuoka. On 5 July 1941 the Minister of War Tojo approved the plan for aggression against the USSR, the Kan-Toku-En (Kantōgun Tokubetsu Enshu) ("Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army") and under this plan a secret mobilization and shifting of troops, weapons and military equipment into Manchuria were carried out.⁷ The intention of the Japanese command was to destroy the Soviet air bases in the Far East by a surprise air force raid, and having won air superiority, to make the main thrust in the region of the Maritime Province, to reach the rear of Vladivostok, and then capture it in cooperation with the navy. Subsequently the plans were to capture Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk and other cities and areas of the Far East. At this time special groupings of the Japanese Army and Navy were to seize Northern Sakhalin and Kamchatka.⁸ The Army General Staff planned to commence military operations against the Soviet Union on 29 August 1941.⁹

However, in line with the delay of the Wehrmacht offensive on the Soviet-German Front, the opinion of the need to defer the attack on the USSR began to grow in the Japanese military-political circles.¹⁰

In 1942, the Japanese General Staff and the staff of the Kwantung Army worked out new offensive military plans against the USSR, and these remained in effect for 1943. According to them, the war against the USSR should start by surprise after concentrating around 30 divisions in Manchuria. In the sentence of the International Military Tribunal it is stated: "The Tribunal feels that prior to 1943, Japan not only planned to wage aggressive war against the Soviet Union, but also continued active preparations for such a war."¹¹

In flagrantly violating the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, the Japanese militarists carried out numerous aggressive acts against the USSR. They fired in Soviet territory, they seized and sank Soviet vessels, they dropped armed bands in the regions of the Soviet Far East and violated the frontier of our country. From the summer of 1941 until the end of 1944, the Japanese armed forces seized 178 Soviet merchant vessels. In 1944 alone, 144 border violations were committed and 39 instances of firing into Soviet territory occurred.¹²

The main reason for the temporary refusal of the Japanese militarists to attack the USSR was the heroic struggle of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces which thwarted the plans for the Blitzkrieg of the Nazi leadership and put in doubt the success of a Japanese attack on the USSR. An important role was also played by the far-sightedness of the Politburo of the VKP(b) (All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee) and the High Command which during the difficult months of the defensive battles in the Far East had left forces which prevented the Japanese militarists from deciding on a war against the USSR.

However, the constant threat of a Japanese attack forced our country to maintain a large number of troops in the Far East, impeding the struggle against Nazi Germany. In 1945, the Soviet Union, in carrying out its Allied duty, entered the war against Japan. Its Armed Forces head-on crushed the Kwantung Army and forced Japan into unconditional surrender.

The defeat of Japan, a decisive contribution to which was made by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces was a crushing blow against the entire system of Japanese militarism and the policy and ideology of the military-fascist clique. The Japanese Army and Navy were demobilized, the plants producing military products were stopped, and the military criminals were turned over to the court of an international military tribunal. Conditions were created in the country for the development of democratic forces. In 1947, a new Japanese Constitution was ratified, and Article 9 of it proclaimed the rejection of war "as a sovereign right of the nation, as well as the threat of using the armed forces as a means of resolving international disputes." The Constitution guaranteed that in Japan "ground, sea and air forces, and equally other means of war, would never be created in the future."¹³ However, the roots of militarism--the bourgeois state and the monopolies--were not eliminated in Japan. The postwar monopolistic groups, relying on the significant industry remaining in their hands and the large resources of cheap manpower, as well as using U.S. support, were able to increase their capital by many-fold, to rapidly reequip and expand Japanese industry on a basis of modern technology borrowed from the economically advanced countries. In this manner a basis was created for the recreation and development of the Japanese armed forces.

Even in 1949, in demobilizing the Army and Navy, the Japanese government with the knowledge and agreement of the American occupation authorities, undertook measures to keep a portion of the military personnel. They were used in the police formations, the size of which in 1946-1948 grew from 93,000 up to 150,000 men. Some 10,000 sailors and officers served in the Sea Security Department, and another 20,000 men in the Railroad Police. In addition, "agricultural cooperatives" were organized and some of these completely consisted of demobilized officers and were organized along the lines of a military organization.¹⁴

In 1950 a "Reserve Police Corps" was formed in Japan. Two years later it was transformed into a "Security Corps," and in the summer of 1954, in violation of the Constitution, a law was passed to create "Self-Defense Forces," in fact ground forces, navy and aviation. In 1970, the "Self-Defense Forces" numbered 242,000 soldiers and officers. They were armed with around 800 tanks, 1,300 guns, and over 100 mortars and recoilless weapons, 200 SAM launchers and 50 unguided missile launchers, around 170 fighting ships and auxiliary vessels, including 32 destroyers, 25 submarines, and 1,700 airplanes and helicopters.¹⁵ In recent years, particular attention has been given to the rearming of the ground forces, aviation

and navy with new weapons. In this regard there has been a rapid rise in military expenditures. While for the first plan to reinforce and develop the Self-Defense Forces (set for 1958-1961) allocations were 654.9 billion yen, for the 5th plan (1977-1982), the figures were over 10 trillion yen, that is, 15-fold more.¹⁷

The Japanese monopolies have taken an ever greater part in supplying the Self-Defense Forces with weapons. In 1955, they provided 30.4 percent of the domestically produced weapons, 82.7 in 1965, and 93.6 percent in 1972.¹⁸

The greater strength of the Japanese monopolies, the broadening of their participation in producing weapons for the Self-Defense Forces, and the increase in allocations for military needs have contributed to the recreation and strengthening of ties between the monopolistic bourgeoisie and the military. In Japan military-industrial systems are beginning to be formed, and among them the chief positions are held by the financial monopolistic group Mitsubishi with its military industrial companies Mitsubishi Jukogyo and Mitsubishi Denki which fulfill more than 30 percent of the orders of the National Defense Agency (NDA). The Mitsui and Sumitomo groups are also increasing their participation in military production.¹⁸

As the monopolies have increased their involvement in military production, the ties of the monopolists and their organizations with the leadership of the nation's armed forces have grown. The heads of the Japanese governments in the postwar period--Yoshida, Kishi, Ikeda, Sato, Tanaka, Miki, Fukuda and Ohira--have been closely tied with the monopolists, and a majority of them have ties of kinship. Many former officials in the NDA (which plays the role of the ministry of defense) hold positions in the large industrial companies which produce weapons. Thus, according to a statement in the weekly FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, in 1965-1969, around 145 former highly-placed officials of the Japanese NDA (42 percent of all who had left the agency during this time) held official positions in military industry companies. Moreover, over the designated 5 years, of the 340 officers, generals and admirals who had retired from the Self-Defense Forces, 225 had been hired by the private companies, and 164 of them were working with registered NDA contractors.¹⁹

Thus in Japan again there is the process of the growing together of monopolistic capital and the military upper clique, and a military-industrial complex is being formed which is having an ever-greater influence on the policy of the government and is forcing the country to strengthen militarization and the path of military adventures. "The forces of war and aggression," said L. I. Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress, "exist, certainly, in other imperialist countries.... In Japan these are the militarists who in spite of the Constitution which prohibits war 'for all time' are endeavoring to again force this country into a path of expansion and aggression."²⁰

The pace of militarization in the country is largely influenced by the military-political alliance of Japan and the United States, and this is based on the Treaty for Mutual Cooperation and the Guarantee of Security signed in 1960. It was automatically extended in 1970, and will be in force as long as one of the parties does not give a year's notice of the desire to cancel it. The "Security Treaty" provides an opportunity for the United States "to use equipment and areas on Japanese territory." In accord with Article 5 of the Treaty, Japan is obliged, together with the United States, "to take actions to eliminate a common danger." This means that Japan could be automatically involved in any military conflict started by the United

States in Asia. The "Security Treaty" provides for the development of the capabilities of both countries "to repel armed attack," that is, it obliges Japan to strengthen its military potential.²¹ The strategic plans of the Japanese NDA, like the U.S. Defense Department, are kept secret, and for this reason a great sensation was caused by the publishing of an operational-strategic plan worked out in 1963 and known by the code name "Sanya" ("Three Arrows"), and then the plan for 1966 under the code name of "Kurlan" ("Buffalo Run"). The content of these plans shows that the Japanese Self Defense Forces are preparing for joint operations with the U.S. Armed Forces, as well as for the sea lines of communications. They could be used in offensive operations in Korea as well as for carrying out police functions on occupied territory. Since American doctrine allows preemptive operations for anticipating an attack which is supposedly being prepared, Japan could be involved in a war when the danger of an outside attack would exist for it.²²

During the years of American aggression in Indochina, the Japanese monopolists, according to the "Security Treaty," supplied the American Armed Forces and the Saigon regime with ammunition, napalm, military vehicles and other military materiel, Japanese plants repaired naval ships, tanks and other U.S. weapons which had been put out of commission in Vietnam. In 1965-1971, the total military orders and services carried out by Japan was 3.8 billion dollars.²³

In recent years, closer cooperation has been established between the Japanese and U.S. military agencies in the area of operational-strategic planning. The governments of the two countries have set up a Japanese-American consulting commission for the "Security Treaty," and this supervises its fulfillment. In the summer of 1976, the 10th session of this commission was organized, the Japanese-American Coordinating Committee for Defense Questions. Its functions include "defining the basic line of joint Japanese-American military operations, maintaining contact between the military representatives of the two countries in directing these operations, and establishing the zones of operations for the Japanese and U.S. Armed Forces." The present course of the Japanese ruling circles is aimed at strengthening the military role of Japan in Asia. Even at the first session of the National Defense Council (NDC) after the formation of the Fukuda government, the prime minister who was its chairman proposed that the functions of the council be broadened and that it be turned into a body on security questions not only for Japan but also for the Asian region.

One of the main factors which has contributed to the militarization of Japan has been its growing ties with China, the Marxist leadership of which since the end of the 1950's has begun to carry out a great-power and anti-Soviet policy, making territorial demands on the USSR and supporting the claims of the Japanese ruling circles to the Kuril Islands which belong to the USSR.

On 22 August 1978, the Japanese and Chinese governments concluded a "Treaty of Peace and Friendship." The most politically and militarily loaded question in it is Article 23 on territorial issues, and the talks were drawn out for almost 4 years because of this issue. The article states that "none of the sides should seek to change the status of the area of Asia and the Pacific, or in any other region, and each of the sides will support the efforts of any other country or group of countries to establish a new system." In considering the attempts of the Chinese leadership to distort the essence of Soviet foreign policy and to ascribe to the USSR a desire for universal hegemony, it can be said with confidence that this article has an

collected with Soviet support. The chairman of the 107-member committee, that committee, advised Khrushchev in his report at a session of the All-Union Congress of Soviets (Sovietization) in March 1956 that actions against "reactionaries" in "action against the USSR."

The country's kind political cooperation of Japan and China is strengthening the mutual friendship of Japanese militarism. In a talk with a group of Japanese journalists in September 1974, Deng Xiaoping stated that it is Japan's responsibility to make efforts to strengthen defense. From China and Japan we will build a solid friendly relationship. The first official military delegation from the PRC headed by the deputy chief of the general staff of the PLA People's Liberation Army Chang Shengyan visited Japan last year almost after the signing of the treaty. It was given an opportunity to observe Japanese military enterprises. As a result of talks with the members of the Self-Defense Forces, agreement was reached on the establishing of exchange between the military agencies of both countries.⁷⁷

[illegible]

At initial 30 with the polymerized films, there are 100 layers of polymer. It is usually observed that 100 is decreasing after the polymerization into 30. This decrease should be due to the degradation of the polymer film and had formed the layer in the initial stage.

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the 1990s, the 1990s saw a significant shift in the way that the world was perceived, and a new era of globalization began. The world was no longer seen as a collection of isolated nations, but as a single, interconnected global community. This new perspective led to a new era of international cooperation and collaboration, and a new era of global development. The world was no longer seen as a collection of isolated nations, but as a single, interconnected global community. This new perspective led to a new era of international cooperation and collaboration, and a new era of global development.

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

FOOTNOTES:

1. "Tainichi Sensu-e ni Hishi" "Complete Collected Works", Vol. 17, p. 188.
2. "Ishikawa Kenji: State Archives of the October Revolution", folio "86", inv. 1, file 482, sheets 118, 154.
3. Ibid., sheet 119.
4. "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voiny 1939-1945" "The History of World War II of 1939-1945", Vol. 2, Voenizdat, 1974, p. 38.
5. "Tret'ya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 25-31 Maya 1939 g." "Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 25-31 May 1939", verbatim report, Moscow, 1939, p. 475.
6. "Ishikawa Kenji: State Archives of the October Revolution", folio "86", inv. 1, file 482, sheet 802.
7. "Tainichi Sensu-e ni Hishi" "The Path to War in the Pacific", Vol. 5, Tokyo, 1962, p. 220.
8. "Jalifa Sengo-Kyaku Sen Shi" (Official History of the War in Great Eastern Asia), Vol. 20, pp. 14, 50, 125. "Shimada Toshinari Kanto gun" (The Kwantung Army), Tokyo, 1960, pp. 3, 164.
9. "Tainichi Sensu-e ni Hishi", Vol. 5, p. 319.
10. For more detailed information on the preparations of Japan for war against the USSR in 1941, see VOTKINO-ISTORIYUSKIY ZHURNAL, No. 6, 1971.
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17. "MIRNAYA VILIZIA" 1988, p. 113, "MIRNAYA VILIZIA" 1988, p. 113.
18. "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny" "The History of the Great Patriotic War", Vol. 2, Moscow, 1973, p. 113.

1. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1967, p. 12

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4. "Fushikawano Yakusan, 1972" White Paper on Foreign Trade, Review of Markets, 1971-1972, 1972, p. 415

5. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., April 1977

6. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1979, pp. 14-15

7. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1979, pp. 14-15

8. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1979, pp. 14-15

9. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1979, pp. 14-15

10. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1979, pp. 14-15

11. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1979, pp. 14-15

12. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1979, pp. 14-15

13. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1979, pp. 14-15

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17. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1979, pp. 14-15

18. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1979, pp. 14-15

19. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1979, pp. 14-15

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22. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1979, pp. 14-15

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27. "K. KIBELTSEV, op. cit., 1979, pp. 14-15

CLAUSEWITZ: VIEWS AND BACKGROUND REVIEWED

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12 Jul 80 pp 80-83

Article published under the heading "Scientific information," by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Lt Col V. Kuskov: "The German Military Theoretician Karl Clausewitz (On the 200th Anniversary of His Birth)"

First Karl Clausewitz is rightly considered one of the major military theoreticians of the 19th century who by his study of the essence of war as well as by the elaboration of the most important questions of the theory of military art made a significant contribution to the development of military thought. In applying the dialectical method of Hegel's, as the most progressive at that time, Clausewitz disclosed many phenomena of military affairs much more profoundly than his predecessors and contemporaries had succeeded in doing.

Clausewitz was born on 1 June 1780 in the city of Burg (not far from Magdeburg) in the family of an official. His military career started in 1792, when while still a young boy he was initiated as a junior Junker in the Prussian Army and along with his regiment at the age of 12 for the first time was in the trenches at Mainz.¹ During the battles against the French revolutionary army

having become an officer (1801), Clausewitz began to be seriously concerned with his self-education. At that same time he developed an increased interest in military affairs which was further strengthened after completing military school in 1803.

The military views and philosophy of Clausewitz were shaped under the impact of the enormous social upheaval and wars caused by the French Revolution of 1789-1794. The war between France and Prussia (1806) left a particularly deep trace in his mind. At this war Prussia suffered a cruel defeat because of its economic and political backwardness. Under the blows of the Napoleonic wars the entire military system of Frederick the Great was collapsed, and this had been marked by deep stagnation, harsh discipline and routine. Even after the catastrophe he experienced, the young Clausewitz wrote that "Prussia perished because of its forms of state administration."²

The brutal suppression of the French Empire caused a desire among the broad public of the country to fight for the rebirth of Prussia considering the revolutionary changes in Europe, as well as for the reorganization of the Prussian Army. However

1812 - "It was I, supported but not by revolutionary means, the overthrow of the all-
ruling regime, but rather by reform from above. The insipient movement was headed
by H. von Arnim, Schamhorst, v. Gersdorff, H. Boyen and others." Clausewitz joined
them. Upon the instruction of patriotically inclined generals and officers who were
in favor of the national independence of Prussia, in February 1812 he drew up a pro-
gram for national literature under the title "The three Symbols of Faith." It pro-
claimed the idea of a popular war in alliance with Russia against Napoleonic rule.
However, the implementation of this program did not succeed due to the opposition
from the court and aristocracy, as well as Napoleon himself.

In 1800, during the 1800-1801 campaign with Vitell and others left for Russia and entered service in the Russian Army. In 1812, during the Patriotic War of 1812, he served in the garrison of the fortress of V. P. Pskov, and later that of P. P. Minsk. Taking direct part in the battle of the Russian Army at Smolensk, the Battle of Borodino, and the Berezina River.

The USSR Book Fair in West Berlin (1950-1951) demonstrated the tremendous strengths of the Soviet Union. The large participation and visibility will for victory in the struggle against fascism and capitalism everywhere, as the further development of the people's democratic revolution - concepts of Clausewitz - the need much of the USSR. In the middle war of 1941 in writing his book "Strategical Principles of War" (1942) Clausewitz of the military actions in various stages of the war. The USSR is the only country in the world.

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... century. He lived in the same old
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... the driving force in the French Rev-
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1. The first step in the process of identifying a problem is to define the problem. This involves identifying the symptoms of the problem and determining the scope of the problem. Once the problem has been defined, the next step is to identify the causes of the problem. This involves identifying the factors that are contributing to the problem and determining the underlying causes. Once the causes have been identified, the next step is to develop a plan of action. This involves identifying the steps that need to be taken to solve the problem and determining the resources that will be needed to implement the plan. Once a plan of action has been developed, the next step is to implement the plan. This involves carrying out the steps that have been identified in the plan and monitoring the progress of the implementation. Finally, the last step in the process is to evaluate the results of the implementation. This involves determining whether the problem has been solved and whether the resources have been used effectively.

Of great interest are the statements by Clausewitz on the main conditions for conducting a successful war. Among them he put first of all the territory of a country and its population. "...A territory," wrote Clausewitz, "feeds and continuously replaces the armed forces. Thus, they depend on one another, they support one another, and are equally important for one another."¹⁵

Clausewitz well realized that it was essential to consider the internal conditions of both one's own and the enemy state, the behavior of the people, their courage or insufficient strength, patriotism or dissatisfaction. He pointed out that the resistance of republic France derived "its basic strength from the vital participation of the people in the war."

Thus, here Clausewitz endeavored to view the concept of the "rear" in a broad sense, considering the attitude of the broad masses of people to the war. However, Clausewitz, of course, was unable to establish a sufficiently clear dependence of the strength of the rear upon the state and social system, the policy, the nature of the war, the development and organization of the economy.

Clausewitz assigned a major place to troop morale. "History," wrote Clausewitz, "best shows the value of moral values and its most vividly discloses their at times imperishable influence.... It is impossible to explain the action of any victory in any way satisfactorily, without considering its moral impression."¹⁶

However, Clausewitz could not scientifically define the role and significance of troop morale, as he did not have a correct understanding of the factors which shape the high morale of army personnel in liberation wars.

Clausewitz was not only a military theoretician, but also a major military historian of his time. He studied and analyzed over 130 military campaigns which occurred from 1630 through 1815. He penned a number of original military historical works.¹⁷

We should also note certain statements by Clausewitz on his approach to military history research. "...It is extremely important," he pointed out, "to trace phenomena back to their initial elements, that is, to the indisputable truths, and not halt, as is so often the case, half way, that is, at any arbitrary assumptions or suppositions."¹⁸ In pointing to the necessity of disclosing the relationship between the causes and consequences of phenomena, he pointed out that "it is a real evil when because of a lack of accurate data, a half-truth is recognized as sufficient for explaining the consequences, that is, when this half-truth is ascribed an exaggerated importance."¹⁹

In the historical analysis of military operations, Clausewitz considered it essential to proceed not from a simple cause, but rather from the aggregate of them. And for this reason it is not enough to trace dispassionately and conscientiously the whole series of events back to their sources, but it is also essential for each of the apparent causes to establish the degree of its influence, and submit the nature of the causes to a closest scrutiny.

In contrast to a majority of the historians of his time, Clausewitz did not merely describe what, but also attempted to provide a broad analysis of the related social, political phenomena and events. However, being a representative of his age, he was completely under the sway of the conditions existing in those times. The idealism

which underlay the military-theoretical views of Clausewitz as well as the limited possibilities of idealistic dialectics as the method which he used did not permit this truly profound thinker from understanding the true, class nature of both previous and contemporary wars. All of this caused the contradictoriness of many of his judgments and conclusions.

But in assessing any historical personality, one must be guided by Lenin's instructions that "historical merits are judged not from what historical figures did not provide in comparison with present requirements, but what they did provide that was new in comparison with their predecessors."²¹

In this sense the achievement of Clausewitz in elaborating the military thought of the 19th century is indisputable. And it has been given its due by Soviet military history science.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Karl Clausewitz died on 16 November 1831 from cholera, being the chief of staff of a corps in the Prussian Army.

² From a letter of K. Clausewitz (see F. Fabian, "Peró i Mech" [The Pen and the Sword], Voenizdat, 1956, p. 15).

The Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) were expansionistic, although at first they also had a certain progressive importance. They objectively aided in undermining the foundations of feudalism in Europe and cleared the way for new capitalist relationships. A bourgeois Civil Code was introduced in the conquered countries, many feudal institutions were abolished, and the small feudal states were eliminated in Germany and so forth.

³ Clausewitz, "Sobrynaniye" [Clausewitz, 1806], Voenizdat, 1938, p. 9.

⁴ V. A. Kuznetsov, Kuznetsov, Voenizdat, 1978, p. 287; "Sovetskaya Voenennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol. 4, Voenizdat, 1977, p. 292.

⁵ (Marx and Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol. 21, p. 360).

⁶ V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobrynaniye" [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 36, p. 292.

⁷ 1912, Vol. 36, p. 79.

⁸ Clausewitz, "Sobrynaniye" [Clausewitz, 1806], Vol. 1, 4th edition, Voenizdat, 1938.

⁹ 1912, Vol. 1, p. 73.

¹⁰ 1912, Vol. 1.

¹¹ 1912, Vol. 1, "Izobrazheniya" [Images], Vol. 1, p. 79.

¹² 1912, Vol. 1.

¹³Clausewitz, "O Voyne," Vol 1, 3d Edition, 1936, p 10.

^{13a}Ibid., p 283.

¹⁴Ibid., p 300.

¹⁵Ibid., Vol 2, p 204.

¹⁶Ibid., Vol 1, p 197.

¹⁷"Ital'yanskiy Pokhod Napoleona Bonaparta 1796 goda" [The Italian Campaign of Napoleon Bonapart of 1796], Voenizdat, 1939; "Shveytsarskiy Pokhod Suvorova 1799 goda" [The Swiss Campaign of Suvorov in 1799], Voenizdat, 1939; "1806 god" [1806], 2d Edition, Voenizdat, 1938; "1812 god" [1812], 2d Edition, Voenizdat, 1957, and others.

¹⁸Clausewitz, "O Voyne," Vol 1, p 153.

¹⁹Ibid., pp 153-154.

²⁰Ibid., p 154.

²¹V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 2, p 178.

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BOOK REVIEW: LENIN AND SOVIET AVIATION DEVELOPMENT

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22 Jul 80 pp 84-86

Auth. Valery Lvovich Honored ASFSR Scientist, Professor, Doctor of Military Sciences, Maj Gen Avn G. Savrik, and Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Maj Gen Avn I. Timokhinich of the book "V. I. Lenin i Sovetskaya Aviatsiya. Dokumenty, Materialy, Vospominaniya" (V. I. Lenin and Soviet Aviation. Documents, Materials, Memoirs). Voenizdat, 1979, 238 pages.

Text: "V. I. Lenin is the greatest genius of the proletarian revolution and the outstanding theoretician and practitioner of military affairs. With unusual perceptiveness he outlined the ways for the further development of the older branches of troops and services of the armed forces (the infantry, cavalry and artillery) and the projects of the new ones (tanks and aviation), making these harmonious components of the new type of army.

Lenin not only masterfully assessed the role and importance of aviation in carrying out the tasks of defending the nation and in national economic construction, but also showed the greatest energy and knowledge of things in directing the creation and strengthening of the Air Force of the young Soviet republic. Even on the third day of the October revolution, upon the instructions of V. I. Lenin, the first air detachments began to be organized and these comprised the beginning of the Red Air Force. They made a worthy contribution to defeating the forces of the intervention and internal counterrevolution. At the same time, under the Military Revolutionary Committee, the Bureau of Aviation and Air Balloon Commissars was created and this became the central body for directing the national air forces. Later on there were the Field Headquarters for Aviation and Air Ballooning of the Operational Army as well as the district, front and army air force leadership bodies.

V. I. Lenin was directly involved in all the questions of the organizational development of the young Soviet Air Fleet, and took energetic measures in the area of the organizational and material-technical reinforcing of the air units, and showed particular interest in the aviation personnel. Upon his instructions, the aviation plants were produced and overhauled airplanes and motors were rebuilt, centers of aviation science were organized, airfields were constructed, and flight and technical training facilities were set up. The leader of the revolution met repeatedly with the leaders of the Young Soviet aviation, and talked with flyers, officers, candidates and workers of the aviation enterprises.

The reader will learn of all the diverse activities of Lenin related to the creation and development of the Soviet Air Fleet from the book "V. I. Lenin i Sovetskaya Aviatsiya" "V. I. Lenin and Soviet Aviation". In the language of documents it relates how under extremely difficult conditions of the war and chaos, the Red Air Fleet was set up. It contains in full or in excerpts the letters, instructions, telegrams and orders written by V. I. Lenin, and gives the decisions of the RKP(b) Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), Central Committee, the decrees and directives of the Soviet of People's Commissars, the Soviet of Worker and Peasant Defense, the Soviet of Labor and Defense on the questions of the development of aviation as prepared and approved with his personal involvement. Many documents are published for the first time.

The documents show that V. I. Lenin had developed an interest in aviation long before the revolution, at the dawn of flying. While in Paris in 1909-1911, he, as N. K. Krupskaya wrote, during his free time bicycled 15 km to the Juvisy airfield, where he could watch the maneuvers of airplanes to his heart's content" (p. 10). In 1914, V. I. Lenin called the 20th century the age of "airplanes, electricity and motor vehicles". Subsequently, he focused attention on the possibility of using aviation and aeronautics in carrying out reconnaissance and target designation missions.

The collection provides an opportunity not only to become familiar with the historical facts in the rise and development of Soviet aviation, but also with the documents worked out with the personal involvement of the leader of the revolution. These documents show the close attention paid by Lenin to the development of Soviet aviation, and his desire to find the most effective methods for using it on the fronts of the Civil War.

In October 1919, V. I. Lenin wrote to L. M. Skiyarskiy: "Can't you order a reply signed by him the military scientist A. V. Z. for airplanes against cavalry? Examples: very low flight. Examples" (p. 83). To consider as equal, noted the Soviet of Labor and Defense, "the aviation plants and the shock group of defense plants (guns and cartridges) in terms of supply with fuel, raw materials and semifinished articles. To oblige all centers, main administrations and departments of the Superior Soviet of the National Economy to satisfy the demands of the aviation plants first." (L. Ilyanov (Lenin), 1 June 1920' (pp. 95-96).

The documents of the collection clearly reflect the zeal with which Lenin acted against those who denied the necessity to create a military aviation for the Soviet Republic, or those who proposed breaking up the flight schools, eliminating the aviation detachments and the aviation plants, and limiting the financing for the development of the Air Fleet (p. 145).

From the documents we can see that in the organizational development of the new Soviet Army, V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party considered the complexity of the task of the personnel and the necessity of the efficient equipping of the units with modern military equipment. For personnel, still lacking, the aviation detachments of the Cavalry Arm had not been ordered up, and after the appropriate purging of counter-revolutionary elements, they joined the ranks of the Red Army. In the last of the instructions of V. I. Lenin, the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs on 24 January 1918 in a special order authorized the complete preservation of all the aviation units and schools for the working people.

The materials of the collection clearly show that during the most difficult years experienced by the young Soviet Republic, V. I. Lenin undertook decisive measures to strengthen the Red Air Fleet. Thus, in 1920, more than 780 million rubles were allocated for the strengthening and development of Soviet aviation (pp 102-103).

On 30 August 1920, at a session of the Small Soviet or People's Commissars, there was a special investigation of the question of "granting special rights to the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs for Organizing Experimental Airplane Construction" (p 104). The same session examined the "petition of the Main Directorate of the Worker-Peasant Red Air Force for Allocating 25 Million Rubles for Experimental Aviation Construction" (p 22). On 25 October 1920, V. I. Lenin signed the decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars on granting the Soviet of the Military Industry some 38,537,000 rubles from the above-estimate credit for organizational and production expenditures of the Main Directorate of United Aviation Plants (p 106).

In seeing provision for the development of Soviet aviation, V. I. Lenin also gave special significance to the personnel, aviation cadres, pilots and technicians, scientists and designers, and the developers of the winged machines. From the numerous documents published in the basic section of the collection, one is struck by the decree signed by V. I. Lenin of the Soviet of People's Commissars of 15 December 1920 and approved on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the scientist and designer of the "father of Russian aviation," Prof N. Ye. Zhukovskiy. In 1920 he was granted the right to be freed from the compulsory giving of lectures. In 1924 he was granted the right "to appoint courses of a more scientific content." At the same time the decision was taken to publish the works of N. Ye. Zhukovskiy and establish a special prize in his name for prominent scientists for outstanding work in the area of mathematics and mechanics (pp 110-111).

A decree signed 25 November 1921 granted a life-long increased pension to A. E. Tsiolkovskiy due to his special services as a scientific inventor, a specialist in aviation... in the area of the scientific elaboration of aviation questions..." (p 113).

One of the articles devoted to the memoirs about V. I. Lenin written by aviation specialists had the good fortune to meet him or listen to his advice, or carry out his instructions and orders. We feel that the reader will be particularly interested in the stories of unforgettable meetings with Lenin written by F. I. Zharov, V. A. Tumanovskiy, A. V. Sergeyev, M. P. Struyev, and others.

The aviationists responded to Lenin's concern for the Air Force with fervent affection and unflinching loyalty. With the name of Lenin they entered the battles for our Motherland and defeated the hordes of interventionists and White Guards armed to the teeth during the years of the Civil War. With the name of Lenin, they strengthened the Soviet Air Fleet; they set world records for altitude, speed and distance in the interwar period. With the name of Lenin they were victorious in the air during the years of the Great Patriotic War and are now reliably protecting the peaceful skies of the Motherland.

It is well to point out individual shortcomings in the collection. It would be desirable that the notes for the published documents should be more complete. It would be good to supplement the collection with a brief references about

those writing memoirs about V. I. Lenin. For many readers, particularly young ones, their names are unfamiliar. It would also be advisable to incorporate in the book a separate chapter of letters written by aviators to Lenin, where they shared their cherished thoughts with him.

However the designated shortcomings do not reduce the positive importance of this book which will attract the attention of not only aviation specialists and historians, but everyone who is interested in this glorious service of the Soviet Armed Forces.

FOOTNOTES

V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." (Complete Collected Works), Vol 25, p 175.

Ibid., Vol 26, pp 258-259.

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BOOK REVIEW: HISTORY OF STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY

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[Book review by Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Stepanov, and Dotsent, Candidate of Historical Sciences Col P. Balashov of the book "60 Let Bor'by SSSR za Mir i Bezopasnost'" (60 Years of the Soviet Struggle for Peace and Security), Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 438 page]

[Text] For the Soviet nation and for all the progressive forces of the world there has not been and is no more urgent problem than the problem of preserving peace, preventing a world war and ensuring the security of peoples. Precisely this determines the value of the collective work reviewed by us and prepared by the Institute for USSR History of the USSR Academy of Sciences under the leadership of Academician A. L. Narochnitskiy.* Here basic attention has been given to the main and determining problem in the foreign policy activities of the CPSU and the Soviet government, the problem of the struggle for peace and security.

The urgency of this struggle is convincingly affirmed by the recent events when imperialism has begun attacks on a lessening of international tension, has sharply intensified the arms race, and has urged a return to the times of the Cold War. In speaking before the voters of the Baumanskiy electoral district of Moscow, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, said: 'The Soviet Union is cowed by no one. Our forces and capabilities are enormous. We and our allies will always be able to defend ourselves and repel any hostile attacks. And no one will succeed in provoking us. The 'doctrine' of military hysteria and a feverish arms race are opposed by us with a doctrine of a consistent struggle for peace and security on earth."¹

The work clearly traces the sequence and succession of the Soviet peace policy, and takes up the unity of the Party's foreign policy line with the domestic one. Its first chapter provides a sound analysis of the Leninist policy of peace and security during the first years of the existence of the Soviet state. It shows all the

*"60 Let Bor'by SSSR za Mir i Bezopasnost'" [60 Years of the Soviet Struggle for Peace and Security], Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 438 pages.

greatness and enormous international importance of the Peace Decree, Lenin's program for the establishing of a just and democratic system of interstate relations under the most difficult wartime conditions, the complex domestic and international situation of Soviet Russia surrounded by a hostile ring of imperialist states which considered the destruction of the Soviet Union as their most important mission. And only the unbending will of the party, the improbable heroism of the working class and the genius of V. I. Lenin provided the prerequisites for bringing the Soviet country out of the imperialist war, repelling the hostile invasion, and winning the right to existence side by side with the countries of the capitalist system.

Most important stages in the history of the Soviet state were the beginning of the peace truce and the zone of its recognition by the leading capitalist state (pp 43, 50-51). However, the balance of forces in the world remained such that the serious threat was not excluded of a second military intervention by the international forces of imperialism. Considering these circumstances, the authors have been able to show those political and diplomatic means and methods which provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to defend the peace and ensure the security of its frontiers. At the same time, they have succeeded in more fully disclosing the role and significance of the system of nonaggression treaties which was created by the efforts of the Soviet nation at the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's.

The reader will be attracted by the section on the struggle of the USSR for peace and security, against fascist aggression in the prewar years. It has been written on a sound documentary basis. Here new documents of the Soviet government and the governments of foreign states have been made available for scholars showing many nuances of the provocative policy of England and the other imperialist states on the eve of World War II. The work convincingly depicts the steadfast struggle of the USSR to create a collective security system in Europe and the Far East during the period when Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan were changing over to direct aggressive actions.

World events have been well treated in one of the most difficult periods for Soviet foreign policy, from the start of World War II to the attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR.

However, the balance of forces in the world at that time was such that the Soviet Union alone was unable to prevent a broadening of the new world war. Under the conditions of rejecting the collective security measures proposed by the USSR, and with the policy of connivance with fascist aggression by the "Munichers" who endeavored to direct it against the world's first socialist country, the concluding of a non-aggression agreement with Germany by the USSR was a diplomatic action of enormous importance for winning time and strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state (p 127).

The chapters devoted to the foreign policy of the USSR during the period of the Great Patriotic War and postwar world development are linked by a logical unity. They reflect all the complexity and scope of the titanic armed, military-political and diplomatic struggle of the Soviet state aimed at ensuring victory over the enemy, creating and strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition, achieving a truly democratic world and the development of peace-loving relations between states during the postwar times.

In taking up the decisive contribution of the Soviet Union to the defeat of the fascist aggressors, the authors rightly note: "The military, political and moral defeat of the shock forces of world reaction marked a sharp weakening of the imperialist camp. The balance of forces in the world changed in favor of socialism.... Soviet diplomacy, in benefiting from the profound contradictions between the imperialist states, prevented the creation of an united front of the capitalist countries. The foreign policy of the Soviet government to a significant degree contributed to the creation of the most favorable international conditions for the victorious completion of the war" (p. 189).

Of great interest is the sound treatment of the activities of Soviet diplomacy in the post-war period. The reader will find many interesting ideas related to an analysis of the formation of the world socialist system and its role in ensuring the peace and security of peoples under the conditions of the Cold War and in the struggle to check the nuclear and "conventional" arms race by the imperialist power (pp. 231-262).

Considering the defense right of the Soviet Union, the imperialist powers of the West, headed by the United States, urged a "crusade" against the USSR and the other countries of the world socialist system. The elimination of the U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons, the rapid increase in the economic potential of the Soviet Union, and the development of the other countries in the socialist system led to new positive shifts in the balance of military-political and economic forces in the world. As a result, if these changes on the world scene, the authors emphasize, the imperialist powers were forced to recognize that there was no other reasonable alternative but peaceful coexistence between the states of the two different socio-economic systems and the establishing of mutually advantageous political, economic and cultural cooperation between them (pp. 332-333).

The book accotes a special place to the program of the struggle for peace, disarmament and detente proposed by the 24th and developed by the 25th CPSU Congress, and which is now being successfully carried out in the struggle against the danger of a new world war deriving from the NATO countries headed by the United States. Here the primary restraining role is played by the coordinated peaceful foreign policy of the countries in the socialist commonwealth. However, the generally good book would have been more complete if the authors had been able to take up and disclose the initiatives presented to the United Nations in 1978 by the CPSU and the Soviet government on the problem of disarmament.

The book has been written on a high scientific and theoretical level, considering the demands of the CPSU Central Committee to improve ideological, political-indoctrination work and raise the ideological level of social disciplines. Its content shows the constancy of the peace-loving foreign policy of the world's first socialist country over the 60 years of its existence and development. And the USSR is unswervingly fighting for peace now when the imperialists of the United States, FRG, Great Britain and the other countries in the aggressive NATO bloc as well as the Chinese hegemonists are feverishly continuing the arms race, increasing international tension and the preparations for war against the USSR and the other countries in the socialist commonwealth.

"The entire course of world events... the experience of the Pact member states," emphasizes the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact member states, "convincingly show

that in the modern world each step ahead in the strengthening of international security, in developing the process of detente is achieved in the decisive struggle of peoples, all progressive and democratic forces against the imperialist policy of force and dictates, confrontation and the initiating of conflicts, the arms race, and outside interference into the internal affairs of states."²

The foreign policy course of the Soviet Union is perfectly clear and unchanging. "Our aim," said L. I. Brezhnev, "is a strong peace and security for the Soviet people, a lasting peace and peaceful coexistence between all states of the world. We will fight unceasingly to achieve this goal, sparing no forces or energy."³

The inflexibility of this course was reemphasized by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the June 1980 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: "Our course has been set and its truthfulness has been tested by practice. It has brought positive results both in the area of domestic and foreign policy."⁴

FOOTNOTES

¹ PRAVDA, 23 February 1980.

² Ibid., 16 May 1980.

³ Ibid., 3 May 1979.

⁴ Ibid., 24 June 1980.

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BOOK REVIEW: AVIATION AND SPACE MEDICINE

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[Review by Professor, Doctor of Military Sciences, Maj Gen Avn (Res) G. Pshenyanik
of the book "Chelovek, Nebo, Kosmos" (Man, Sky and Space) by A. N. Babiychuk,
Voenizdat, 1979, 270 pages]

[Text] The Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense has published an interesting book on the people in the most humane profession, the medical workers in aviation during the war years and the years of peaceful labor. Its author, Doctor of Medical Sciences, Professor, Maj Gen Med Serv A. N. Babiychuk, was a direct participant and witness to many important events covered by his memoirs. This makes it possible to the reader to become familiar in detail with all the stages in the development of the Air Force Medical Service in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the postwar years, and to trace its professional, friendly ties with the air force medical services of the countries in the socialist commonwealth.

The military biography of the author is inseparably linked with the 4th Air Army and its predecessor the Air Force of the Southern Front. His campaign record occurred in the ranks of these aviation operational formations, starting with the position of senior physician in the 654th Night Light Bomber Regiment and ending as the flagship physician of the 4th Air Army. And naturally, the remembrances of the war years are organized chiefly on the experience of medical support for the combat operations of the units and formations in the 4th Air Army.

Of great interest are the pages devoted to organizing the search for and rescue of pilots, the providing of medical aid to them and their evacuation in the event of a forced landing of the crippled aircraft on the water in the Kerch' Strait during the winter of 1943-1944.

In a good literary language, the author describes the comrades with whom he worked or came into contact in service. Skillfully and with psychological accuracy he describes the individual features of each of them in a professional situation, in the course of solving the specific tasks of medical support and under contemporary conditions.

The author shows great warmth for Chief Mar Avn K. A. Vershinin under whose leadership he worked during the war years and after it. Well shown are his humanity,

great courage and charm, firmness of character and strength of will, and the ability to approach a solving of difficult problems considering state interests.

In the book a great deal of space has been devoted to the activities of the air medics in the postwar period in the area of flight safety. Of particular interest are the chapters describing the history of space medicine in preparing man for space flights. A. N. Babiychuk met the chief spacecraft designer S. P. Korolev in the flight preparations and during the spacecraft launches. It has interesting things to say about the first conquerors of space, Yu. A. Gagarin, G. S. Titov and other Soviet cosmonauts.

With a general positive assessment of the reviewed book, it is essential to point out that it is not devoid of shortcomings which have a particular nature but do not reduce the merit of the work. There are individual inaccuracies in the description of combat episodes (pp 132, 133, 148 and 151), the time for carrying out certain organizational measures (pp 28, 63 and 68), and the beginning of the combat use of the IL-10 aircraft (p 177). There are inaccuracies in the giving of positions and military ranks of individuals (pp 46, 73 and 147).

As a whole, the work is successful and we feel that a demanding reader will value it properly.

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AIRBORNE TROOPS: 50TH ANNIVERSARY ARTICLE

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[Article under the heading of "Military History Dates" by Lt Gen K. Kurochkin,
Deputy Commander of the Airborne Troops: "The 50th Anniversary of the Airborne
Troops"]

[Text] On 2 August 1930, in the course of an experimental demonstration exercise of the air force of the Moscow Military District, at Voronezh, an airborne assault force was dropped consisting of a small group of paratroopers under the command of the military pilots L. G. Minov and Ya. D. Moshkovskiy. This small-scale experiment became the first attempt at introducing into military affairs a fundamentally new method of combat operations, the dropping of an airborne assault force for fighting in the enemy rear in cooperation with the troops advancing from the front. The day of the dropping of this force is considered to be the birthday of the Airborne Troops.

The first use of airborne forces in tactical exercises was preceded by profound theoretical research as well as the elaboration and production of parachute and special aviation equipment and weapons.

The decree approved in December 1932 of the USSR RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] on the deployment of airborne detachments marked the beginning to the broad development of the Airborne Troops. This document pointed out that the introduction of new aviation equipment as well as the successes achieved in the designing and building of equipment for the airborne transporting and dropping of troops, cargo and military equipment necessitated the formation of new combat subunits, units and formations of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] (air-motor-landing). For the purposes of developing airborne activities in the RKKA, the RVS decreed that on the basis of the air-motor-landing detachment of the Leningrad Military District a brigade would be established to train instructors for airborne landing activities and to work out operational and tactical standards. At the same time it was proposed that air-motor-landing detachments be formed by March 1933 in the Belorussian, Ukrainian, Moscow and Volga military districts. Each of these was to be assigned a squadron of heavy bomber aviation and which would have TB-1 or TB-3 aircraft.

Beginning in 1934, the use of large airborne assault forces became part of the permanent practice in the Red Army exercises. Thus, a paratrooper force consisting of

900 men was dropped in the autumn of 1934 in the troop maneuvers of the Belorussian Military District. Airborne forces were used particularly widely in the course of the exercises of the Kiev Military District in September 1935 during which the People's Commissar of Defense K. Ye. Voroshilov voiced great praise for the actions of the airborne forces. He pointed out that the success in combat and the operation could largely be achieved by using a mass airborne force. The military representatives of foreign armies present at the maneuvers were literally stunned by the mass dropping of paratroopers, since they had seen nothing of this sort previously.

The experience gained in the course of combat training and in exercises made it possible to thoroughly test out the theoretical views on the role and missions of airborne assault forces in combat and an operation, and to work out recommendations on the organization and improvement of the weapons of the airborne units and formations. In 1938, on the basis of the airborne landing units and formations existing at that time, six airborne landing brigades were formed, the 201st, 202d, 204th, 211th, 212th, and 214th. Their commanders, respectively, were: Col I. S. Bezugliyy, Maj M. I. Denisenko, Maj I. I. Bugarevich, Maj V. A. Glazunov, Maj I. I. Zatevakhin, and Col A. F. Levashev. In March-April 1941, a decision was taken to reorganize the airborne landing brigades into airborne landing corps. As a total five airborne landing corps were deployed, each numbering over 8,000 men.¹ Their commanders were: Maj Gen M. A. Usenko, F. M. Kharitonov, V. A. Glazunov, A. S. Zhadov and I. S. Bezugliyy. In June 1941, the Headquarters of the Airborne Troops was established.

The Airborne Troops underwent severe testing during the years of the Great Patriotic War at the beginning of which the airborne corps were in the stage of deployment and formation.

The difficult situation which developed during the first days of the war forced the Soviet command to use the basic forces of the airborne corps as rifle formations. At the same time a portion of the forces from these formations was used for carrying out missions in the enemy rear, where the airborne troops conducted reconnaissance, disrupted the command of enemy troops, destroyed its important objectives, and participated in combat as part of partisan detachments. For the purpose of effective command of the airborne troops, Hq SHC, at the end of August 1941 changed the Headquarters of the airborne troops into the Headquarters of the Commander of the Airborne Troops of the Red Army. The airborne corps were taken out of the operational fronts and put directly under the commander of the Airborne Troops. Only with permission from Headquarters could they be used for landing in the enemy rear or conducting combat operations as part of the fronts. Maj Gen V. A. Glasunov was appointed the first commander of the Airborne Troops.

In September 1941, they began to form 10 separate air transport squadrons and 5 separate air detachments which later were reduced to separate air-glider (2) and air transport (2) regiments. They were armed with the U-2, R-5, DB-3, TB-3 and PS-84 airplanes, and later the LI-2.

With the going over of the Soviet troops to a counteroffensive at Moscow at the end of 1941, conditions were created for the broader use of the Airborne Troops. As a total during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet command used more than 50 airborne assault forces of varying composition and purpose.² The largest

was the Vyaz'ma airborne operation (January-February 1942) with the landing of the IV Airborne Corps and other airborne units in the area of Vyaz'ma. This was carried out in the aim of assisting the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts in encircling and crushing the Vyaz'ma-Yukhnov grouping of Nazi troops. In the course of it over 10,000 men, 320 mortars, 541 machine guns and 300 antitank rifles were landed in the enemy rear.

An airborne force consisting of three airborne brigades was landed in the Dnepr Airborne Operation in September 1943. It was to assist the advancing troops of the Voronezh Front in crossing the Dnepr in the area of the Bukrinskiy Bend.

The airborne assault forces were widely used in the war against imperialist Japan. In particular, they were dropped into regions of Chanchun, Mukden (Shenyang), and Dal'niy (Daliang). Here the airborne troops by their bold actions protected industrial enterprises, railroads and many military installations, and accelerated the surrender of the Kwantung Army. The airborne troops inscribed many heroic pages in the glorious victory of our Armed Forces on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Over the period of the war, 26 divisions and several airborne brigades were sent from the Airborne Troops into the operational army. The airborne troops routed the enemy at Moscow and on the Northwestern Front, at Stalingrad and the Kursk Salient, on the right- and left-bank Ukraine, and in the battle of the Caucasus. They participated in the liberation of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Austria from the Nazi invaders, they stormed Berlin, and beat the enemy in the Far East in the course of the Manchurian Operation. The airborne troops made a particularly significant contribution to the victory at Stalingrad, where ten divisions were sent from the Airborne Troops, and they fought valiantly in the Vienna and Prague operations.

The motherland has highly regarded the services of the airborne troops. All the airborne formations during the war years became guards. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals were awarded orders and medals, and the most distinguished of them received the highest decoration of the motherland, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

It should be pointed out that in 1944, a number of organizational measures was carried out in the Airborne Troops. In particular, in October, on the basis of them, the Separate Guards Airborne Army was formed (commander, Lt Gen I. I. Zatevakhin). In December this was changed into the 9th Guards Army. The remaining units and the Headquarters of the Commander of the Airborne Troops became part of the Air Force.

A qualitatively new stage in the development of the Airborne Troops under the leadership of the Communist Party began in the postwar period. In June 1946, they were separated from the Air Force and put directly under the minister of defense. The position of the commander of the Airborne Troops was reestablished. Col Gen V. V. Glagolev was appointed the commander of the Airborne Troops. Subsequently, these troops, in various years, have been under the command of: Lt Gen A. F. Kazankin, Col Gen Avn S. I. Rudenko, Col Gen A. V. Gorbатов, Col Gen I. V. Tutarinov, and Gen Avn V. F. Margelov. At present this post is held by Col Gen D. S. Sukhorukov.

Along with carrying out organizational changes, the Communist Party and the Soviet government have given great attention to the rearming of the troops with more modern weapons and landing equipment.

Specially equipped aircraft such as the AN-12, AN-22 and IL-76 have begun to be used for the landing of the troops; these have made it possible to increase the combat capabilities of the Airborne Troops.

The changes which have occurred in the technical equipping of the Airborne Troops have necessitated a revision of the previous provisions on the use of airborne assault forces and the working out of new ones. At the beginning of the 1950's, there was further development of the theory of conducting airborne operations, and these came to be viewed as the basic form for using the Airborne Troops. It was felt that they could be a part of a front offensive operation or a naval landing operation, and sometimes be carried out independently in the interests of a strategic offensive operation.³

At present, the military feats of the fathers are being added to by the sons and grandsons of the veteran landing troops. For exemplary fulfillment of military duty, many soldiers have received governmental decorations, while the paratroopers P. G. Volokitin, M. S. Zinukov, N. V. Murav'yev and N. I. Kharlamov have been awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In celebrating their 50th anniversary and in welcoming the 26th CPSU Congress, the Airborne Troops are fully determined to achieve even greater successes in the mastery of military skills.

FOOTNOTES

¹"Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopaedia], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1976, p 289.

²VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1977, p 53.

³"50 Let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [50 Years of the USSR Armed Forces], Voenizdat, 1968, p 498.

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